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Abstract 
 
Many East Asian economies have experienced rapid economic growth since the early 
1960’s, with Singapore and Malaysia being two of the best performers.  A number of 
factors have contributed to these growth rates. They include export-orientated 
policies, capital investment, a market-friendly approach and an institutional 
regulatory framework that attracts foreign investors.  Another factor that is 
repeatedly referred to is the role of human capital in the form of formal and informal 
education.  Human capital has been the subject of much research at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. This thesis attempts to explore the relationship 
between economic growth in Singapore and Malaysia and human capital 
accumulation as measured by labour force educational attainment. 
 
This thesis uses two empirical models and data sets that are not available for most 
other developing economies to assess the link between education and the growth 
rates in both economies. The Seemingly Unrelated Regression approach and 
Seemingly Unrelated Time Series Equations are used. They find that that the returns 
to investment in human capital appear to be higher in Singapore compared to 
Malaysia. That is, in Malaysia investment in higher education does not have the same 
growth dividend in terms of raising domestic economic growth rates as it does in 
Singapore.   
 
The results of the empirical work also suggest that for a more developed economy 
investment in higher levels of education (poly-technical and university) produces 
stronger growth. Alternatively, for an economy that is less mature, such investments 
in higher education are less productive. The thesis then identifies nine points that 
may explain the disparities between Singapore and Malaysia. 
1. Singapore encouraged a close interaction between education and industry 
policies and the needs of the private sector.  This was not so evident in 
Malaysia. 
2. Singapore has maintained high levels of investment in vocational and technical 
education; again this was not so much the situation in Malaysia. 
 xv 
 
3. The capacity of Singapore to attract and maintain highly qualified and 
motivated teaching staff at all levels of education by offering attractive 
remuneration and conditions.  
4. Singapore mandated the use of English as the language of instruction at all 
educational levels, compared to the Malaysian emphasis on the Malay 
language. 
5. Singapore has long been recognised as having high quality and systematic 
policy-making processes as well as competent government agencies. This was 
not the situation in Malaysia. 
6. In Singapore direct foreign investment consistently provided an impetus for 
better domestic and industry-relevant education and training, both on and off 
the job.  This effect was much lower in Malaysia. 
7. Singapore is very open to international trade. This exposed the economy to the 
spread of new technologies, as well as new products and services. Malaysia 
was far less open and so this diffusion was not as uniform. 
8. A further factor that advantaged Singapore was the quality and timing of 
specific government interventions in the domestic economy so as to maximise 
efficiency.  This feature also allowed Singapore to reduce special interest group 
rent-seeking.  
9. A final factor that disadvantaged Malaysia was the role that ethnic and racial 
considerations played in the policy-making process. These were clearly absent 
in Singapore. 
 
Having identified these points it would be instructive for developing economies to 
follow some of the lessons from the Singaporean experience. Specifically, education 
policy cannot be created independently of the overall policy-making process.  
Moreover there must be a willingness to efficiently allocate resources to education. 
This allocation should be based on the relevant stage of development.  Finally, non-
economic criteria such as ethnic and social issues should be minimised as 
considerations when education policies are being framed. 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 General Motivation 
 
The East Asian economies have experienced high economic growth rates since the 
1960s. There has been much focus on explaining this phenomenon, perhaps since the 
World Bank described this as The East Asian Economic Miracle in 1993. In the 
period since 1960, Singapore and Malaysia have both recorded high levels of 
economic growth. Their sudden growth from being relatively underdeveloped into 
being newly industrialising economies has been the subject of much research and 
analysis. A range of key performance indicators, including Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), Human Development Index and GDP per 
capita, all point to the rapid development of the economies of both countries. While 
Singapore has been regarded by most as one of the Asian Tigers, the group of four 
high-performing Asian economies, along with South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong, Malaysia has been viewed as the economy in the next group down. Using 
some different data sets to those previously used, this thesis attempts to explore some 
of the factors that may explain the variation in growth rates between Singapore and 
Malaysia over the period of 1975 to 2006. Therefore, this thesis will examine two 
main questions: 
 
1. What has been the relationship between changes in labour force educational 
attainment levels and the growth rates in real GDP per capita over this 
period? 
2. To what extent have other factors impacted on the growth rate differences in 
both economies? 
 
The majority of research has attempted to identify the major factors that have 
enabled such growth to be achieved in a relatively short time period, and one of these 
factors is the level of human capital. There are various measures of human capital 
that have been used in research going back to the work of Schultz (1961). These 
include the level of health, formal education levels, on-the-job training, adult 
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education and labour force movements so as to identify better employment 
opportunities. In this thesis the primary focus is on labour force educational 
attainment as a measure of human capital. Assuming that all economies possess an 
initial stock of human capital, it has been traditionally argued that education or 
related activities, such as improved levels of labour force educational attainment, will 
increase that initial stock level. It is then assumed that an increase in the stock of 
human capital should lead to an increase in the economic growth rate. This final 
point has been the subject of much discussion and debate with various studies 
producing a variety of results. 
 
These variations are examined in the literature review in Chapter 2. However, it may 
be useful to provide three such examples of this point. Firstly, studies such as Romer 
(1986, 1990) and Dougherty and Jorgenson (1996) support the view that the stock of 
human capital has a positive effect on growth. Secondly, studies such as Hanushek 
and Kimko (2000) suggest that labour force quality differences between economies 
are important to growth differences. In turn, labour force quality is related to overall 
schooling. However these quality differences are not necessarily related to the 
volume of resources allocated to schooling in various economies. Labour force 
quality is not necessarily determined by the total level of public- and private-sector 
resource allocations to education. Thirdly, studies such as Bosworth and Collins 
(2003) have only been able to identify a very negligible association between 
increases in global growth as measured by output per worker and increases in human 
capital as measured by education at various levels. All of the previous studies have 
been based on cross-country growth regressions using extremely wide cross-country 
data sets that are often subject to questions of data reliability. This thesis uses a 
different approach based around Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and 
Seemingly Unrelated Time Series Equations (SUTSE), which is presented in Chapter 
8. 
 
In this thesis economic growth has been measured by the growth rate in real GDP per 
capita expressed in terms over the period. The empirical results from Chapter 8 
indicate that there has been a significant growth gap between Singapore and 
Malaysia. A number of possible factors have been identified in trying to explain this 
gap. The primary factor is the level of the labour force human capital in relation to 
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post-secondary and/or tertiary educational attainment. This is particularly the case for 
Singapore and less significant in the case of Malaysia, but to identify this variable in 
isolation is inadequate. This educational level has been important in the Singaporean 
economy because it has been the outcome of a series of planned educational reforms 
and institutional changes. The latter have produced an educational system in the 
technical, vocational and university sectors that is closely linked and responsive to 
ongoing industry needs. Further, educational reforms in the first two decades after 
independence aimed to provide universal access for all residents of a minimum of ten 
years primary and secondary education combined. This was to minimise the level of 
educational wastage during this period. These elements are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
The educational reforms that were determined primarily by economic considerations 
in Singapore were not replicated in Malaysia. While Singapore recognised the 
importance of English language acquisition to facilitate access to new information as 
well as global markets, Malaysian policymakers attempted to impose the Malay 
language on all ethnic groups as vehicle for achieving national unity. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, educational policy-making in Malaysia was very much seen as part of an 
overall policy thrust aimed at removing racial and ethnic inequalities. The 
introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1970 was aimed at remedying the plight 
of the Bumiputra (son of the land) majority in terms of income and wealth 
disparities. As part of these reforms educational quotas were introduced at the 
university level. Such a system may have retarded opportunities for wider labour 
force educational attainment, especially for the non-Malay Chinese and Indian 
minorities within the population. Another significant difference has been the 
emphasis in Singapore on recruiting the very best graduates to teach in all levels of 
the education sector and pay them at levels commensurate with private-sector 
professionals such as engineers, medical practitioners, and lawyers. This was not 
evident in the Malaysian education system. The net effect was to widen the quality of 
instruction gaps as well as the level of industrial and vocational experience that could 
be offered to students in the Singaporean education system in contrast to that of 
Malaysia. This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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A further factor that differentiates Malaysia from Singapore was the role of 
Malaysian public-sector enterprises. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
While Singapore avoided forming large public-sector enterprises that were directly 
involved in industrial production, Malaysia was more proactive in such activities. In 
contrast, Singapore’s primary focus was on the formation of government technocratic 
agencies that were to be key policy-making units with examples being the Economic 
Development Board and the Vocational and Industrial Training Board. The 
Malaysian approach saw industrialisation hampered by bureaucratic constraints 
while the Singaporean approach aimed to produce a business-friendly environment 
for the private sector. Moreover in the Malaysian policy-making process there has 
been an adherence to criteria that have been based more on social and political 
factors. In the Singaporean context policies aimed at improving labour market skills 
and training were more clearly and consistently linked to the needs of the private 
sector in both the manufacturing and service sectors. 
 
In relation to the private sector another clear difference between the two economies 
has been the respective attitudes towards foreign investment. In the case of Singapore 
there has been a consistent willingness to maintain an open and free-market 
orientation towards capital flows. As a result there has been a continual flow of 
foreign capital into the economy as multinational corporations have established 
operations in the city-state. This pattern has had a positive effect on the levels of 
education and skills that the Singapore labour force has developed and this is 
discussed and explained in detail in Chapter 6. Alternatively, Malaysia has 
experienced stages during this time period when it maintained levels of protection to 
allow domestic firms to develop in the style of an infant-industry model. In addition 
Malaysia has imposed currency and capital controls in order to stop so-called 
speculation in the domestic financial market as was the case during the Asian 
Currency Crisis of 1997/98. The latter is discussed in Chapter 3. These policies have 
contributed to lower levels of foreign investment in comparison to Singapore. As 
most research into Asian economic development indicates, this will inevitably retard 
economic growth. 
 
The respective levels of openness are also considered in both Chapters 3 and 5. The 
relatively high levels of openness in Singapore compared to Malaysia is considered 
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in terms of access and exposure to new goods and services as well as new 
technologies that are embodied in imports of capital, plants, machinery and 
equipment. The static and dynamic gains from trade that can be realised from such 
openness are explored in relation to the skills and experience that increased exposure 
provide for the domestic labour force. Higher levels of openness provides both the 
private and public sector with greater incentives to provide higher levels of education 
and training in the vocational, polytechnic, and university, both on-the-job and off-
the job. The net result should be improved productivity in those sectors that are more 
exposed to global and regional trade. This appears to be particularly evident in the 
Singaporean case. 
 
A final factor that has emerged from the research into both economies has been the 
nature of government intervention across both economies. Singaporean policy 
settings regarding their macroeconomic, labour market, industrial and education 
policies have been made with a focus on improving comparative advantage. 
Adopting a so-called market-friendly view, Singapore developed a well-paid public-
sector technocratic bureaucracy that attracted the some of the best and brightest 
university graduates. This was to facilitate the design of policies that could solve 
particular problems based on benchmarks. Selective interventions in the economy by 
the government were limited, but when they did occur they were explicitly aimed at 
reaching specific targets. A good example was the intervention in wage 
determination in the late 1970s so as to move Singapore to a higher wage rate 
manufacturer. While the Singaporean government was prepared to be proactive in 
using taxation and other policies to attract direct foreign investment, it was not 
prepared to jeopardise the overall budget results using these policy initiatives. 
Frequently these latter policies used clear price incentives to efficiently allocate 
resources. In contrast Malaysian policy making varied from one five-year planning 
cycle to another. The motivations for policy changes were often unclear and highly 
influenced by non-economic considerations. Further, over this period, the Malaysian 
public sector was often resistant to reform and unaccountable. Public service pay and 
conditions, apart from those at the very senior levels, were usually often well below 
those of their counterparts in the private sector, exposing it to corruption allegations. 
As a result the quality of the decision-making processes and the implementation of 
policy have been low and have attracted international criticism (Siddiquee 2002). 
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Finally, entry into the Malaysian public service was also subject to ethnic quotas, 
which may have adversely impacted upon the relative quality of entrants. 
 
From a structural perspective, the main objectives of this thesis are to address the 
effects of human capital accumulation as represented by labour force educational 
attainment for both Singapore and Malaysia over the period of 1975 to 2006. In 
essence this thesis will conduct an empirical investigation into two main research 
questions as follows: 
 
1. What has been the relationship between changes in labour force educational 
attainment levels and the growth rates in real GDP per capita over this 
period? 
2. To what extent have other factors impacted on the growth rate differences in 
both economies? 
 
Once these two questions have been addressed, they will give an indication as to the 
sorts of policies (educational and other) that may lead to high rates of economic 
growth. 
 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a survey of the relevant 
literature in three main sections. The first section presents the main developments in 
human capital theory over the period since the 1950s. This section also examines the 
relationship between human capital and the various measures that represent human 
capital including formal education. The various proxies that have been used to 
represent human capita in the previous theoretical and empirical research are 
considered. The second section addresses the character of human capital as a stock 
and/or a flow variable. The various methods used to calculate the stock of human 
capital are reviewed. The third section looks at the relevant literature on the 
relationship between human capital, education and economic growth in the East 
Asian context. 
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Chapter 3 presents an economic history of the Malaysian economy since becoming a 
federation in 1957. It identifies the key characteristics of the economy from its 
colonial past and its movement to become an independent nation-state. While 
Malaysia appeared to follow an import-substitution industrialisation policy in the 
early years after independence, it eventually changed to an industrial policy based on 
exports. This chapter also considers the role of ethnic and racial imbalances between 
the Malay majority and the Chinese and Indian minorities in framing economic 
policy. It reviews the key policy approaches adopted in the period after 1980 when 
there was more of an emphasis on industrialisation via heavy industry. Finally it 
examines the impact of the Asian Currency Crisis on Malaysian economic policy in 
the period after 1997. 
 
Chapter 4 presents an examination of Malaysian education policy since becoming a 
federation. It considers the original educational system left by the British 
administration in 1957 and the associated changes that were initiated by 
policymakers with a focus on using education policy as a method of achieving 
national unity. A major motivation for these policies was the racial riots of 1969. 
Educational policy was very much aimed at replacing English within the domestic 
education system with Malay. This policy was explicitly aimed at assisting the 
Bumiputra majority. Finally this chapter considers the relationship between 
education policy and economic objectives. 
 
Chapter 5 presents an economic history of Singapore since independence in 1965. 
While it had previously been a member of the Federation of Malaya over the period 
of 1963 to 1965, it did not become a sovereign state until it left the federation in 
August 1965. This chapter traces the transformation of the economy from a trading 
and maritime centre as a British colony to one that concentrated initially on labour-
intensive manufacturing. Singaporean economic development is examined with a 
focus on the role of government agencies in planning for discrete patterns of 
industrial development. Agencies such as the Economic Development Board are 
examined in terms of their role in attracting foreign investment. In contrast Malaysia 
attracted much lower levels of foreign direct investment both as a share of GDP and 
as a share of gross capital formation over the period of 1970 to 2006 (Ng 2006). A 
further factor that is identified is the high level of domestic savings that Singapore 
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has been able to achieve through vehicles such as the Central Provident Fund. No 
equivalent entity operates in the Malaysian economy for mobilising domestic savings 
 
Chapter 6 presents an examination of Singaporean education policy and influences 
since independence. An ongoing theme of this chapter is the close relationship 
between educational policy adjustments and economic policy. Discrete phases of 
educational reforms are identified that correspond with various stages of Singaporean 
economic development. A strong focus was on the introduction of English language 
instruction across all levels of formal education. This was clearly associated with the 
recognition that English was the key language for global business. Another 
characteristic was the increased emphasis on technical and vocational education in 
the period after 1965. As well as educational reforms, there was increased investment 
in post-secondary and tertiary education in the form of polytechnic and university 
spending. Finally, this chapter examines the relationship between educational 
offerings at the secondary and post-secondary levels and the private sector in terms 
of increased levels of collaboration. 
 
Chapter 7 presents and analyses the data used in the thesis. The various data items 
are defined and explained. The aggregate time series national accounts data for both 
economies is shown in both current and constant prices. It is also shown in terms of 
USD. All data is also presented in terms of annual percentage changes. Given the 
focus of this thesis on labour force educational attainment, labour force data and 
population data are provided. Other data categories that are examined in detail 
include investment, government expenditure and trade variables, again in both 
current and constant prices, as well as being expressed in USD. Finally the various 
levels of labour force educational attainment are defined and explained. These levels 
are also expressed as annual changes in each labour force variable. The data on 
which these levels are based comes from annual labour force surveys conducted by 
the relevant government agencies in both economies since 1975. 
 
Chapter 8 presents and discusses the econometrics models used to analyse the data 
provided in Chapter 7. The SUR is used as well as the SUTSE approach. Both 
techniques are used to assess the strength of the relationships between labour force 
educational attainment variables and real GDP per capita growth rates in the two 
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economies. The models show that Singapore has generally outperformed Malaysia, 
while much of the rest of this thesis aims to explain this result. 
 
Finally a discussion of the research and some concluding remarks are made in 
Chapter 9. The final chapter lists ten factors that could explain the superior 
performance of Singapore’s economy relative to that of Malaysia. These points are 
clearly related back to the respective education policies applied in both economies. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In order to appreciate the impact of labour force educational attainment on domestic 
economic activity it is necessary to more broadly examine the role of human capital 
in relation to economic growth in Singapore and/or Malaysia. This can be measured 
by the rate of real GDP growth or the growth rate of real GDP per capita or real GDP 
per member of the labour force, or any other relevant key performance indicator. 
 
In the case of both Singapore and Malaysia there appears to be a consensus that 
investment in human capital was not an insignificant player in their respective levels 
of growth (Eggertsson 2004; Jajri 2007; Lim, Chong Yah 2008). Most studies of 
economic growth in both economies have traditionally used growth accounting 
techniques to estimate the contributions of the various key elements such as labour, 
capital, education, and total factor productivity. Whilst capital and labour inputs have 
been recognised as the main drivers of economic growth in both economies over the 
period from 1974 to 2006, there has been a general consensus that both economies 
needed to increase their performances with respect to both education and total factor 
productivity if their respective economic growth rates are to be maintained, if not 
substantially, improved. This assumes a disembodiment of human capital from the 
production function approach. 
 
The idea of human capital (and in turn human capital accumulation) evolved from 
the recognition that physical capital in the form of investment goods was inadequate 
for explaining economic growth. Many diverse social indicators, such as educational 
enrolments and life expectancy, have historically been combined to represent a joint 
concept, namely: human capital. On many occasions, human capital is implicitly 
referred to as both formal and informal education. Yet, it can also contain factors 
such as the costs of raising children, health costs, and a much more elusive item: 
ability or talent. At the micro level, ‘an individual's marketable human capital can be 
defined to be the annualized value of the difference between the individual's wage 
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and the wage for the rawest of raw labor’ (Pritchett 1996). However at the 
macroeconomic level, it has posed a number of problems in terms of definitions, 
estimation and measurement, to name three main aspects. 
 
Section 2.2 of this chapter will examine the historical developments associated with 
human capital theory. Section 2.3 considers the nature of human capital as a stock 
variable. Section 2.4 looks at the alternative methods of calculating human capital in 
relation to income and/or cost approaches. Section 2.5 examines a joint approach to 
the measurement of human capital. Section 2.6 surveys the literature regarding the 
role of human capital and East Asian economic growth since 1960. 
 
2.2 Historical Development of Human Capital Theory 
 
In this study, whilst the overall focus is upon human capital, a more refined 
examination is going to be made on the role of labour force educational attainment 
specifically and the associated overall economic performance in both Singapore and 
Malaysia using data provided by annual labour force surveys carried out in each 
economy by the relevant government agencies. These are the Reports on the Labour 
Force Survey of Singapore conducted by the Ministry of Manpower in Singapore, in 
the case of the Singaporean economy, and the Labour Force Survey Reports of 
Malaysia, conducted by the Department of Statistics in Malaysia, in the case of the 
Malaysian economy. Both reports refer to various issues in chronological sequence 
over the period of 1975 to 2006. This chapter will look at various aspects of the 
development of human capital theory and its specific application to East Asian 
economies including Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
It would not be unreasonable to say that human capital theory escalated in popularity 
in relation to historical research after the increased attention to growth theory in the 
1950s and in turn, the human capital theory developed by Mincer (1958), Becker 
(1964) and Schultz (1971). Schultz, in fact, developed a range of discrete strategies 
that should be adopted by developing economies in order to improve human resource 
development ranging from increased levels of on-the-job training, including 
expanded numbers of traditional apprenticeships arranged at the firm level, to 
increased levels of formally organised education at the elementary, secondary and 
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higher levels, respectively. Further, Meier (1970) suggested that any program of 
domestic human resource development must include the dual aims of developing 
skills on one hand and providing productive employment opportunities for non-
utilised or underutilised manpower on the other. Both stem from investment in 
people in the form of education and training, which are known to be institutional 
mechanisms for enhancing people’s knowledge, skills and capabilities. 
 
However, economic historians have used human capital, education, or skills in their 
research. The concept has usually been referred to as either literacy or skills (see 
Cipolla 1969; Houston 1983). However, following the human capital revolution in 
the 1960s, historical research went into two directions. Research into pre-modern 
economies continued to use pre-existing proxies in the absence of other options. In 
more contemporary research examining industrialised economies effectively similar 
proxies have been applied by both economic historians and economists.    
 
Initially there was a general view that education in terms of enhancing domestic 
human capital levels had a beneficial and positive effect upon economic growth. 
Research by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Barro (1991), as well as those by 
Hanushek and Kim (1995), Temple (2001), Krueger and Lindahl (2001), Gemmell 
(1996) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1992) have all demonstrated a positive 
relationship between the quantity of education and economic growth. The standard 
approach has been to measure education quantity in terms of enrolment ratios at 
various school levels. The latter include Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro 
(1991), Levine and Renelt (1992). Alternatively, other studies have used the average 
years of schooling see for example, Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) and Krueger 
and Lindahl (2001). Some others such as Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Romer 
(1990) have used the adult literacy rate. 
 
In addition, other studies have examined the levels of education expenditure and its 
impact upon educational outcomes, either concurrently and/or independently. Several 
empirical studies have also found that education expenditure has had a positive and 
significant impact on outcomes (Baldacci et al. 2003; Gupta et al. 2002; 
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos 2004; Anand & Martin 1993). Baldacci et al. (2003) and 
Gupta et al. (2002) have also found that the effect of spending in education is greater 
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than in health. A number of other studies, in contrast, have found a limited education 
spending effect on educational outcomes (see Flug et al. 1998; Mingat & Tan 1998; 
Mingat & Tan 1992; Noss 1991). 
 
In the second half of the nineties a new round of empirical papers generated 
relatively disappointing results on the effects of education and more specifically, 
schooling, upon aggregate productivity. These included Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994), Islam (1995), Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) and Filmer and Pritchett 
(1997). 
 
In contrast to previous studies, which relied primarily on cross-sectional data to 
analyse the determinants of growth over long periods, most of the latter papers used 
pooled data at relatively short frequencies. They also primarily relied upon either 
panel techniques or on the use of differenced specifications to control for unobserved 
country heterogeneity. Hence the educational variables in these regressions were 
often found to be either insignificant or had a negative effect on either GDP growth 
rates and/or productivity, respectively. 
 
In addition, many of these studies were characterised by significant measurement 
problems associated with the use of cross-sectional data. This has been recognised by 
De la Fuente and Doménech (2002, 2006) amongst others. Of equal concern to 
researchers in many of the studies, is that it was not known how the primary data was 
collected, how reliable it was or how consistent it may prove to be. This has even 
been the case with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization data as demonstrated by Behrman and Rosenzweig (1994, 1999). 
 
Alternatively, there have been a number of studies that have produced only a 
relatively weak association between education quantity in a generic sense and 
growth. In fact, both Bils and Klenow (2000) and Pritchett (2001) found that there 
was no significant relation between the quantity of schooling and economic growth. 
 
It is notable that more recent research into this area has now moved from 
concentrating upon the quantity of human capital to the quality of human capital as 
the focus of research. Studies by Barro (1999), Hanushek and Kimko (2000), 
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Hanushek and Kim (1995) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) have all examined 
various measures of educational quality. The previous studies of Hanushek and 
Kimko, Hanushek and Kim and Hanushek and Woessmann constructed a measure of 
labour force quality based on the acquisition of discrete cognitive skills in 
mathematics and science. The resultant measures of the quality of education are 
usually achieved by taking a simple average of the mathematics and science scores 
over international tests. These are then interpreted as a proxy for the average 
educational performance of the whole labour force. The results of the previous 
studies suggested that this specific proxy for educational quality has had a significant 
and robust influence on economic growth. 
 
Alternatively, Barro (1999) using data on student scores on internationally 
comparable examinations to measure schooling quality, found a positive relation 
between the level of schooling quality and economic growth. Various test scores 
have generally been used as the relevant proxies for educational quality in many of 
the contemporary empirical studies. However, other studies, such as those by Barro 
and Lee (2001), have used a range of proxies for quality based upon relevant school 
resources such as class sizes, schooling life expectancy, and teacher salaries. Their 
specific results would suggest that smaller class sizes, extended schooling life 
expectances and higher teacher incomes would all lead to improved educational 
outcomes. 
 
Other definitions used by economic historians looking at pre-modern economies 
have been very diverse. Nakamura’s research into pre-industrial Japan is a useful 
example.  He defined human capital broadly as ‘labour skills, managerial skills, and 
entrepreneurial and innovative abilities-plus such physical attributes as health and 
strength’ (1981, p. 265). Alternatively economic historians such as Newland and San 
Segundo (1996) in examining colonial South American economies, used items such 
as the physical capacities and talents when trying to measure the human capital of 
slaveholdings.  These researchers viewed human capital as the mix of ability and 
education of an individual and, conversely, as the costs of physically raising a child 
or its health. However other more quantitatively inclined researchers (Sandberg 
1979; Rosés 1998; Reis 2005) have provided more specific definitions of human 
capital.  Therefore the relevant human capital measures have been based on relative 
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money wage rates of skilled workers such as shipwrights, metal-workers, carpenters 
and bricklayers compared with unskilled workers and labourers. 
 
This measure, which includes factors such as on-the-job training and experience, is 
the same as used by Rosés (1998) while Reis (2005) and Sandberg (1979) ignore 
items such as ability and experience, by concentrating on literacy and to a lesser 
extent numeracy. As growth theory emerged and the human capital proxies widened 
in the 1950s and 1960s, historical research looking at early industrialising economies 
produced new estimates of human capital.  These studies refined the scope of human 
capital proxies, in order to better match the proxies developed by economists.  They 
were also constructed so to better use available data. Numerous examples of such 
analyses exist. For example, Ljungberg (2002) looked at the relationship between 
education and growth in Sweden over the period 1867 to 1995 by using enrolment 
data and education expenditure. However before the 1950s, economic historians 
specified human capital in a very broad fashion when conducting their research.  
Other examples included, Nunes (2003) who examined the cyclical behaviour of 
government expenditure on education in Portugal between 1852 and 1995.  Another 
example was Marchand and Thélot (1997) who developed an index of human capital 
for France over a two hundred year period.  This was based upon the number of 
economically active persons and a labour quality proxy for labour productivity 
determined by the years of formal education. 
 
The various proxies or estimates that were used to measure human capital were 
undoubtedly better than their precursors.  However they were not well connected to 
economic theory. For example, Broadberry and Crafts (1992) used earnings per 
employee as a proxy for human capital per worker. This study also examined the 
causality of the relationship between wages and productivity as to whether any 
endogenous relationship applied.  For example do higher wages suggest the existence 
of higher productivity? Or does higher productivity suggest higher wages? They also 
looked at the relative impact of trade union membership on wage levels and the 
extent to which the latter could distort human capital measures. A more fundamental 
problem that follows is the interpretation of these proxy variables such as money 
wages. Should they be viewed as proxies for stock or flow variables? According to 
human capital theory this should be seen as a flow variable since it neither keeps 
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track of all investments in human capital nor of all possible future extra earnings. 
Nevertheless, it incorporates education, ability and on-the-job training, which also 
affect wages.  This in turn has raised a wider question when school enrolment ratios 
are used as a proxy.  For example, do these variables try to capture the flow of 
investment in human capital or its stock? 
 
2.3 Human Capital as a Stock Variable 
More recent research into human capital has produced human capital definitions that 
have been much more specific and refined compared to previous economic and 
historical research into pre-industrial periods. This is not surprising given the focus 
that most contemporary economists have had on identifying and explaining the 
growth process as opposed to overall economic development.  In addition, in the last 
three decades the amount of data in this area has dramatically increased with a 
number of contemporary data sets being developed. Irrespective of the human capital 
definitions being used, it is not a simple task to collect and calculate a human capital 
dataset.  To convert any such dataset into a meaningful monetary variable requires 
significant effort.  Given that most recent research has examined cross-country 
datasets across both developed and developing economies, data availability has been 
a major consideration.  To proxy human capital as a stock item, the education stock 
approach has been the preferred method.   
   
The range of human capital proxies have been primarily based on various aspects of 
formal education such as literacy and numeracy rates as well as enrolment ratios.  
The latter have been used to show changes in human capital over various time 
periods. The use of human capital proxies became relevant with the application of 
growth accounting exercises.  These aimed at identifying the relative contributions of 
inputs such as physical and human capital investment as opposed to productivity 
increases in the form of total factor productivity, to growth rates in GDP.  This was 
particularly apparent in the neo-classical models such as Solow (1957).  Investment 
in human capital in the form of labour was enhanced by including parameters such as 
age and education (Denison 1967). The latter was used to explain the heterogeneous 
character of labour inputs.  However, these approaches while accounting for human 
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capital inputs did not explain the nature of the causality process between such 
proxies and output growth (Griliches 1997). 
 
As a result of the data constraints imposed upon them, the earlier research projects 
were hampered by the relatively short periods for which relevant data was available.  
This also applied to the number of economies that were disadvantaged in relation to 
the time periods covered and range of economies for which data was available. 
However with the advent of large data sets such as the Penn World Tables (Summers 
& Heston 1988, 1991), there was a large increase in the range of cross-country 
empirical work that attempted to explain cross-country growth performances since 
the early 1960’s. Given this progress it was easier to represent human capital with 
proxies such as school enrolment ratios and adult literacy rates.  These proxies were 
viewed as more quantifiably legitimate (Azariadis & Drazen 1990; Romer 1990).  
 
The latter proxies had some theoretical problems. Firstly, school enrolment ratios are 
a flow variable, and not a stock variable. A second problem was the nature of the 
school enrolment ratio which relates to that section of the population who are outside 
of the labour force.  A third problem is that adult literacy is almost exclusively a by-
product of primary education.  As such, it does not take into account other 
contributors to human capital such as work experience and on the-job-training.   
Given these problems, new human capital proxies emerged such as the average years 
of education in the adult population, either for male and/or total. These new proxies 
were seen as theoretically superior in the mid-1990s and early 2000s (Benhabib & 
Spiegel 1994; Islam 1995; Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1995; Barro 1997, Barro & Jong-
Wha 2001; Temple 1999; Krueger & Lindahl 2001). 
 
The choice of average years of education presented a number of challenges for 
human capital research.  There are three methods of calculating the average years of 
schooling.  Firstly, economists such as Lau et al (1991); and Nehru et al. (1995) have 
used a perpetual inventory method. To estimate average years of education, factors 
such as enrolment levels, mortality and repeaters are aggregated. The second method 
is the projection method (Kyriacou 1991). The benchmark is the average years of 
schooling from the mid-1970s census data. Logged enrolment ratios were then 
applied to estimate average labour force years of schooling into the future. Kyriacou 
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(1991) estimated a regression relationship. The latter indicated a strong relationship 
between average years of schooling and logged enrolment rates. This result has been 
questioned by a number of growth macroeconomists. The final method is referred to 
as the attainment census method. Census data is used to directly provide educational 
attainment data (Psacharopoulos & Arriagada, 1986).  Then average years of 
education for the working-age population are calculated. 
 
The final method is compromised by the relatively small number of completed 
censuses and therefore census data.  Cesnsuses are often only conducted every ten 
years, especially in developing economies.   Attempts by economists such as Barro 
and Lee (1993) to expand the available data by interpolation techniques have 
attracted some criticism.   Portela et al. (2004) have suggested that the perpetual 
inventory method based on enrolment ratios tend to underestimate educational 
attainment. The latter was criticised due to the assumption that mortality is not 
correlated with education. 
 
However these methods should be treated with care and caution.  The more 
contemporary proxies including average years of education are not uniform.  Using a 
wider concept of human capital that incorporates all types of knowledge and skills 
that will contribute to the production process, then average years of education may 
be inadequate.  For example, it assumes that all levels of education will produce a 
uniform increase in domestic human capital if additional years are consumed.  
Another difficulty is that while other inputs such as physical capital can be expressed 
in monetary units, human capital proxies are not.  Hence comparisons across 
different economies can be problematic.  Finally, attempts to estimate human capital 
stock at specific points in time, following the educational stock method, have been 
very difficult, if not almost impossible, especially for developing economies. 
 
2.4 Alternative Methods of Calculating the Stock of Human Capital: 
The Income and Cost Approaches 
 
In order to separate the stock and accumulation effects in relation to various human 
capital proxies, economists have developed specific and refined methods for 
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estimating the stock of human capital.  Usually, they have been categorised into two 
main approaches.  They are termed: the income-based approach (or prospective) and 
the cost-based approach (or retrospective). 
 
The cost-based approach method includes all relevant costs of forming human capital 
into account retrospectively.  This method requires that various dimensions of human 
capital have to be calculated separately. These include items such as education, 
finance, food and health. As a result this method is often much narrower than the 
alternative prospective method. Engel (1883) was the first to apply a cost-based 
method when he estimated human capital from the costs of bringing up children to 
the age of 25 but ignoring the time value of money. His argument, was given the 
difficulties in estimating future earnings or income flows, the costs of actually 
producing human capital may be a more reliable basis for any estimate as opposed to 
any income-based option. The cost-based approach remained very popular up to the 
1930s (Dagum & Slottje 2000). Identifiable weaknesses associated with this 
approach were the exclusion of all social costs, including health and nutritional 
factors, as well as any depreciation (or appreciation) of the domestic human capital 
stock due to changing education systems.  
 
Further extensions took place in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Schultz (1971) and 
Machlup (1962) refined Engel’s method. Their work quantified human capital so that 
‘the depreciated value of the dollar amount spent on those items defined as 
investments in human capital is equal to the stock of human capital’ (Le, Gibson & 
Oxley 2003, p. 274). Another application of the cost-based approach was developed 
by Kendrick (1976).  This proved to be well-regarded (see Pyo & Jin 2000). The 
Kendrick approach was based on a human capital estimate for total human capital 
stock for the United States over the period 1929 to 1969. This method involved the 
estimation of all tangible costs (rearing a child until age fourteen) and the intangible 
costs (health, safety, education and the opportunity costs of students attending 
school).  Others such as Eisner (1985) have also used this approach. This process 
was made easier by the availability of relevant and reliable data for the US economy 
over the appropriate time period, in contrast to many other economies including 
many in Asia.  The latter constraint applied to both Singapore and Malaysia. 
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The alternative to the cost-based approach has been the income based approach.  It is 
also called the retrospective method. This method is based on estimates of future 
earnings.  Conceptually this approach reflects the idea that human capital embodied 
in individuals can be valued. This valuation process equates to the total income that 
an individual’s lifetime of work could produce in the labour market (Le, Gibson & 
Oxley 2003, p. 273). While this method was popular in the first half of the twentieth 
century (De Foville 1905; Barriol 1910; Dublin & Lotka 1930), it eventually lost its 
popularity in favour of the cost-based approach after the 1940s.  However it was used 
in two studies by Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) and Macklem (1997) in relation to 
the USA and Canada, respectively. 
 
The empirical work generally suggests the cost-based methods generate lower 
estimates of human capital than the income-based methods.   This discrepancy can be 
explained by the elements included under each method.  Under the income-based 
approach all additional earnings derived from human capital are included.  Under the 
cost-based approach only aggregate investments in human capital are included.  As 
the former method includes wider dimensions of human capital such as experience 
and ability, it is likely to be higher. Conversely not all extra earnings will be 
produced exclusively by human capital under the cost-based approach. Regardless of 
the method used problems can be found in both.  In the cost-based method the 
relationship between human capital investment and output quality is not identified. 
 
Another problem for these estimates of human capital stock is the use of investment 
as the basis for the retrospective method as opposed to using output based on market 
value.  Alternatively in the income-based approach other items such as health and 
nutrition are included.  The latter are only relevant when trying to establish the 
labour force in terms of a monetary value.  This can present problems when 
empirical work attempts to include a human capital variable as well as a labour force 
variable in regression equation.  Therefore it is not possible to use two such variables 
when adopting the broader human capital definition.  This has been a constraint 
faced by some of the new endogenous growth research into human capital.  Another 
difficulty associated with the income-based approach is the assumption that labour 
productivity differences correspond to money wage rate differentials.  A final 
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problem is the relative lack of detailed data on wage earnings compared to 
investment data (Le, Gibson & Oxley 2003, p. 281–283). 
 
2.5 The Joint Approach: Combining Income and Cost 
The latter two approaches for calculating human capital stock have their advantages 
and disadvantages. Given these potential complexities, some economists have 
attempted to construct an integrated approach. The rationale for an integrated 
approach is twofold.  Firstly, it tends to produce a more realistic measure of human 
capital stock which is usually higher the retrospective method but lower than the 
prospective method.  Secondly, it is usually easier to calculate.  These two aspects go 
some way to overcoming some of the specific previously-identified problems 
associated with each method.   
 
Dagum and Slottje (2000) provided a useful example of this combined method. They 
equated the ‘monetary value of a person’s human capital with the average lifetime 
earnings of the population, weighted by the level of human capital that he has 
relative to the average human capital of the population’ (Le, Gibson & Oxley 2003, 
p. 293).. Through using a new statistical definition of human capita as a latent 
variable, Dagum and Slottje (2000) attempted to eliminate any omitted variable bias. 
As a result this approach recognises the wider costs of production including social 
costs.  It also has the advantage of incorporating variables such as parental and 
household incomes and wealth levels that can impact on any human capital 
estimates.  It also factors in other considerations such as parental education and 
innate ability levels.  All of these will affect the development of human capital at the 
microeconomic level. 
 
Tao and Stinson (1997) provided another example of this joint approach. Their key 
argument was that investments in human capital determine the human capital stock 
(cost-based method), while human capital determines earnings for individuals 
through the income-based approach (Le, Gibson & Oxley 2003). A complex model is 
developed that includes sex, age and educational level data. At a more technical level 
it includes a human capital yearly rental rate. To overcome the estimation problems 
associated with identifying both a rental rate and a human capital estimate, Tao and 
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Stinson equated the human capital stock of base entrants to the labour force with 
total expenditures on education. These are entrants into the labour force after 
completing polytechnic, college or university education. However their initial human 
capital levels are not impacted upon by experience or on-the-job training.  This 
method adjusts for ability by using SAT scores. A cost-based approach is then used 
to produce a human capital stock estimate.  This effectively corresponds to all 
relevant and accumulated real education expenditure.  Having produced a human 
capital stock estimate, it is than possible to estimate a rental rate of return for this 
variable.  Assuming it is constant across all groups, a total human capital estimated 
value can be generated. 
 
The Tao and Stinson (1997) method has a number of advantages. Firstly the 
retrospective method is used exclusively to produce a human capital estimate of the 
base entrants.  By using this estimate for other groups in the labour forces overcomes 
the problem of what defines investment in human capital. Secondly there is no need 
to make assumptions of any depreciation or appreciation of human capital values in 
this method.  However the Tao and Stinson method has some problems. One of the 
difficulties when using human capital proxies in growth regressions is the treatment 
of the so-called ability concept.  Normally it is excluded as it is not considered part 
of formal education.  Both the Dagum and Slottje (2000) and the Tao and Stinson 
(1997) approaches try to adjust their models to allow at least partially for the ability 
variable.  Both adjustments produce less than optimal results with less than perfect 
measures of ability; which is admittedly often undefined.  Moreover both require 
very extensive data resources.  These are real problems for economists trying to 
produce time series estimations of human capital stocks.   
 
Perhaps a bigger problem that has held back research into human capital stock has 
been the treatment of skills development.  There are two dimensions to skills 
development; quantity and quality.  The challenge is to construct a measure of 
human capital stock that incorporates both aspects of skills development in the 
labour force.    Otherwise in the absence of such a proxy it cannot be inserted into 
cross-country growth equations. Cross-country databases such as of Nehru, Swanson 
and Dubey (1995), Kyriacou (1991), and Barro and Lee (1993, 2001) do not 
adequately provide human capital proxies capturing skill components.  The latter 
 23 
 
data sets all use average years of education as proxies.  Such a measure is a very 
restrictive proxy in that it excludes factors such as experience and on-the-job 
learning. Theoretical models that deal with technological change need to account for 
both experience and on-the-job training as the latter can be key facilitators for such 
change. Leaving alone the quantity of skills development, the average years of 
education do not always correspond to an increase in labour skills and in turn overall 
human capital quality.  Economic theory suggests as human capital quality increases, 
then returns to human capital accumulation should be either constant if not 
increasing.  In turn there should be a growth dividend. Given this result, average 
years of education appear to be an unsatisfactory human capital proxy for human 
capital (Foldvari & Van Leeuwen, 2008). 
 
An ongoing problem for human capital researchers is the identification of a 
comprehensive human capital definition that addresses both the quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions of the human capital concept.  Moreover any such definition 
needs to incorporate both educational and labour force experiential components. Any 
appropriate definition would have to account for certain pitfalls.  These are 
incorporating all types of learning but excluding all inputs associated with the 
development of physical attributes.  In turn other costs must be excluded otherwise 
double-counting problems may arise.  This applies to health and other child-raising 
costs.  One possible approach that may prove useful from a theoretical perspective is 
to apply a definition in which human capital consists of all forms of knowledge 
acquiring as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2001, p. 18) as ‘the knowledge, skills and competencies 
embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic 
well-being’ as referred to in Foldvari & Van Leeuwen (2008). 
 
Unlike the standard OECD definition, this excludes human attributes. The rationale 
for the latter is that innate human characteristics do not have an investment 
component. They also do not increase human capital. They may make investments 
cheaper as children can study more easily, but do not increase the stock of human 
capital.  This approach potentially possesses three advantages. First, it maintains a 
difference between human capital and physical labour. This difference may be 
crucial when human capital is inserted into any of the standard growth equations 
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besides labour. Secondly, it allows for the possibility of directly comparing the 
theories of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). Thirdly, this definition of human capital 
overcomes the problem, which has troubled the cost-based approach, of determining 
which expenditures are investments in human capital and which are consumption.  
 
2.6 Human Capital, Education and East Asian Economic Growth 
 
The association of the role of human capital with periods of high levels of long-term 
economic growth in East Asia has been raised by a number of Asian economists in 
the past (Jung 1992; Woo 1991). While there have been many attempts made to 
explain the role of human capital in the context of East Asian and Southeast Asian 
growth performances since the 1960s and 1970s, there has been a general consensus 
that investment in human capital has been a key ingredient in the rapid growth rates 
achieved by these economies since those decades and up until the present time (Fogel 
2005, 2009). Using the 1993 World Bank Report as a starting point, it was very 
explicit in terms of attributing Asian economic success over the 1965 to 1990 period 
to getting the so-called basics right. The latter elements included human capital 
accumulation through the provision of universal primary and secondary education, 
mainly through the public sector, but as in some cases through private provision 
(World Bank 1993). This is not to underestimate the role played by other factors such 
as sound macroeconomic policies, high levels of capital investment, a focus on 
export orientation and competent levels of public administration. However, a 
consistent pattern that appears when examining the high-performing Asian 
economies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. Each has 
invested heavily in human resource development. While there are variations amongst 
them, they have all prioritised educational reform (Mingat, 1998). 
 
Other studies have recognised not only the quantity of education being provided in 
various East Asian economies as being important for economic growth, but have also 
highlighted the importance of educational quality (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). 
However, one the difficulties associated with such an approach is how to measure 
quality as a discrete variable. The general consensus appears to be that quality is very 
much linked to the acquisition of cognitive skills (Hanushek and Woessman, 2007). 
 25 
 
In recent years, cognitive skills are now being measured through standardised testing 
results. Studies from Murnane et al. (2000), Lazear (2003), McIntosh and Vignoles 
(2001), Finnie and Meng (2002), and Green and Riddell (2003) all examined the 
relationship between skills such as literacy and numeracy, and the individual 
earnings of workers. Generally the relationships proved to be positive although 
occasionally quite modest. Other studies at the microeconomic level in developing 
countries would suggest that returns associated with increasing cognitive skills are 
even higher in developing economies (Hanushek and Woessman, 2007). 
 
At the macroeconomic level, the use of international testing regimes such as Program 
for International Student Assessment have been increasingly used to trace the 
relationship between educational quality and economic growth The key studies in 
this area were Hanushek and Kim (1995) and Hanuskek and Kimko (2000), which  
used data from the international student achievement tests commencing in 1991. 
They then constructed a measure of educational quality. They found a statistically 
and economically significant positive effect of the quality of education on economic 
growth over the period of 1960 to 1990. This effect was much stronger than that 
existing between quantity of education and growth. Other studies that found similar 
results using international test score data included Barro (2001), Wöβmann (2002, 
2003), Bosworth and Collins (2003), Coulombe, Tremblay and Marchand (2004), 
Ciccone and Papaioannou (2005) and Coulombe, Tremblay and Marchand (2006). 
 
Given the consistently high results achieved by East Asian economies in these 
international tests, further studies such as Hanushek and Woessman (2007) show an 
equally strong relationship between the quality of education and economic growth. 
These results apply across various levels of education whether they were at the 
primary or secondary levels. This also applied to students cohorts from specific 
economies who performed at above or below the relevant average test score or some 
other pre-determined threshold level. However one of the possible problems with 
using such a measure for to represent cognitive skills, let alone any skill, is that it 
may not truly reflect the particular skills that are in demand in the labour force.  
Apart from some of the earlier methodological issues that have been covered in this 
chapter, there is one more that may need to be considered in the East Asian context.  
That is the issue of reverse causality in relation to the human capital and growth 
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nexus.  Are faster growing and richer Asian economies such as Singapore more 
likely to invest more in education and training?  Or in contrast, is there another 
process at work here whereby rapid income growth is due to more and better-quality 
education across all levels?  This is an ongoing issue in this area of research.
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Chapter 3: The Economic History of the Malaysian 
Economy since Becoming a Federation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between human capital accumulation and 
economic performance in both the Singapore and Malaysian economies. In order to 
assess this relationship it is necessary to review the economic history of the period 
under review. The models that are used in this thesis examine economic performance 
as measured by GDP per capita. This chapter traces the key features of the 
development of the Malaysian economy over this period. The rationale for this 
examination is to trace the key changes in the Malaysian economy and relate them to 
both education and training policies required for the provision of a suitably skilled 
labour force. Inevitably as economies develop there will be attempts made to explain 
the key drivers of their economic growth. This was the rationale for the World 
Bank’s 1993 publication, ‘The East Asian Economic Miracle: Economic Growth and 
Public Policy’, which attempted to identify and explain these key drivers. In the 
previous study as well as other studies, the key drivers have been generally 
acknowledged as the accumulation of both physical and human capital. Another key 
ingredient for growth identified by the World Bank was the ability of Asian 
governments to achieve the right policy settings in relation to not only fiscal and 
monetary policies from a macroeconomic perspective, but in relation the provision of 
physical and social infrastructure and especially human resource development. In this 
context macroeconomic stability in terms of both policy formulation and 
implementation was pivotal in making growth in economies such as Malaysia 
sustainable over this period. This chapter will examine the economic history of 
Malaysia with a focus upon domestic macroeconomic policy. 
 
When examining the performance of Malaysian economic growth over the period 
under review from 1975 to 2006, it is important to put the period into some relevant 
historical context. It is therefore necessary to look at the background to the 
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Malaysian economy prior to the specific period under review. To fully appreciate the 
historical context of Malaysian economic development over this period, it is 
necessary to examine Malaysian economic policy in an historical context since the 
Federation of Malaya was established in 1957. To do the latter, it would be useful to 
divide this time periods into four discrete time periods. The first period starts with 
merdeka (independence) from Britain in 1957. It runs up until 1969 and includes the 
interethnic violence culminating in the May 1969 racial riots. The second period 
starts in 1970 with the adoption of the New Economic Policy and ends in 1987. The 
third period runs from 1987 up to the 1997/98 period when the Asian economic and 
currency crisis severely impacted the Malaysian economy. In turn the latter had a 
critical effect upon Malaysian economic policy, particularly in relation to the 
imposition of exchange rate controls. The fourth and final period covers the post-
crisis interval. During this latter period policymakers made a deliberate change from 
orthodox economic policy making towards the adoption of capital controls as crisis 
management mechanism. It then ends with the recovery period running up until 
2006. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 surveys the Malaysian economy 
from Independence to the May Riots of 1969, Section 3.3 examines the impact of the 
New Economic Policy from its introduction in 1970 in its purest form to its variation 
in 1987, Section 3.4 examines the period from 1987 to 1997 during which the New 
Economic Policy, albeit in a more moderate and far less purist form, was replaced 
with the National Development Policy, Section 3.5 examines the content and 
direction of Malaysian macroeconomic policy from the onset of the Asian Currency 
Crisis of 1997/98 to the period of 2006 and Section 3.6 ends with some concluding 
comments in relation to the linkage between macroeconomic policy and structural 
changes and the associated consequences for labour market policies aimed at both 
education and skills acquisition. 
 
3.2 The Malaysian Economy: 1957 to 1969 
 
At the commencement of independence in 1957, Malaysia (or the Federation of 
Malaya) was very well placed to benefit from its rapid economic growth potential. 
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The country had inherited a well-established British colonial structure having been a 
colony since 1824. This included an extensive and efficient public-sector 
bureaucracy, an extensive infrastructure, and a buoyant and growing agricultural 
sector. Relative to other Asian economies in the same region, Malaysia had achieved 
higher outcomes for key performance indicators such as per capita income, literacy, 
education and health care, respectively. Another retardant to improved living 
standards such as high population growth rates as was then occurring in Malaysia 
was viewed as not a serious problem. This was due to the high endowment of natural 
resources across Malaysia, both peninsular and non-peninsular, relative to its 
population (Athukorala & Menon 1997). This was particularly the case in relation to 
key natural resources such as tin, rubber and oil especially in the non-peninsular 
states of Sabah and Sarawak, and on the island of Borneo. 
 
Whilst these favourable economic conditions prevailed, the process of economic 
development in the newly independent Malaysian economy proved to be challenging 
nonetheless, as it had to be achieved in an environment of potentially conflicting 
objectives. These were the simultaneous objectives of preserving a level of ethnic 
peace between the three major racial groups on one hand, and pursuing economic 
growth, on the other. At that time the ethnic Malays accounted for approximately 52 
per cent of the population and in turn dominated the domestic political process 
(Menon 2008). However the Malay majority were relatively poor and participated 
primarily in low-productivity and low-technology agricultural activities. 
Alternatively, the ethnic Chinese represented approximately 37 per cent of the 
population, but possessed disproportionately greater economic power and owned 
much the economy in relation to service industries and manufacturing (Athukorala & 
Menon 1996). Therefore, in the post-independence period of Malaysia, economic 
policy-making, especially macroeconomic management policy, proved to be a 
continuing battle to achieve discrete development objectives while concurrently 
maintaining communal harmony between the Malay and Chinese communities, and 
political stability, respectively. The remaining 4 per cent were of Indian background. 
 
During the initial post-independence period, contemporary Malaysian economic 
policy operated within a wider and more sensitive context from a political 
perspective. It navigated a fine line between fostering economic development whilst 
 30 
 
at the same time suppressing, if not provoking, historical ethnic and inter-communal 
differences and tensions that characterised the Malaysian population. This policy 
approach continued with the colonial open-door approach relating to trade and 
industry policy, while addressing ethnic and regional economic imbalances through 
rural development schemes and the provision of social and physical infrastructure. 
As was the case in many other developing countries, Malaysia encouraged an 
informal import-substitution industrialisation policy during this period. Where 
Malaysia differed from many other contemporary Asian economies was that it did 
not adopt any explicit policy initiatives that directly encouraged an import-
substitution approach, such as import restrictions and the formal establishment of 
state-owned enterprises (Menon 2008). 
 
A number of economic commentators, such as Snodgrass (1980), have linked the 
Malaysian policy approach to the influence of multi-lateral institutions such as the 
World Bank. The latter was a key provider of advice to the Malaysian government 
during the period 1955 to 1961. In contrast to what may have been expected to be the 
norm in terms of economic policy approaches adopted by other developing 
economies during this period, Malaysia did not adopt an explicit import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy. Traditionally the latter policy approach was adopted when 
economies experienced ongoing balance of payments imbalances. 
 
In contrast, Malaysia did not have such problems as it had increasing commodity 
export sales based primarily on tin and rubber. Given these advantages, it was 
considered unnecessary for Malaysia to adopt a strategy of import substitution to 
change industrial development in an explicit manner. Another constraint facing 
policymakers when considering adopting import substitution was in relation to the 
ethnic and racial context in which these economic policies would operate. The 
contemporary Malaysian business sector was then dominated by the Chinese 
minority adopting policies that could be seen as dictating to this community and as 
such could be viewed as racially provocative as pointed out by Tongzon (2002). The 
Malaysian government was keen to avoid any policy mix that could at the time be 
seen unfairly redistributing income and wealth from the Chinese minority towards 
the Malay majority. Therefore there was an explicit reluctance by policymakers to 
adopt an overt import-substitution policy during this period (Leigh 1992). 
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Some commentators have described the industrialisation strategy of the Malaysian 
government at the time as largely a ‘promotional effort, geared to the provision of an 
investment climate favourable to private enterprise, especially to foreign private 
enterprise’, Wheelwright (1993). In support of this view, it is significant to note that 
across the entire economy only a small minority of industries were protected by 
tariffs exceeding 30 per cent whilst nontariff barriers were negligible compared to 
other Asian economies at the time (Alavi 1996). 
 
In order to cultivate foreign investment flows it is necessary to have a liberal trade 
policy approach as part of domestic economic policy. It is fair to say that during the 
period after independence, if not before, that Malaysia was one Asian economy that 
was relatively open and receptive to foreign investment flows (Athukorala and 
Menon 1995). Whilst in many East Asian economies after 1945, there was an 
ongoing suspicion, if not open distrust, of foreign direct investment, Malaysia proved 
to be somewhat of an economic exception. Some would argue that even as early as 
1958, with the introduction of a specific tax concession scheme known as the Pioneer 
Industry Ordinance (Lim 2008), the government was not only hostile to foreign 
capital, but also prepared to be interventionist when it appeared to be needed. (Rasiah 
and Shari 2001). During the 1950s, and more so during the 1960s, there were 
minimal restrictions on capital inflows into the economy. This was clearly in contrast 
to many other developing economies during this period. In relation to potential 
institutional impediments, the Malaysian Central Bank, Bank Negara Malaysia, 
imposed very few controls on capital flows. The latter clearly represented an explicit 
decision to apply minimal intervention to such capital movements. Rather Malaysian 
Central Bank policy prioritised interest rate stability as opposed to countercyclical 
policy initiatives during this period (Ariff 1991). 
 
Towards the mid-1960s and early 1970s, a more consensual approach or view had 
developed within the country that import-substitution industrialisation as an effective 
development strategy was no longer viable or desirable. In response to this approach 
a significant initiative was the establishment of the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority in 1965. This agency was charged with the promotion and 
facilitation of both domestic and foreign investment in both manufacturing and 
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services sectors. In turn a deliberate policy change towards export-oriented industries 
was required in order for economic and specifically industrial development to occur. 
A key policy initiative signalling this shift was the Investment Incentives Act of 
1968. The latter represented a deliberate policy aimed at shifting from import 
substitution towards the promotion of export-oriented activities, especially through 
increased access to foreign direct investment. The act provided a wide range of 
incentives to export-oriented foreign direct investment, including relief from payroll 
tax, investment tax credits, exemptions from company tax and duty on imported 
inputs, accelerated depreciation allowances on investment, and miscellaneous tariff 
protection (but excluding nontariff barriers). Further legislation was enacted in 1970 
allowing the establishment of special export processing zones across Malaysia. 
Together these legislative changes represented a deliberate policy change towards a 
more labour-intensive export-orientated industrialisation (Sivalingham 1994). 
 
During the 1957–1969 period, economic growth was averaging approximately 6.5 
per cent per annum. However it did not produce any tangible results in terms of 
redistributing income and general economic opportunities towards the Malay 
majority within the population. This became a particular problem given the rising 
unemployment towards the latter part of the decade and especially amongst the urban 
Malay population. Moreover the Chinese minority, concerned with education and 
language issues as by-product of the new policy, became increasingly uncertain 
about the direction of economic policy in relation to their economic safeguards being 
maintained. As a result of this and the increasing discontent amongst both the Malay 
and Chinese groups it was not surprising that the severe and bloody interethnic riots 
of May 1969 took place. The social and economic challenges presented by these 
events forced policymakers to review economic and development policies with a 
view to negate visible economic disparities along ethnic lines. It was therefore 
inevitable that there needed to be a concrete change in the direction of Malaysian 
economic policy. 
 
3.3 The New Economic Policy Period: 1970 to 1987 
The political environment was to change dramatically during this period. The leaders 
of the various Malay political parties adopted a new hard-line approach towards the 
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issue of Malaysian governance. This approach was to reflect that fact that these 
parties were the dominant members of the ruling coalition government. When 
parliamentary government was eventually restored in February 1971, after the May 
1969 riots, the constitution was amended to make certain offences illegal such as any 
public discussion of constitutional provisions relating to language, citizenship, and 
the special position of Malays and the status of the Sultans (Malay rulers), 
respectively within Malaysian society. From an economic perspective, policy making 
moved explicitly from criteria being based on economic indicators towards a more 
affirmative action policy based on racial and/or ethnic lines. The latter re-alignment 
of policy was expressed in the New Economic Policy program which was introduced 
in the context of the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–1975). 
 
The major thrust of the New Economic Policy was to preserve a manageable level of 
national unity. Preservation was to occur through the explicit pursuit of two major 
objectives. These were the elimination of poverty across the entire population. The 
second objective was to restructure both the economy and in turn society so as to 
terminate the unhealthy juxtaposition of economic activity with specific racial 
groupings. 
 
The first objective required a key change in Malaysian economic development policy 
that then focused on export-oriented industrialisation. This was combined with an 
increased emphasis on a wide-ranging rural and urban development programs. The 
second objective was manifested in the creation of long-term targets for the 
Bumiputra ownership of share capital in limited companies and the proportion of 
Malays employed in manufacturing and/or installed in managerial positions. This 
was to be accompanied by an emphasis on using educational policies to achieve both 
national unity and to improve the socioeconomic position of the Malay majority. 
With the latter in mind, the New Economic Policy established concrete targets such 
as increases in the Malay share in corporate assets from two per cent in 1970 to 30 
per cent by 1990. Simultaneously it aimed to achieve employment patterns in the 
urban sector that reflected the contemporary racial composition of the country. 
 
To achieve increased Malay business participation these were the two major 
activities that were pursued. The Malaysian public sector was expanded so as to 
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allow Malays to occupy increasing numbers of senior management and executive 
positions. Secondly, Malays were uniformly provided with privileged access to share 
ownership and business opportunities in the private sector. One method by which the 
latter was to be achieved was the enactment of the Industrial Co-ordination Act of 
1975. Its aim was to enhance Bumiputra participation through the New Economic 
Policy at the enterprise and/or firm level so as to increase Malay participation across 
the economy. To facilitate this process, Malaysian education policy was re-aligned to 
complement increased Bumiputra participation so as to provide enhanced 
employment opportunities by improving both education and training. 
 
In the context of overall economic performance, it should be pointed out that the oil 
price increases of 1973 and 1979 produced significant growth in revenues during the 
1970s. However this pattern simply continued the reliance of Malaysia upon a policy 
of continued import-substitution industrialisation. Whilst there had been some 
assistance had been made to export-oriented manufacturing industries, they were 
relatively minor in scale. As of 1980, primary industry and agricultural exports still 
represented over 82 per cent of total exports (Tan 1999). 
 
The Fourth Five-Year Plan commenced in 1982, with an emphasis upon the 
promotion and the development of heavy industry. This was constructed in the 
context of moving away from an import-substitution policy towards a moderate 
export-orientated industrialisation policy. To facilitate this approach a public-sector 
holding company, the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), was 
created in order to allow local Malaysian companies to go into partnership with 
foreign firms. HICOM was a wholly owned government corporation that initiated 
joint partnerships in relation to strategic industrial projects. Perhaps the best known 
example was the establishment of the National Car Project in 1983 in relation to the 
construction of the Proton. This project was a joint venture with both Mitsubishi and 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation where HICOM held 70 per cent equity, and the other 
Japanese partners held the remaining 30 per cent. Priority was given to further joint 
venture partnerships in industries such as petrochemicals, iron and steel, cement, 
paper and paper products, machinery and equipment, general engineering, transport 
equipment, and building materials, respectively (World Bank 2008). This strategy 
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had a clear aim to strengthen and diversify the domestic manufacturing sector 
(Athukorala and Menon 1996). 
 
A number of commentators have seen this initial shift as a Malaysian attempt to 
replicate Japan and South Korea in terms of focusing on the Asian region in terms of 
increased export opportunities. However, many of the new projects selected were 
based very much on traditional import-substitution criteria. As a result, the latter 
projects were supported with traditional mechanisms such as: subsidised credit, 
government procurement provisions, and heavy tariff protection, without subjecting 
them to market-based performance norms. 
 
As to the relative success of this policy, substantive evidence is absent. Specifically, 
export-orientated industrialisation did not expand in relation to this new government 
policy during the 1980s. The industrial structure of Malaysia in the late 1980s was 
still very much what would have been expected given the character of Malaysia’s 
comparative advantages and its factor endowments. Unfortunately, many of these 
new industries were dependent heavily upon government subsidies. Moreover they 
created very few now employment opportunities given the funds invested, in excess 
of RM 42 billion. Other key performance indicators such as exports, employment, 
and skills, displayed only moderate improvement given the funds invested (Menon 
2008). 
 
Contemporary detailed analysis of Malaysian productivity performance during this 
period (1979–1989) indicated that state-owned and/or state-managed enterprises 
generated zero, if not negative, productivity results in relation to total factor 
productivity (Alavi 1996). Moreover these industries tended to produce at price 
levels that disadvantaged other Malaysian firms that used these firms’ products as 
inputs. In contrast, the industries that produced above-average productivity results 
were mainly private-sector labour-intensive firms that received very little 
government assistance in the form of subsidies and/or tax concessions. The latter 
industries included relatively low-level technology products such as textiles, 
clothing, footwear, and more generic industries such as leisure and recreational 
goods and services. An additional disadvantage associated with this government lead 
approach for accelerated development in the heavy industries sector was the higher 
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cost environment for other firms. These firms were now forced to pay higher prices 
for inputs due to the higher overall levels of protection. Inevitably this produced 
additional domestic inflationary pressures. Moreover whilst subsidies did assist 
certain firms in terms of the acquisition of some scale economies on one hand and 
some improved technical and managerial skills on the other, imposed additional 
fiscal budgetary costs at a government level. 
 
The increased level of government expenditure on items such as subsidies related to 
the national drive towards industrialisation during this period lead to increasing dual 
deficits both in the domestic budget as well as the current account, over the five-year 
period from 1981 to 1986. Malaysian government expenditure increased at a 
particularly rapid rate during the years, 1981 and 1982, respectively. Ongoing fiscal 
imbalances were exacerbated by a number of external factors such as falling export 
prices in combination with a collapse of global demand for numerous exportable 
commodity items due to the world recession of the mid-1980s. The terms of trade 
decreased by about twenty per cent in the two years between 1981 and 1983 and so 
lead to falling levels of GDP during this time period (World Bank Indicators). The 
net result of this policy approach was a pattern of current account deficits exceeding 
five per cent of GDP, and public-sector deficits that had averaged ten per cent over 
the period of 1971 to 1980, peaked at 21 per cent in 1982. A further adverse 
development during this period was the dramatic falls in commodity prices during 
the 1985/86 period that significantly decreased export revenues. The resultant 
declines in GDP growth rates during the middle 1980s also reduced government 
revenues and so lead to cuts in government discretionary expenditures in order to 
avoid widening budget deficits in succeeding years. The net effect was to ratchet up 
the level of contractionary pressures operating upon the Malaysian economy. These 
variations in policy approaches did little to retard the increasing levels of adverse 
foreign investment confidence. 
 
The trend towards large government investment projects during this period lead to a 
significant expansion in government expenditure far beyond budget forecasts. In 
turn, it impacted adversely upon the current account deficit levels. Moreover, the 
decline in commodity prices during the period 1981 to 1983 exacerbated the 
worsening current account results during this period. The associated decline in 
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domestic GDP generated a domestic fiscal response of expanding government 
expenditures so as to avoid a severe domestic recession during 1983, 1984 and 1985, 
respectively. Whilst growth in both 1983 and 1984 exceeded 6 per cent, it placed 
excessive stress on both the current account deficit and public-sector deficit, 
respectively. Unfortunately, fiscal policy could not maintain growth in 1985 as 
export commodity prices fell dramatically. Rather to deal with the latter the 
government was required to cut domestic expenditures. In turn, the economy 
contracted and caused a significant increase in domestic unemployment. Moreover 
these changes in the direction of economic policy produced an economic 
environment that had an adverse impact upon foreign and local investment prospects. 
 
However the various reforms that did take place during the 1980s did generate 
average annual export growth over the period 1983 to 1993 exceeding fourteen per 
cent. More specifically over that period, primary exports as a percentage of total 
exports declined from 43 per cent to 21 per cent. Conversely, machinery and 
transport equipment exports increased from twelve per cent to 41 per cent of total 
exports. Additionally, other or miscellaneous manufactured items rose from eight per 
cent to 24 per cent of total exports (Tan 1999).However these results were not simply 
the result of domestic policy reforms. The significant revaluation of the Japanese yen 
as a result of the 1985 Plaza Accord agreement effectively devalued the ringgit and 
so provided a substantial comparative advantage for Malaysian exports, across the 
Asian region and beyond. As a result there was a significant surge in Malaysian 
exports. 
 
3.4 Transition from the New Economic Policy to the National 
Development Policy: 1987 to 1997 
 
In response to the budgetary and trade problems that arose during the 1985/86 
period, the government decided to employ a less explicit and a far less dogmatic 
interpretation of the New Economic Policy that could be varied with specific 
circumstances, and particularly those of an economic nature. As a result of this, a 
significant piece of new legislation named the Promotion of Investment Act of 1986 
was introduced. The latter not only provided more incentives for private investors, 
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both domestic and foreign, but also lessened some of the more demanding 
restrictions of the New Economic Policy. This policy initiative was reflective of a 
general move by most of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries to 
liberalise their respective foreign investment regimes. A key development in wake of 
this policy change was the replacement of the New Economic Policy with the 
National Development Policy in 1990. The latter was fashioned with the aim of 
placing far more emphasis upon wealth creation as opposed to active wealth 
redistribution. However, the issue of racial imbalance in terms of poverty reduction 
and improved employment opportunities for Malays was not explicitly abandoned. 
The approach of the National Development Policy was to tackle racial imbalances 
through a series of more open policy initiatives aimed at improving Malay 
entrepreneurship, enhancing Malay management skills, and to expand Malay access 
to improved education and skills training across the economy. The overall aim of 
government was to achieve these outcomes in more subtle and less explicit ways, so 
as not to provoke any new ethnic tensions. 
 
The combination of the economic reforms of the mid-1980s and early 1990s  
produced a pattern of increased privatisation and restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises. As a result of the latter, state ownership in the manufacturing sector was 
restricted to strategic and politically sensitive industries such as automobiles, 
petrochemicals, iron and steel, and cement industries, respectively, by the mid-1990s. 
To facilitate the movement towards greater privatisation and economic restructuring, 
protection levels were reduced. The average effective rate of manufacturing 
protection declined from approximately 70 per cent in the early 1970s to below 30 
per cent by the late 1980s (Alavi 1996). 
 
The reformist agenda commencing in 1990 was also combined with a determination 
to achieve and maintain macroeconomic policy in terms of clear fiscal and monetary 
policy objectives. The latter included an explicit aim to achieve budget surpluses in 
the medium to long-term. It also included an aim of maintaining a stable real 
exchange rate as well as achieving infrastructure targets that would match a growing 
economy. Therefore reductions in government expenditures were key features in 
both the fifth (1986–1990) and sixth (1991–1995) Malaysia Plans. Moreover there 
was a clear reallocation of government expenditures away from recurrent 
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expenditures towards more infrastructure spending to support overall private-sector 
activity. 
 
Both the Fifth and Sixth plans reflected a shift in emphasis away from overtly 
achieving a target of a 30 per cent ownership by Malays of corporate equity holdings 
by 1990. Therefore companies incorporated for business purposes usually had to 
have at least 30 per cent of their share capital allocated to Bumiputra, including those 
that were seeking public listing on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange. Some of these 
changes could be traced back to the Promotion of Investment Act of 1986 whereby 
regulations on foreign equity participation in Malaysia were also relaxed and up to 
one hundred per cent foreign equity ownership of export-oriented companies was 
allowed. The new approach effectively amounted to the provision of support for the 
Malay majority to enable it to compete more successfully with other racial groups 
and communities across the country (Ariff 1991). The government also relaxed 
regulations on foreign equity participation in Malaysia, and parts of the Industrial 
Co-ordination Act were liberalised. For example, work permit requirements for 
foreign employees of companies with foreign paid up capital of two million USD or 
more were eased. Additionally, guidelines for the approval of new investment 
projects were relaxed (Athukorala & Menon 1996). 
 
Given the initiatives adopted by the Malaysian government in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, it was not surprising that the period of budget deficits was now replaced 
by consecutive budget surpluses over the period 1993 to 1997. This position 
continued to improve up until the eve of the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis. The 
elements that contributed to these improved budget outcomes included higher tax 
revenues associated with stronger economic growth because of built-in or automatic 
stabilisers. In addition tax reforms widened the tax base allied to more efficient tax 
collections increased tax revenues. A final positive element was the improved 
financial performance of collective public enterprises over the period 1990 to 1996 in 
terms of extending their collective surplus from 5.2 per cent to 7.7 per cent of GDP 
(Athukorala 2001). 
 
However it may be somewhat overly optimistic to interpret the improved budget 
position over the mid-1990s as indicating a strong domestic economy across all 
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sectors. In fact various weaknesses were revealed during the period. Many of these 
were linked to the key policy decision to liberalise capital markets in the early 1990s. 
The latter was reflective of an aim to make Kuala Lumpur a major financial centre 
within the Asian region in direct competition with Singapore. Unfortunately as a 
result of this policy, Malaysia commenced attracting increasing amounts of short-
term capital, in pursuit of high-yielding money and share markets, respectively. 
Government concerns about excessive speculation were heightened. In turn, the 
Malaysian ringgit appreciated significantly in real terms which placed adverse 
pressure upon the competitiveness of the Malaysian tradeable goods and services 
sector (Athukorala and Warr 2002). In response to the latter, the Malaysian Central 
Bank, the Bank Negara Malaysia, responded in a fairly predictable fashion by 
imposing controls in short-term capitals inflows, commencing in 1994 and remaining 
until 1995. As part of these controls, banks were prohibited from conducting swaps 
and forward transactions which were unrelated to trade, investment or inventory 
activities. In addition, the Bank Negara Malaysia also placed a ceiling on domestic 
banks’ net external liabilities, increased and extended reserve requirements on all 
deposits from abroad, and prohibited residents from selling short-term financial 
instruments to foreigners in January and February 1994. 
 
Unfortunately, whilst the short-term capital controls were effective immediately, they 
became far less relevant when they were lifted in the middle of 1995. Short-term 
flows again constituted more than half of total inflows by late 1996. Moreover share 
market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP approximated around 250 per cent, the 
highest in the Asia-Pacific region. It was clearly visible to market observers and 
economic commentators that the Malaysian economy was exposed to a speculative 
attack, if not a series of attacks, in terms of unexpected and rapid reversals of short-
term capital flows by investors. 
 
 
 
3.5 From the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis to 2006 
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The next phase of Malaysian economic history commences with the Asian Currency 
Crisis that commenced in Thailand in early July of 1997. Malaysia, as was the case 
with a number of Asian economies, had been made vulnerable to currency attacks 
due to a number of factors previously discussed. However it would be useful to 
identify some of these additional factors that characterised the currency crisis across 
Asia. Firstly, the Malaysian ringgit, like several Asian currencies, had appreciated in 
real terms in the 1990s and large and growing current account imbalances had 
emerged in the countries that faced a speculative attack in 1997. Secondly, the 
current account imbalances and related growth of foreign debt was also driven by an 
investment boom (as well a consumption boom). These investment booms were 
excessive and often in the wrong sectors (non-traded goods, real estate, speculative 
asset accumulation). A third problem was the general expectation by many 
Malaysian banks that government bailouts would always be ultimately available if 
financial difficulties arose. Buoyed by the latter many Malaysian banks prior to the 
crisis were inclined to borrow excessively from offshore and at the same time were 
predisposed to lend heavily for risky domestic investment projects. This has been 
partially attributed to a lack of prudent central bank supervision in terms of 
inadequate deposit insurance. Additionally the relevant interest rate levels at which 
Malaysian banks could borrow funds from abroad and then lend domestically were 
far too low given the relative levels of risk associated with many of these investment 
projects. The net result was that there was excessive domestic investment in projects 
that carried borderline profit expectations if not high chances of negative returns. 
 
Fortunately, in the Malaysian case, the domestic banking system had only been 
partially exposed to foreign debt unlike its counterparts in Thailand, South Korea, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Fourthly, a significant fraction of the borrowing and 
lending was not going to finance new investment projects that would have increased 
the stock of capital; instead, the loans were financing speculative demand of existing 
assets in fixed supply (land, existing real estates and the outstanding stock of equity). 
Evidence on this is provided by the movements of asset prices (especially stock 
markets, land values and real estate prices) that were increasing faster than warranted 
by economic fundamentals. The asset price bubble (in stock markets, land and real 
estate prices) was fed by the excessive borrowing by banks in international capital 
markets, therefore, part of the accumulation of foreign liabilities went to the 
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financing of the speculative asset bubble. Given that the ratios of Malaysian stock-
market capitalisation to GDP as well as outstanding credit to GDP were the highest 
among the four Asian economies initially affected by the crisis, it is not difficult to 
identify its relative vulnerability (Hill 2005). 
 
When the crisis commenced, the Bank Negara Malaysia attempted to defend the 
ringgit over the period 8 July to 14 July 1997, immediately after the collapse of the 
Thai baht. However eventually it lacked sufficient foreign exchange reserves to 
protect the ringgit and on 14th of July, the currency was allowed to freely float. It 
should be mentioned in this context that the Malaysian ringgit had previously been 
operating under a managed float regime since December 1992. Prior to that date it 
had been a fixed currency. As a result of the free float, over the period July 1997 to 
January 1998, the ringgit depreciated approximately by 50 per cent against the USD. 
Given the relative strength of the Malaysian banking system, it enabled policymakers 
to construct a domestic policy package independently of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) albeit a policy mix that was not totally dissimilar to a customary IMF 
policy response. The Malaysian response included large cuts to government 
spending, deferring all public-sector capital (or development) projects, bans on all 
capital outflows by Malaysian enterprises, and an immediate freeze on all new 
company share issues and/or proposed corporate restructures. 
 
The fiscal contraction was accompanied by a monetary contraction orchestrated by 
the Bank Negara Malaysia. As a result the interbank lending rate increased from 7.6 
per cent to 8.7 per cent in December of 1997, and then from ten per cent to eleven 
per cent in February of 1998. However the unanticipated by-product of the latter 
produced a very lethargic and poorly performing recovery. Therefore a new policy 
response was considered necessary and in September of 1998 the government 
decided to embrace a range of new policy initiatives including pegging the exchange 
rate, and imposing controls on short-term capital inflows. More publicly, the 
government decided to reject any application of a formal IMF rescue policy package 
as was adopted in other Asian economies. This could be equally attributed to a 
reluctance to cede policy autonomy to a multi-lateral agency just as much as to 
formal critiques of the policy ingredients that would be likely to constitute such a 
 43 
 
policy response. It was certainly also prompted by a decrease in GDP of -7.4 per cent 
in 1998 after achieving a growth increase of 7.3 per cent in 1997. 
 
The Malaysian government under the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, effectively 
moved towards a more expansionary Keynesian style policy mix with increases in 
government expenditures with concurrent increases in money supply producing 
lower domestic interest rates. The policy however had to be combined with the 
introduction of short-term capital controls to as to retard a flow of domestic capital 
overseas in pursuit of higher rates of return. The rationale applied by policymakers 
was that, especially in times of crisis, financial markets tend to over-shoot, and that 
there is a case for Keynesian style pump-priming measures to stimulate the economy. 
The contemporary argument at the time appeared to be that the domestic capital 
market needed to be temporarily decoupled from the global economy while the 
government applied its stimulatory measures (Hill 2005). To achieve that decoupling 
a key policy initiative was adopted namely, fixing the exchange rate at RM 3.8 to one 
USD. This rate was seen as being somewhat at the lower end of the expected 
spectrum. In turn such a rate was expected to provide a significant advantage for 
Malaysian exports in the tradeables sector. The strategy behind these controls was to 
prevent currency speculators from having access to supplies of Malaysian ringgit and 
in turn eliminate excessive stock-market speculative activity. 
 
To put these changes into some perspective, the 1999 Budget, presented in October 
1998, foreshadowed increasing the budget deficit from 1.8 per cent of GDP to a 
target of 3.2 per cent of GDP in 1999, while the 2000 budget predicted a further 
increase to a target of 4.4 per cent of GDP. In relation to monetary policy, the Bank 
Negara Malaysia successively cut the statutory reserve requirement from a pre-crisis 
level of 13.5 per cent to four per cent by late 1998. The interbank lending rate, which 
had risen to eleven per cent in February 1998, was brought down gradually to four 
per cent by early 1999. A range of other monetary measures was also introduced to 
reduce the cost of bank credit, free up capital for banks, and boost credit expansion 
(see Athukorala 2001 for details).The general consensus view was that monetary 
policy had been given the greater role in stimulating the economy, and that this had 
only been possible with capital controls in place (Hill 2005). Unlike fiscal policy, the 
various time lags associated with monetary policy can be shorter, and rather than 
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running the risk of crowding out private investment, the lower interest rate 
environment was aimed for so as to stimulate it. The net result of these policies was 
to see an expansion of GDP in the first half of 1999 and in turn annualised growth 
rate of 6.1 per cent for the financial year. However this was then exceeded by the 8.9 
per cent result achieved in 2000. 
 
The role of Malaysian economic policy in dealing with the challenges presented by 
the Asian Currency Crisis has attracted much comment. It would not be unfair to 
characterise the Malaysian response as one which was unorthodox relative to the 
approaches adopted by other economies in the region. Whilst the policy components 
themselves did not constitute a radical policy approach, the explicit decision to not to 
embrace an IMF-style approach could be viewed as a significant, if not radical, 
departure. Various commentators, including Athukorala (2001, 2010), Zainal-Abidin 
(2002) and Hill (2005), identified some key characteristics that particularly applied 
to the Malaysian economy. To commence with a less well-known item that exposed 
the Malaysian monetary system was the amount of Malaysian ringgit that had moved 
into Singapore during the Asian Currency Crisis in pursuit of significantly higher 
interest rates. Approximately 25 to 35 billion ringgit ($6.3–8.8 billion), amounting to 
40 to 60 per cent of the total domestic money supply (M1), had been deposited in 
Singapore at the height of the crisis in mid-1998 (IMF 1999). 
 
Other items that need to be considered in the context of this period were the relative 
level of the initial exchange rate peg itself, the process by which the controls were 
put into operation, and finally the degree to which the various Malaysian institutions 
were seen to be operating at arm’s length during the crisis period. In relation to the 
level of the peg it was viewed as being placed at a relatively competitive level at RM 
3.8 to $1.00 USD. Hence it was seen as a deliberate policy step to advantage the 
Malaysian tradeables sector. In relation to the actual application of the controls, it has 
been recognised the Malaysian government was at pains to emphasise the short-term 
nature of the controls, particularly to foreign investors. It should be noted that rather 
than deterring foreign direct investment expenditure, it actually increased in the 
period after the controls were imposed. Finally, it was important given the nature of 
past relationships between the government and various government agencies, and 
specific domestic corporate interests in turn, to construct a program that did not 
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encourage or even appear to encourage any forms of political patronage. It would not 
be inaccurate to observe that government expenditures associated with the crisis were 
heavily scrutinised for any suggestion of behaviour inconsistent with objective levels 
of corporate governance. The consensus appears to be that the two key government 
agencies involved in the Malaysian policy response, namely the Bank Negara 
Malaysia, and the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, both operated in a fully transparent 
and objective manner during this period (Hill 2005). Whilst there is some dispute as 
to whether the imposition of capital controls were essential or not for the economy’s 
recovery, (Johnson et al. 2006), there appears to be an acknowledgement that they 
reflected a positive level of institutional credibility and political non-interference. 
 
In the period since the imposition of capital controls in response to the Asian 
Currency Crisis period, the Malaysian economy has grown at annual rates exceeding 
5.5 per cent apart from 2001. In that year the economy recorded a growth rate in 
GDP of 0.5 per cent. This relatively poor result compared to the years that followed 
could be attributed to a large fall in global demand for information and 
communications technology products, which in turn led to an ongoing and 
contemporaneous slowdown in the world economy. This had a marked and adverse 
impact upon Malaysian exports and especially manufactured exports, with an export 
contraction of -10.4 per cent. A further brake on recovery was the uncertainty that 
flowed from the terror attacks surrounding 11 September 2001. The series of events 
that retarded Malaysia’s growth during this period to some extent reflected the risks 
that can be associated with a possible over reliance on an export-led growth strategy. 
 
In the period since and then up until the end of 2006, the Malaysian economy has 
achieved a solid growth performance. With a rebound in exports of approximately 
seven per cent in 2002, they then exceeded ten per cent growth rates each year up 
and until including 2006. With rising oil prices for much of this latter period, 
Malaysia as both an oil exporter and a liquefied natural gas exporter, respectively, 
has experienced a surge in energy related export revenues. This has been particularly 
important for Malaysian government revenues of which approximately 35 per cent 
comes from this source. 
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From a demand-side perspective, prices hovered around the 1.4 per cent per annum 
up until 2004, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. However there was a 
significant spike in the rate to 3.1 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively in 2005 and 
2006. This was primarily due to domestic factors including higher indirect taxes 
and/or significant reductions in fuel subsidies. Finally, the unemployment rate for 
Malaysia for the seven years since 1999 has averaged a relatively moderate level of 
3.4 per cent. 
 
At the end of this period, the Malaysian economy had underwent a significant 
structural transformation from an economy heavily reliant upon both agriculture and 
extractive industries to one that is far more industrialised as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy as Percentage of GDP 
Year 1970 (%) 1980 (%) 1990 (%) 1995 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 
Agriculture 29.0 22.9 18.7 10.2 8.4 8.2 
Mining 13.7 10.1 9.1 8.2 6.8 6.7 
Manufacturing 13.9 19.6 27.0 27.1 33.4 31.6 
Construction 3.8 4.6 3.5 4.4 3.3 2.7 
Services 36.2 40.1 42.3 49.9 47.9 50.8 
Sources: Ministry of Finance; Economic Reports (various issues), Asian Development Bank Key 
Indicators series, 1999–2007. 
 
The table clearly demonstrates the structural transformation that Malaysia has 
undergone over this period. Whilst the largest sector remains the services sector, it is 
significant that Malaysia’s manufacturing sector is now comparable to most of the 
prominent Asian Newly Industrialising economies such as Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. These changes cannot have taken place independent of 
domestic macroeconomic policies as described earlier in this chapter. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
When examining the not only the specific period under review in this study, but 
beyond to the period commencing with independence since 1957, the economic 
performance of Malaysia has been extremely strong, not only in comparison to other 
developing economies in Asia, but relative to all other developing economies, 
globally. Whilst the growth performance has been robust for most of that longer 
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period, it has been particularly strong since the latter part of the 1980s up until the 
Asian Currency Crisis and then in the period after 1997/98 and ending with the 
specific period under review, namely 2006. 
 
Commentators such as Athukorala and Menon (1997) have attributed much of this 
performance to the deliberate policy decision to adopt a much more export-oriented 
focus commencing in the mid to late 1980s. The latter is also viewed as being a key 
driver of economic growth that averaged in excess of five per cent in the 1970s, 
seven per cent in the 1980s, nine per cent in the 1990s, and then 5.5 per cent in the 
period from 2000 to 2006. In addition the positive growth story has enabled Malaysia 
to not only increase domestic living standards as measured in per capita GDP levels, 
but also make significant inroads into both domestic poverty and perceived racial 
gaps in relation to both wealth levels and incomes. The strength of the Malaysian 
economic performance can be gauged by its response to the 1997/98 Asian Currency 
Crisis. Whilst this had a crippling effect on the economy, in the short-run over the 
period 1997 up to 1999, its ability to turnaround the economy to achieve growth rates 
in real GDP of 6.1 per cent and 8.9 per cent in 1999 and 2000, respectively. These 
growth rates would have been the envy of most developed economies, let alone other 
economies across the Asian region. Ironically the Asian Currency Crisis may have 
provided an important juncture in the Malaysian growth story in that it provided an 
opportunity for the economy to resume growth at lower, but perhaps more 
sustainable growth rates into the future. This was reflected in the growth rates 
achieved in the years 2002 to 2006, inclusive. 
 
Some commentators such as Tan (2002) have described the nature of Malaysian 
macroeconomic policy over the period since 1957 as one of conservative 
pragmatism. In relation to the specific tools of macroeconomic policy it would be 
fair to say that for the majority of the period under review that fiscal policy was the 
major tool of discretionary policy. This was particularly the case during the 1985/86 
recession. However discretionary monetary policy played a significant role during 
the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997/98 in terms of reducing the level of capital 
mobility. Whilst fiscal policy has been used primarily as a countercyclical policy 
instrument for much of this period, it has also been used to as a policy tool that 
would ameliorate racial disparities in terms of both income and wealth levels. 
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The macroeconomic management policy experience in Malaysia over the past 50 
years is an approach that could be well described as conservative pragmatism (Tan, 
2002). Apart from the period of crisis management in 1997 to 1999, when monetary 
policy played the dominant role in reviving the economy, fiscal policy has been the 
major discretionary instrument. As a small, open economy, fiscal policy has served 
the role of a countercyclical stabiliser, to minimise the impact of exogenous shocks, 
with monetary policy playing an accommodating role. But fiscal policy has also been 
actively employed in an attempt to address the disparities in income along racial 
lines. The affirmative action policies of the New Economic Policy, designed to 
improve the status of the Malay population, did constrain, if not hamper 
occasionally, the flexibility of fiscal policy to some extent, but never in a significant 
way. 
 
It would appear that the affirmative action program under the New Economic Policy 
played an important role in ensuring both political stability and social harmony. It 
was an important signalling device, and at the very least it served to demonstrate the 
intention that all ethnic and racial groups should share in future growth. The actual 
role that it played in delivering these outcomes is difficult to determine, especially 
when rapid economic growth and structural change were taking place almost 
concurrently and may have been the key drivers. The important point is that the 
resource cost of these direct re-distributional policies was not a major drag on 
growth, given that foreign direct investment inflows and rapid export expansion were 
available to augment the domestic resource base. But that is now history. Foreign 
direct investment inflows have not returned to their pre-crisis levels and the 
subsequent emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a major competitor in 
export markets suggests the need for change, in the future. Skills shortages and other 
bottlenecks also appear to be holding back Malaysia’s progression up the technology 
ladder (Menon 2008). 
 
As noted earlier, the New Economic Policy has played an important signalling role, 
and has played its part in delivering the peace and stability that Malaysia has 
enjoyed. It is now past its expiry date however. Further, changes to Malaysia’s 
demographics as a result of Chinese outmigration and significantly higher Malay 
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fertility rates imply that the current system is simply unsustainable. Unless Malaysia 
is willing to sacrifice macroeconomic stability, then the resource requirements of the 
current system will be overwhelming. Malaysia has always opted for economic 
pragmatism during times of economic stress or impending crises and it is to be hoped 
that this approach will prevail in the future. 
 
In an overall sense, it would appear that economic policy over the period has been 
aimed at providing the right policy settings consistent with both economic 
development and in turn economic growth. In moving initially from a relatively 
resource-based economy with a focus on the agricultural and extractive sectors to a 
sequentially more industrialised economy, policy processes and settings need to be 
appropriate for such economic restructuring. In the case of Malaysia, the policy-
making process has continuously been influenced by ethnic and racial factors as 
discussed earlier. In the next chapter there is a far more detailed examination of 
education policies in Malaysia over the relevant period. However when 
industrialisation and the associated changes in production processes are taking place, 
the domestic labour force needs to be suitably trained and skilled. Why is this 
important in the context of the Malaysian economy? The answer can be best related 
to the debate about the process of economic development amongst the various Asian 
economies. Whilst factor accumulation in terms of both capital and labour inputs can 
be maintained for a finite period of time, there comes a point whereby the 
responsibility for growth needs to achieve significant productivity increases. As 
mentioned by some commentators (Jajri 2007), an economy driven by productivity 
growth such as Malaysia will need higher levels of professional, technical, and 
skilled labour across all sectors. Hence the content and direction of macroeconomic 
policy needs to be in line with the content and direction of policies that cover 
education and training, and so the associated quality of not only the current labour 
force, but those individuals entering at some point in the future. 
 
In its 2006 Asian Development Outlook, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
clearly acknowledged that past Malaysian growth has been driven by predominantly 
by physical input accumulation. It also indicated that such accumulation will be 
insufficient in the future as the basis for ongoing growth in more competitive 
regional and global markets and must be replaced by productivity enhancement. As 
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part of that productivity performance, labour skills must be improved if the 
investments in infrastructure projects are to be realised. Effectively industrialisation 
policies cannot be conducted in isolation from education and training policies. Given 
the latter it is salient that the ADB in relation to Malaysia concluded that: 
 
There are concerns, though, about how effectively the education and 
training systems can produce the skills and knowledge needed to assure the 
transition to a more technology-oriented and innovative economy. 
Malaysia’s enrolment performance in tertiary education does not match that 
of some newly industrialized economies. Schools, as in many other 
countries, are characterized by rote learning, excessive pressure to pass 
exams, and an emphasis on uniformity, while the transition to new 
industries and services will require creativity, risk taking, entrepreneurship, 
and adaptability. Such attributes would more likely stem from an education 
system that promotes problem-solving skills, communication, and 
teamwork. 
(Asian Outlook, 2006, p.211) 
 
Whilst macroeconomic transformation and restructuring have successfully occurred 
in the Malaysian economy over this time period, it is important to consider whether 
the education policies adopted and the criteria used for such policies are appropriate. 
This will be conducted in Chapter 4 when the Malaysian educational system is 
examined. In the case of Malaysia, total education expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP has on average exceeded 5.6 per cent of GDP, over the period of 1975 to 2006. 
However it is not clear whether such spending has achieved education and training 
outcomes that are consistent with the accompanying economic transformation. Data 
limitations in respect of expenditures on different levels of education spending such 
as primary, secondary, technical, and university categories for this entire period 
restrict the capacity to conduct more refined research. However there is no doubt that 
macroeconomic policies aimed at achieving rapid economic growth will be less 
effective in productivity terms if the technology associated with capital accumulation 
is not matched with a suitably qualified labour force. 
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Chapter 4: Malaysian Education Policy and 
Impact on the Economy 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the relationship between the ethnic composition of the 
Malaysian population and the key developments in Malaysian education policy. The 
premise of this thesis is that a trained, skilled and a well-educated labour force is 
pivotal in an economy that is attempting to enhance the nature of work, and to 
improve economic performance, and to increase competitiveness during the process 
of industrialisation. Therefore there is a very close nexus between both education 
quantity and quality and in turn the educational profile of the domestic labour force. 
When considering the impact of labour force educational attainment upon the 
performance of the Malaysian economy over this period it is necessary to examine 
the content and direction of state educational policy. There are a number of key 
markers that must be identified when looking at the development of Malaysian 
education policy in this chapter. Section 4.2 will examine the ethnic composition of 
the Malaysian population and its effect upon domestic education policy. Section 4.3 
will in detail the key events in the development of Malaysian educational policy 
since 1957. Section 4.4 will then explain in some detail the breakdown of the policy 
consensus on Malaysian education and particularly after the interethnic May riots of 
1969 associated with the general election of that year. Section 4.5 will examine the 
policy approach after the 1969 riots. Section 4.6 will consider the policy directions 
associated with the end of the New Economic Policy in the early 1990s., and its 
replacement with the National Development Policy in 1991, and in turn the National 
Vision Policy commencing in 2001. Section 4.7 will provide some concluding 
remarks. 
 
Malaysia is distinctive in that its population contains three quite separate ethnic 
groups. These groups have not only kept their separate identities in terms of Malay, 
Chinese, and Indian ethnic groups in relation to the languages that they speak, but 
have also preserved as well as other distinctive cultural elements. This includes 
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diverse factors such as value systems, dress codes, religious practices, and familial 
behaviours (Sendut, Madsen & Thong 1990). Across the population, all members of 
these three ethnic groups possess their own unique cultural framework, belief 
systems, and values. Within the Malaysian economy, the three ethnic groups have 
identities that provide explanations as to those components which are essential for 
their respective prospects and aspirations as strong and continuing entities. 
 
Through various processes and methods of socialisation, these cultural items, belief 
systems, and religious values have all been maintained, if not strengthened, within 
the separate contexts of family, community, religious establishments, social 
institutions, and economic relationships, including their respective workplaces. In the 
period since independence in 1957, those population members from each ethnic 
group have used and demonstrated their separate ethnic identities as part of their 
cultural markers. 
 
Before examining the Malaysian education system and associated policies in detail 
over the period 1975 to 2006, it is important to identify some key characteristics of 
the Malaysian population that reflect some of the factors that have affected 
development of education policy in the Malaysian economy over this period. 
However there is also a fiscal policy dimension to educational services and their 
provision in that education expenditures represent a significant proportion to total 
government outlays. 
 
Given the importance of education to the process of development it is therefore 
important to examine the policy approaches to educational priorities within the 
Malaysian context over the period being examined in this study. Many economists 
such as Tan (2001) have identified Malaysia as the next so-called Asian Tiger 
economy (newly industrialising country) in terms of attaining a developed economy 
status. To achieve such status both the general education of the population and 
educational attainment of the labour force need to be improved significantly. To 
achieve these outcomes education policy is and has been a Federal responsibility and 
has been administered by the Federal Ministry of Education. However both 
educational policy and administration in the Malaysian context has shown an 
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awareness of being responsive to certain conditions that are somewhat unique to the 
Malaysian economy. 
 
Through various processes and methods of socialisation, these cultural items, belief 
systems and religious values have all been maintained, if not strengthened, within the 
separate contexts of family, community, religious establishments, social institutions 
and economic relationships, including their respective workplaces. In the period 
since independence in 1957, those population members from each ethnic group have 
used and demonstrated their separate ethnic identities as part of their cultural 
markers. Even as early as 1948, commentators such as Furnivall (1948) described 
Malaysian society as a plural society which could be characterised by having 
different sections of the community living side by side, but separately within the 
same political unit. Moreover even in the economic sphere, there is a division of 
labour along racial and ethnic lines. 
 
4.2 The Ethnic Composition of the Malaysian Population 
 
Given the colonial status of Malaysia for much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, it is not surprising that with the end of official British rule in 1957, a 
system often labelled communalism remained intact. Colonial policy, whilst not 
always openly or overtly encouraging divisions between the three main ethnic 
Malaysian communities, did not discourage the development of a pluralistic society, 
based on clear ethnic divisions. The Malay, Chinese, and Indian, communities not 
only spoke different languages, but usually followed different religions, and have 
adhered to different cultural practices and varying traditional values. In turn these 
differences were only intensified by the impact of rapidly-changing ethnic criteria in 
terms of participation on the shape and structure of various political, economic, and 
educational institutions. 
 
According to the Malaysian Census 2000, the total population of Malaysia was 
approximately 23 million, of which 21 million (95 per cent) were Malaysian citizens. 
In the total of Malaysian citizens, the Malays and other indigenous groups (namely 
Bumiputra) comprised over 66.1 per cent, the Chinese 25.3 per cent and Indians 7.4 
per cent (Malaysia 2002), respectively. Malays overwhelmingly speak Malay and 
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their religion is Islam. Alternatively, the Chinese primarily speak Mandarin and their 
religious preferences will either be Buddhism, Confucianism or Taoism. The 
smallest community, the Indian, are mainly Hindus whose ancestors came from 
Southern India, and they speak Tamil. All three ethnic groups will often use English, 
as a by-product of the British colonial period. However English is not an official 
language or a common language across the country. Malay is Malaysia’s only 
national language. It is regulated in the Constitution of Malaysia. Moreover the 
National Language Act prescribes the predominance of Malay as the national 
language over other languages spoken in Malaysia. 
 
The estimated population in the Eighth Malaysia Plan shows the growth of the 
multiethnic population in Malaysia in 2005, where the Malays will comprise 
approximately 67.3 per cent, Chinese 24.5 per cent and the Indians 7.2 per cent of the 
total population,. As the results of the 2010 Census for Malaysia are still not 
available, the estimates for 2005 will be used in this study as shown in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Population Growth in Relation to Separate Ethnic Groups in 
Malaysia, 1995–2000 
Population 1995 
(Millions) 
 % 
Of Total 
Citizens 
2000 
(Millions) 
% 
Of Total 
Citizens 
2005 
(Millions) 
% 
Of Total 
Citizens 
Citizens 19.68 100 22.04 100 24.66 100 
Total (including 
noncitizens) 
20.68  23.27  26.04  
Malay/Bumiputra 12.47 63.3 14.56 66.1 16.59 67.3 
Chinese 5.22 26.5 5.58 25.3 6.04 24.5 
Indian 1.49 7.6 1.63 7.4 1.78 7.2 
Others 0.50 2.6 0.27 1.2 0.25 1.0 
Noncitizen 1.00  1.23  1.38  
Source: Malaysian Department of Statistics, 2007 
 
The different ethnic identities have constituted a multiethnic or pluralistic nature in 
Malaysian society. As members of distinct cultural communities, Malays, Chinese 
and Indians have been naturally inclined to identify with their respective languages, 
cultures and religions, and so strive to actively to preserve and encourage them (Lee 
2000). 
According to Lee (2000) ethnicity remains the most significant force in Malaysia 
even if its influence has been somewhat adulterated by other social stratifying factors 
such as class and gender. The empirical study found that the three major ethnic 
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groups in Malaysia were heterogeneous (Fontaine, Richardson & Foong 2002). The 
ethnic beliefs, languages, socioeconomic backgrounds and customs and traditions are 
deeply rooted, and they often had a significant influence on policy production in 
Malaysia education system. It was obvious, therefore, that the ethnic dimensions of 
all the major ethnic groups have been intricately linked into the Malaysian education 
policy production (Mano, 1986). 
 
Since the socioeconomic structure of Malaysia, before and after independence, has 
been ethnically stratified, it is not surprising that the Malaysian political and policy-
making process, responding to this reality, has been organised on this basis. 
Accordingly, the practice of ethnic-based political parties reinforced the distinction 
of Malaysia’s numerous ethnic communities. In this sense, most of the political 
parties in Malaysia were mere pressure groups seeking privileges and advantages for 
their ethnically oriented members (Saad 1979). They always act as a mediator, in 
terms of not only preserving, but strengthening, ethnic symbols and interests. Over 
the period that this thesis examines, ethnic differences have been given an important 
part of Malaysian political dimension, and so educational issues have been being 
structured and debated around ethnic dimensions and criteria. 
 
4.3 The Malaysian Education System and Policy: Development and 
Change Since 1957 
 
When examining the Malaysian economy over the period 1975 to 2006, and the 
various policy approaches including education policy, it is necessary to place each 
policy in the context of ethnic imperatives on one hand and the various challenges 
posed by ethnic differences on the other. The latter can be a problem when new 
educational policies are adopted and the ethnic divisions within Malaysian society 
produce difficulties in terms of not only implementation, but also the initial 
production of policy initiatives. To be more specific, Malaysian policymakers have 
always been conscious of various ethnic criteria when formulating policy options. 
Harris (1990) points out, that these issues in Malaysian education have reflected 
various elements of national and ethnic divisions, if not often have been prejudiced, 
by beliefs suggesting the superiority of one ethnic group 
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The contemporary Malaysian education system can be traced back to when the 
British initially introduced secular education by establishing the first English school 
in Pulau Pinang in 1816. While the Malaysian education system was initially based 
upon the British system as a by-product of the British Colonial period, it has 
undergone some important changes since 1957, and particularly 1960. It has 
represented a key plank of National Development Policy since that period. Over the 
period 1975 to 2006 much of the focus of policy was spent on nation-building and on 
improving national unity through the development of a unified education system, a 
national curriculum, and the overt adoption of Bahasa Melayu (the national 
language) as the medium of instruction and communication. In terms of the actual 
organisation, the Malaysian education system is based on a 6-3-2-2 system. Hence, 
primary education takes place over a six-year period whilst lower secondary 
education takes place over a three-year period. In turn upper secondary education, it 
operates over a two-year period, and pre-university education also over a two-year 
period. 
 
In relation to different types of schools at the primary and secondary levels, there are 
three types of national primary schools. The dominant type is called the Malay 
medium national schools. In these schools Malay is the only instructional language 
used. The remaining two types are called Chinese medium schools and the Tamil 
medium schools, where the respective instructional languages are Mandarin and 
Tamil, respectively. However in both of these schools Bahasa Malay is a compulsory 
subject. At the secondary level there is only one type of school, namely the Malay 
medium secondary school. The restricted nature of secondary schools in terms of the 
language used meant that effectively final year primary school students from Chinese 
medium schools and the Tamil medium schools have been required to complete an 
additional year of Malay language schooling before they can transfer to a secondary 
school. A final observation that must be made is that until 2003, primary education 
although increasingly available and free to all ethnic groups across the population 
was not compulsory. A number of possible explanations have been offered as to why 
compulsory primary education was not introduced until 2003, but the general view is 
that it has been a by-product of the ethnic differences that have characterised 
Malaysian society, particularly since the late 1960s. It has been proposed that 
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compulsory education would have particularly disadvantaged the Bumiputra 
population and especially in rural areas where the concept of the tradition of all 
family members, regardless of age or gender, were to be available to work. 
 
However as part of this policy approach there have been clear goals set in terms of 
achieving a significant increase in enrolment. As Table 4.2 indicates there have been 
significant increases in enrolment at both the primary and secondary levels over the 
period 1956 to 2006. Consequently universal access to education at both the primary 
and lower secondary levels has been achieved. However the pathway to those 
outcomes requires a much more detailed examination. 
 
Table 4.2 Student Enrolment in Primary and Secondary Schools in Malaysia, 
1956–2006 
Year Primary Schools Secondary Schools 
1956 789,287 72,586 
1958 1,007,829 96,902 
1960 1,078,829 118,336 
1962 1,124,483 134,374 
1964 1,382,033 203,995 
1966 1,503,954 387,342 
1968 1,613,460 501,447 
1970 1,676,083 539,030 
1972 1,761,924 638,775 
1974 1,836,134 751,008 
1976 1,896,155 864,956 
1978 1,966,155 997,501 
1980 2,006,746 1041,587 
1982 2,071,802 1127,144 
1984 2,146,756 1247,683 
1986 2,199,096 137,452 
1988 NA NA 
1990 2,455,525 147,975 
1992 2,540,623 1,511,084 
1994 NA NA 
1996 2,810,000 203,897 
1998 2,887,753 2,176,863 
2000 3,025,977 2,205,426 
2002 3,009,009 2,300,062 
2004 3,159,376 2,583,993 
2006 3,133,399 269,321 
Source: Education in Malaysia; prepared by Educational Planning and Research Division, Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia, 1986, page 20. 
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators; http://data.worldbank.org/topic/education 
Source: Indicators for Malaysia, Trading Economics. 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malaysia/indicators/ 
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The starting point of policy for the post-independence period was the result of an 
agreement reached among the major ethnic communities (Malay, Chinese and 
Indian). There was a consensus among political elites from the three major ethnic 
groups which could be viewed as a binding agreement among all major ethnic groups 
in Malaysia. In both state political and public discourse, the consensus among the 
major ethnic groups was commonly understood as a social contract among them. 
This contained provisions which protected the legitimate interests of each 
community in the country, which is enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution. It 
clearly distinguished the special rights of the Malay and other ethnic groups’ rights 
as the citizens in Malaysia pluralist society. This has been considered as 
underpinning elements for a guiding principle of Malaysian independence and 
further development of the country. 
 
In this sense, ethnic compromise among the major ethnic groups was an important 
aspect that enabled the nation to gain independence from the British. Hence, it also 
framed educational policy in Malaysia when Malaysia was independent, as 
manifested in the Report of the Education Committee or often referred to as the 
Razak Report (1956), which became the most significant document during this 
period in terms of influencing the development and direction of Malaysian education 
(Roff 1974). Amongst the important aspects in this report were the suggestions that 
the Malay language become a compulsory subject to be taught in schools, and 
gradually become the sole official language after 1967 (Lim 1985). This was based 
on the belief that the process of uniting the nation could only be achieved with 
national language through its implementation in the educational system. 
Significantly, the Razak Report (1956) stated: 
 
We believe further that the ultimate objective of educational policy in this 
country must be to bring together the children of all races under a national 
educational system in which the national language is the main medium of 
instruction, though we recognise that progress towards this goal cannot be 
rushed and must be gradual. 
(Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee 1956, p.3, 
paragraph 12) 
 
At the secondary level, the Razak Report granted official approval for three language 
media schools, namely Malay, English, and Chinese mediums of instruction. The 
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Chinese medium would be allowed if it conformed to certain curricular conditions 
and more importantly accommodated the compulsory teaching of both Malay and 
English. The report’s recommendations on the goal and function of secondary 
education revealed the accommodation stance and assurance that particular ethnic 
groups would have their interests taken into consideration within the framework of a 
national education policy. 
 
This statement regarding the language aspect in education was perhaps to lessen 
concern with cultural claims and interests when an emphasis on national solidarity 
was crucial for independence. The collaboration and co-operation among the three 
major ethnic groups in the political field on the way towards independence meant 
that a compromise would have to be agreed and achieved by the leaders of the 
ethnic-based political parties. It also meant that any major decision made by the 
government would have to take into consideration the opinions and views of all 
ethnic groups: 
 
One of the primary functions is to foster and encourage the culture and 
languages of the Malayan community and we see no educational objection 
to the learning of three languages in secondary schools or the use of more 
than one language in the same school as the medium of instruction. 
 
(Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee 1956, p. 3) 
 
In 1960, a new committee was appointed to review the implementation of the Razak 
Report (1956). This education review committee produced their report, the Report of 
the Education Review Committee 1960, or commonly known as the Rahman Talib 
Report of 1960. This committee accepted and recognised that the Razak Report of 
1956 had ‘succeeded in recommending an educational policy which is national in its 
scope and propose, while at the same time preserving and sustaining the various 
cultures of the country’, (Federation of Malaya 1960, p. 3). 
 
While it recognised the reports of 1956 as accomplishing the interests of various 
ethnic groups in education system in Malaysia, this committee also stressed on the 
need for urgent policy action to achieve the ultimate objective of the adoption of a 
national language as stated in Razak Report. In addition to achieving the ultimate 
objective of national language, as a start for implementing national language as 
 60 
 
medium of instruction in primary level, the committee suggested that ‘primary 
education in Malay must also be made available to more children by the introduction, 
for a start of Malay medium streams in what were formerly government English 
primary schools’ (Federation of Malaya, 1960, paragraph 133). It is clear that these 
policy recommendations represented the government’s attempts to strengthen 
Bumiputra through both control of the curriculum and selective budget allocation to 
Malay schools. This, according to the committee, is an ‘essential move towards the 
ultimate objective of making Malay the main medium of instruction in all schools’ 
(Federation of Malaya 1960, p.28). 
 
Based on the Rahman Talib Report, the multilingual primary schools were 
recommended to continue, but wider recognition was to be given to both Mandarin 
and Tamil within the primary school framework. The review also introduced changes 
at the secondary level, which furthered the principle of a unified Malay language, 
and government-aided education system (Federation of Malaya, 1960, p.49). The 
report took the view that after independence, the Malay language should unilaterally 
assume a dominant place after a period of ten years period. As such, after 1967 the 
Malay language was expected to be the main medium of instruction at the secondary 
schools, with provisions for teaching the other languages only as elective subjects. 
 
It is understandable that the 1960 Education Review Committee Report suggestion 
represented an overall aim to improve and realise the policy framework that had been 
set up by the report of 1956. However, such suggestions as converting the English 
medium primary schools to Malay medium were understandable in the contemporary 
situation. This was a time when the state needed to increasingly accommodate the 
Malay interests in education and at the same time needed to diplomatically meet the 
recognition of other ethnic groups for their respective languages. This delicate issue 
needed to be tackled appropriately to ensure that the policy implementation was not 
contradicted with what has been stated in the policy text of encouraging greater use 
of Malay. Therefore, English was seen as a neutral option for implementing the 
policy that did not adversely impact each ethnic group’s interests in relation to 
language education. In other words, English was not to be regarded as a mother 
tongue for other ethnic groups. It was simply to be used as a transitional tool. It was 
therefore was accommodated to the Malay nationalistic phase during the time of 
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post-independence so as to eliminate the colonial legacy in the education system, in 
order to gradually, but inextricably, develop the new Malay national identity. 
 
In a sense of developing a national outlook for Malaysian education system, the 
Rahman Talib Report 1960 had made a further change to the Chinese school system. 
This report recommended that all pupils of all secondary schools, irrespective of the 
medium of instruction, would be required to sit government public examinations in 
the country’s official language that was either Malay or English. The committee 
explained that: 
The only way to reconcile the existing basic objectives of education policy 
which are to create a national consciousness while at the same time 
preserving and sustaining the various cultures of the country is to conduct 
education at the primary level in the language of the family and thereafter 
to reduce the language and racial differential in our educational system. For 
the sake of national unity, the objective must be to eliminate communal 
secondary schools from the national system of assisted schools and to 
ensure that pupils of all races shall attend both national and national-type 
secondary schools. An essential requirement of this policy is that public 
examination at secondary level should be conducted only in the country’s 
official language. 
(Federation of Malaya 1960, p. 31) 
 
The belief of the importance of national language as the medium of instruction and to 
eliminate ethnic and language differences in the education system was consistently 
stated in this report as requirement of the policy as ‘acceptable to the people as a 
whole’ (Federation of Malaya 1960, p.52). 
 
It is clear that the committee also held the belief that for the nation to be united it 
must be based on the notion of one language for one nation. While suggesting 
continuing primary education in mother tongue, the committee also viewed that this 
was contradicted with the education policy designed to promote both national 
language and national consciousness amongst children from different ethnic groups: 
 
The first requirement was met by providing for the time being at public 
expense primary education in the language of the family. It would, 
however, be incompatible with an educational policy designed to create 
national consciousness and having intention of making the Malay language 
the national language of the country to extend and to perpetuate a language 
and racial differential throughout the publicly-financed educational system. 
 (Federation of Malaya 1960, p.3) 
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Being different from the Razak Report 1956 that allowed the existence of a 
vernacular system whereby different racial or ethnic groups could continue to use 
specific language options apart from the dominant national language, this report put 
forward the idea that the ethnic and language differences in education system should 
be reduced or minimised in order to create national consciousness based on the 
dominant Malay language. Based on this principle, the committee rejected any ethnic 
demands that would have broken down the national education system. 
 
 It was not possible, within the framework of a policy which was truly 
national, to have satisfied completely all the individual demands of each 
cultural and language group in the country 
(Federation of Malaya 1960, p.3) 
 
The suggestions about the education system changes in this report had brought two 
key implications for the subsequent Malaysian education policy development. 
Despite the fact that this report recognised the need to fulfil the interest of the ethnic 
minority of their mother tongue, this committee also tried to reduce the pressure of 
language and ethnic differences in education system. The suggestion of eliminating 
Chinese schools to bring them into the national education system and at the same 
time provide opportunity for education through mother tongue at primary level had 
another agenda. It could be viewed as a compromise aspect of a policy strategy 
aiming for gradual change of the education system towards a single national 
language. This was based on compromise or accommodative strategy to avoid 
conflict with the policy statement that also recognised other ethnic groups’ rights to 
develop, learn and use their mother tongue in education system. The development of 
national education policy in 1960s represented an attempt to attain the goals of 
national integration and unity. 
 
In this sense, the construction of this policy had been based on a belief that this was 
to be achieved through a plural school system and an ambivalent language policy. 
This period was often referred to as a period of education policy for accommodation 
(Santhiram, 1999) of the different interests amongst different ethnic groups in respect 
of education. Accordingly, the development of the educational policies in this period 
involved collaboration and co-operation, if not some degree of consensus, among the 
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three major ethnic groups in the political field. It set the scene for political bargaining 
and striking fair deals for the ethnic members and an accommodative state strategy in 
education in terms of creating a policy mix that was catering to the diverse needs of 
Malaysia’s plural society. 
 
As a result of the 1960 report, the Education Act of 1961 was introduced. Primary 
education was restructured as a result of this new legislation. Whilst fully assisted, 
there were now to be four types of primary schools. These were Malay national 
primary schools, and primary schools in three other languages. The latter were 
English, Chinese, and Tamil national-type primary schools. In relation to secondary 
education, there were to be only two types. These were Malay national-type 
secondary schools and English national-type secondary schools. However Chinese 
and Tamil secondary schools were to be abolished and/or converted to either Malay 
or English secondary schools. Significantly, many of those students who would have 
previously attended either Chinese or Tamil secondary schools, preferred to attend 
English secondary schools as opposed to the Malay alternative. As a result of these 
changes, there was a significant expansion in both primary and particularly lower 
secondary education, as shown in both Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 Student Enrolment of Different Educational Levels in Public Schools 
in West Malaysia, 1960–2000 
Educational Level 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Primary 1,078,615 1,679,798 2,008,587 2,447,206 2,945,906 
Lower Secondary 88,982 432,703 812,065 942,801 1245523 
Upper Secondary 25,733 99,637 247,889 361,411 697,223 
Post-Secondary 1,556 13,635 31,498 72,125 76,755 
Tertiary 8,071 14,291 50,056 124,463 336,189 
Total 1,202,957 2,240,064 3,150,095 3,948,006 5,301,596 
Source: Malaysian Department of Statistics 
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Table 4.4 Annual Increases in Student Enrolment of Different Educational 
Levels in Public Schools in West Malaysia, 1960–2000 
Educational Level 1960–1970 
(%) 
1970–1980 
(%) 
1980–1990 
(%) 
1990–2000 
(%) 
Primary 5.6 2.0 2.2 2.0 
Lower Secondary 38.6 8.8 1.6 3.3 
Upper Secondary 28.7 14.9 4.6 9.3 
Post-Secondary 77.6 13.1 12.9 0.6 
Tertiary 7.7 25.0 14.9 17.0 
Total 8.6 4.1 2.5 3.4 
Source: Malaysian Department of Statistics 
 
4.4 The Riots of May 1969: The End of the Malaysian Educational 
Policy Consensus 
 
In early independence, the government has compromised in its policy production at 
achieving the goal of building a nation through education, especially when related to 
the issue of the language instruction in the educational system. However, such 
educational policy was not successful enough in preventing, or at least ameliorating, 
the level of growing ethnic discontent, particularly between Malays and Chinese. 
During the 1969 general election, the flow of votes towards opposition political 
parties with their narrow communal interests gave communal and primordial 
interests priority, because of the obvious ethnic issues that dominated during the 
election campaign. Among the salient education issues of the election campaign, 
there was the demand for an education system using all the languages of the 
population as medium of instruction (Vasil 1971). 
 
On 13 May 1969, savage communal riots took place in Kuala Lumpur which led to 
violent clashes between the Malay majority and non-Malays (primarily Chinese). As 
a result over 190 people lost their lives, according to official police statistics. Other 
commentators have estimated much higher losses occurred. The riots occurred some 
three days after the 1969 election which took place on 10 May. The election result 
saw the ruling Alliance Party under the Prime Ministership of Tunku Abdul Rahman 
lose a significant number of seats. The Alliance Party was in fact a coalition of 
United Malays National Organization lead by Tunku Abdul Rahman and the 
Malaysian Chinese Association. The Alliance Party had been in power at the Federal 
level since Malaya achieved independence in August, 1957. It also included the 
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Malaysian Indian Congress as a very junior member. The alliance represented the 
type of political party model that the British government had hoped would emerge 
out of the Malay Federation when it was granted independence in 1957. Rather than 
a true multiracial party, the alliance represented a coalition or alternative construct in 
which exclusively communal parties were mainly represented by members of higher 
socioeconomic groups and professionals. As a result inter-elite bargaining and 
accommodations took place concentrating on political aspirations and economic 
advantage priorities that could achieve and maintain government on a harmonious 
basis. 
 
However in the 1969 May election, the alliance, whilst maintaining a majority, had 
suffered significant losses both at the Federal level and in certain key state elections 
such as Selangor, Penang, and Kelantan,. Moreover, the ruling alliance coalition 
government secured less than half of the popular vote, but was able to retain power 
with the assistance of a gerrymandered electoral distribution of seats (Jomo 2004). In 
response to the election results, members of the mainly pro-Chinese opposition 
parties such as the Democratic Action Party and the Malaysian People's Movement 
Party staged celebratory processions through Kuala Lumpur, including 
predominantly Malay areas that provoked angry responses from not only Malay 
political leaders, but also the Malay community generally. In response the United 
Malays National Organization Youth Association demanded that a counter 
procession be held. The latter was approved and as the procession took place, a 
number of incidents involving clashes between Chinese and Malay activists in 
various parts of the capital and the surrounding state of Selangor. The procession 
then escalated into a complete riot whereby Chinese individuals and properties were 
attacked. It is estimated that part from the official death toll, over 6,000 residents of 
Kuala Lumpur were rendered homeless. It is estimated that the vast majority of these 
were Chinese. Whilst the interethnic violence was mainly confined to Kuala Lumpur 
and the surrounding state of Selangor, there were associated clashes in Penang, 
Perak, Malacca, and not surprisingly Singapore. In response to the violence the 
government announced a State of Emergency across the entire nation. Moreover 
strict curfews were imposed in areas affected by the violence. Finally Parliamentary 
government was suspended and did not return until February 1971. A major casualty 
of these riots was the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman who was replaced by his 
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deputy Tun Abdul Razak in September 1970. A key advantage associated with Tun 
Abdul Razak was that during the suspension of the national Parliament, he was 
appointed the head of the National Operations Council. The latter entity became the 
supreme decision-making body over the period from May 16, 1969, until the 
restoration of Parliament in February of 1971. 
 
The riots in May 1969 showed that the development programs of the late 1960s had 
failed to meet the challenges of national integration and unity, and serious rethinking 
of this problem began. The government determined that this ethnic conflict was 
primarily apparent because of public dissatisfaction over the great disparity of 
income and wealth between the Malays and the non-Malays, and particularly the 
Chinese. The dissatisfaction about economic imbalance, particularly amongst the 
Malay who felt there was unequal distribution of income and opportunity, was 
underlined as the most significant element of ethnic tensions. Accordingly, the May 
13 tragedy has been regarded as a catalyst for fundamental policy changes in 
Malaysian public policy after 1971, including the direction and goals of national 
education policy. 
 
From a global policy perspective, the riots and the ensuing political changes led to 
the formation of the New Economic Policy that was introduced by the new Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak in February 1971. The New Economic Policy is 
alternatively referred to as the First Outline Perspective Plan, 1971 to 1990. It lasted 
as policy until 1990 when it was replaced by the National Development Policy in 
1991. The New Economic Policy had the twin key targets of reducing, if not 
eradicating, poverty, on one hand, and to achieve a fundamental economic 
restructuring of the Malaysian economy. Therefore the underlying aim of this policy 
was to break down the linkage between ethnic identification as a community with 
particular economic functions in terms of both income and wealth levels. It also 
represented a major departure from the pre-1969/70 focus on national integration and 
a move towards explicit policies that assisted Bumiputras (and other indigenous 
minorities), in contrast to the Chinese and Indian communities. In a more concrete 
policy fashion, the New Economic Policy was represented by the second, third, 
fourth, and fifth Malaysia Plans over the period 1971 to 1991. 
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As part of the New Economic Policy and in turn the National Development Policy, 
there was a strong emphasis upon improvement in the domestic literacy performance 
across not only different ethnic groups, but also across gender lines. 
 
Table 4.5 Literacy Rates of 15–19 Year Olds by Ethnic Group in Malaysia, 
1970–2000 
Year Bumiputra (%) Chinese (%) Indian (%) 
1970 91.0 94.0 87.0 
1980 96.0 97.0 92.0 
1991 95.9 98.4 96.9 
2000 98.3 99.6 98.7 
Source: Malaysia Department of Statistics, 1983a, 1991a, and 2000d 
 
Table 4.6 Literacy Rates of 15–24 Year Olds by Gender in Malaysia, 1970–2000 
Year Female (%) Male (%) All (%) 
1970 68.0 83.0 75.0 
1980 89.9 94.0 91.9 
1991 95.3 95.9 95.6 
2000 97.3 97.2 97.2 
Source: Malaysia Department of Statistics, 1983a, 1991a, and 2000d 
 
4.5 The Policy Approach after the 1969 Riots 
 
The period after the 1969 ethnic riots, specifically beginning from February 1971 
was marked as the starting point for changing policy orientation of the state in 
developing a united Malaysian nation. Since then, national unity has become more 
important and has repeatedly led the government to implement policies with the 
special intention of national integration. In view of interethnic economic disparity as 
a major problem precipitating ethnic tension that brings the turmoil into existence 
(Malaysia 1976), the state believed that ethnic tension could be resolved by 
accommodating such dissatisfaction amongst particular ethnic groups. Therefore, 
discussions on economic disparity between ethnic groups, has required the state to 
form a united multiethnic society on the basis of equality in the distribution of 
resources and prosperity. Specifically, for the state, the condition for developing a 
united and harmonious Malaysian nation was to narrow the gap of economic and 
social status between the Malays and other ethnic communities, especially the 
Chinese. In this context education policy was critical to facilitate this objective. In 
addition, the state also believed that language issues and particular ethnic groups’ 
dissatisfaction with the liberal approach in implementing the spirit of education 
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policy since independence was amongst the important causes of the riots (Malaysia 
1971; Kheng 2002; Wahid 2005). 
 
Framed by these beliefs of ethnic groups’ conflict, the government orientated their 
various policies to improve the social, economic, culture and language status of the 
ethnic Malay majority. This was very much the approach of the New Economic 
Policy. Since then, the state policy, which has generally been viewed as providing 
preference to Malays (also regarded as Bumiputra) policy (Mason & Omar 2003), 
and also been viewed as an overt affirmative policy for the Bumiputra, directed 
policy implementation to enhance the social and economic position of the 
disadvantaged ethnic majority. This policy also focused on implementing the ethnic 
aspirations on language and culture of the dominant majority for the Malaysian 
nation. 
 
Based on this premise, the New Economic Policy was initiated by the government as 
a vehicle to unite the nation post 1970, in response to the ethnic violence in 1969. 
The New Economic Policy’s strategy had two objectives. Firstly, it emphasised the 
eradication of poverty among all in Malaysian society, irrespective of ethnic group. 
Secondly it aimed at the restructuring of Malaysian society to correct economic 
imbalance, specifically to reduce and eliminate the identification of Malay and other 
indigenous people with primarily low income levels and agricultural pursuits 
(Malaysia 1971a). The government believed that both strategies were major aspects 
for enhancing national unity by ensuring a more equitable distribution of income and 
opportunities. The intention of further policy development was to ensure that this 
source of ethnic group conflict could be eradicated. 
 
The period of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971 to 1975 had been the most pronounced 
phase in stipulating the objective of New Economic Policy. In line with the New 
Economic Policy’s strategy, national integration in this five-year plan could be 
understood in terms of social integration through fairer distribution of income and 
opportunities within Malaysian society (Malaysia 1971a). In this development plan, 
the main discussion in uniting the nation was to ensure that the majority Malay 
ethnic group could be assisted regarding their social and economic situation. This 
guided the state policy orientation post 1970 to develop a united and harmonious 
 69 
 
Malaysian nation. In this regard, the approach of the Second Malaysia Plan and 
future development plans were to help build national unity through development, in 
which progress as a united nation (Malaysia 1971b) based on equal distribution of 
wealth amongst the multi ethnic society in Malaysia, whilst ensuring that the status 
and rights of the dominant ethnic group will be strengthened. 
 
The then Prime Minister Abdul Razak bin Hussein, when presenting the motion on 
the Second Malaysia Plan in the House of Parliament on 12 July 1971, pointed out 
that national unity depending on how the state could ensure the interethnic disparities 
in economic and social position could be resolved: 
 
From our past experience, we fully realise that it is not sufficient to provide 
only the economic infrastructure. This is obvious from the events of May 
13, 1969, which mostly tore this nation asunder. The lesson to be learnt 
from this painful event makes it imperative for all of us to foster national 
unity and harmony among the various races which are at present 
compartmentalized not only according to their way of life and culture, but 
even more significant is the existence of imbalances in the economic 
conditions among the races today. 
(Malaysia 1971b, p. 3) 
 
While the intention of such policy was improving the economic dimension and 
standing for Bumiputras, discussions on Bumiputraism also required the Second 
Malaysia Plan to focus on education. It identified that education ought to be the 
major instrument in promoting unity among all Malaysians by providing an 
opportunity for social and economic mobility within society. In the period of the 
1970s, many developed education policies were adopted within the introduction of 
New Economic Policy and supported the dominant ethnic group’s aspirations 
regarding language and culture of the nation. 
 
As to serve the New Economic Policy’s aims and objectives, the production of 
Malaysian education policy post 1970 can be seen as central amongst the New 
Economic Policy’s strategies for promoting social mobility for the Malay majority 
(Ganguly 1997). This policy also can be regarded as a vehicle to implement the so-
called affirmative action to uplift the Malays (Omar 2003), who constituted the 
majority, but were significantly economically disadvantaged. From a similar 
perspective, Mohamad (2005) saw that the purpose of such policy was for group 
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enhancement, and was often considered a refined tool of the state for social 
engineering in restructuring the ethnic disparity in respect of economic opportunities 
and standing. Thus, this approach opened a new era of determination to overcome 
ethnic divisions, to develop and build Malaysia nation (De Micheaux 1997). 
 
4.6 After the New Economic Policy: The National Development 
Policy 
 
After the end of the period of New Economic Policy in 1991, the government 
introduced a new policy, named the National Development Policy which was a 
successor of the New Economic Policy. The National Development Policy had 
become the basis for developing the country during the subsequent ten years (1990–
2000). In this policy, education was identified as an important enabler to foster 
national unity. It showed that the government was constantly concerned about the 
role of education as the most important factor that had an impact on national 
integration. The state re-expressed this aspect of education’s role: 
 
To inculcate and nurture national consciousness through fostering common 
ideals, values, aspiration and loyalties in order to mould national unity and 
national identity in a multiethnic society. 
(Malaysia 1990, p.) 
 
In the fifth Malaysia Plan (1986–1990), the state further strengthened the role of 
education in promoting national unity, expressing the Malay language as important 
instrument for achieving this goal. 
 
The implementation of the use of Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of 
instruction, served to strengthen the basis for national unity in that it 
promoted effective communication among Malaysians through a common 
language. 
(Malaysia 1986, p. 6) 
 
To achieve these aims two key policy initiatives were introduced in the form of the 
1996 Education Act and the 1997 Vision School Project. The 1996 Education Act 
repealed previous legislation that allowed the Malaysian Minister of Education to 
effectively take over non-Malay primary schools and integrate them into the national 
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primary school system where Malay was the exclusive language of instruction. This 
legislative change was reflective of the desire of policymakers to create an 
environment whereby assimilation was encouraged. It was also an important 
development in terms of reassuring the Chinese community as to their ability to 
maintain their own schools at both the primary and secondary levels. 
 
The 1997 Vision School Project was a by-product of the Malaysia Multi-Media 
Super Corridor project. Under this initiative the Malaysian government was aiming 
to build 90 so-called Smart Schools at both primary and secondary levels whereby 
students would be exposed to a range of new technologies within a learning 
environment. The aim was to better prepare students to deal with the challenges of 
the information age. Moreover Malaysian students by undergoing this program 
would become knowledgeable and skilled workers in an era of continuing 
technological change and challenges. 
 
The National Development Policy was supported by the latter legislative changes, 
and was eventually to be known as the National Vision Policy. This latter plan aimed 
at developing the country to be a developed country by 2020, and was originated by 
the idea of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, when he delivered a 
speech entitled ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’ to the Malaysian Business Council on 
28th February 1991. This speech, commonly known as Vision 2020, has been 
officially accepted as the basis for developing the nation in the 21st century to 
become a developed country with targeted date of 2020. 
 
Malaysia should not be developed in economic sense. It must be a nation 
that is fully developed along all dimensions: economically, politically, 
socially, spiritually, psychologically and culturally. We must be fully 
developed in terms of our economy, in terms of social justice, political 
stability, system of government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, 
national pride and confidence. 
(Mahathir Mohammad, 1991, ‘Malaysia The Way Forward’) 
 
The concept of Vision 2020 produced twenty challenges for the Malaysian nation to 
achieve the status of developed country by 2020, but in Malaysia’s own fashion. In 
Vision 2020, the discourse of developing and integrating the nation surrounds these 
challenges that Malaysia needs to conquer in order to become a fully developed 
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country. The importance of national unity was the key challenge for the nation as it 
had been stated as the first challenge of establishing a united Malaysian nation. 
 
There can be no fully developed Malaysia until we have finally overcome the nine 
central strategic challenges that have confronted us from the moment of our birth as 
an independent nation. The first of these is the challenge of establishing a united 
Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny. This must be a nation 
at peace with ‘itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full 
and fair partnership, made up of one Bangsa Malaysia with political loyalty and 
dedication of the nation’ (Mahathir Mohammad, 1991, Malaysia: ‘The Way 
Forward’). 
 
Specifically, the National Development Policy was to produce an education policy 
consistent with contemporary changes in the Malaysian economy. In order to move 
to the production of more capital-intensive goods as opposed to labour-intensive 
goods, it was important to devote resources to both technical and higher education. 
As Malaysia found it increasingly difficult to compete with the low-wage economies 
of other Southeast Asian economies such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, it was 
decided to re-orient towards capital-intensive goods. Moreover by increasing 
resource allocation to both technical and higher education, there was a clear 
expectation to generate both higher labour productivity as well as the capacity to 
innovate. Both of the latter were seen as holding back the growth of the economy. 
Therefore three key objectives were enunciated as being at the forefront of 
educational policy. There were, an enrolment rate of 40 per cent of the eligible age 
class in tertiary education by 2020 as opposed to the seven per cent being achieved in 
1991, a participation rate across in higher education in technical and scientific 
disciplines of 60 per cent as opposed to the 40 per cent being achieved in 1991, and 
finally, the transition of Malaysian higher education into a viable export industry 
across the Asian region It is clear education policy was aiming at improving labour 
force skills and training over this forecast period so as better match labour with 
changing capital and technology mixes. 
 
The National Vision Policy embraced and built upon the critical thrusts of the 
previous development policies, such as New Economic Policy and National 
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Development Policy with the principal objective of national unity (Malaysia 2001a). 
It was introduced in 2001 and was alternatively known as the Third Outline 
Perspective Plan. However, the different and new discussions in Vision 2020 about 
uniting the nation were primarily concerned with the construction of Bangsa 
Malaysia, which referred to the integrated nation of a multiethnic society with 
common identity and loyalty to the nation, a harmonious society sharing the wealth 
and economic opportunity of the country. In harmony with the latter strategy, the 
National Vision Policy was to continue the broad objectives of eradicating poverty 
and reduce imbalances of wealth and incomes along, ethnic and racial lines by 
directly focusing on regional development. This included the diversification of the 
economic structures of less developed states, particularly in Northern Peninsular 
Malaysia as well as the Eastern Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak and 
accelerating economic development in rural areas. Other broad objectives included 
improving the quality of urban services and promoting specific so-called Growth 
Triangles across Malaysia, involving both Thailand and Indonesia, as a 
contemporary example. 
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Table 4.7 Key Events in Malaysian Educational Policy, 1956–2006 
Year Event Policy Effects 
1956 Report of the Education 
Committee 1956 (or Razak Report) 
Malay language and English language were 
to be compulsory subjects for all primary and 
secondary schools 
1956 Report of the Education 
Committee 1956 (or Razak Report) 
Malay language was to be the sole official 
language after 1967 
1960 Report of the Education 
Committee 1960 (or Rahmin Talib 
Report) 
Primary education in all public schools be 
free 
1960 Report of the Education 
Committee 1960 (or Rahmin Talib 
Report) 
All government secondary schools should use 
only Malay or English languages for 
instruction 
1960 Report of the Education 
Committee 1960 (or Rahmin Talib 
Report) 
All Chinese or Tamil medium secondary 
schools should be closed and converted to 
either Malay or English languages for 
instruction  
1961 Education Act of 1961 Provided the Minister of Education with the 
power to convert national-type primary 
schools using non-Malay as a medium of 
instruction into national primary schools 
using Malay 
1961 Education Act of 1961 Establishment of four types of primary 
schools 
1961 Education Act of 1961 Abolition of Chinese and Tamil secondary 
schools. All remaining secondary schools 
were to be either Malay or English 
1965–70 First Malaysia Plan Large enrolment increases in Malay primary 
and secondary schools 
1965–70 First Malaysia Plan Education was to be used as an instrument for 
racial integration 
1965–70 First Malaysia Plan Aim to increase educational participation at 
the primary school level 
1967 National Language Act Bahasa Malay is established officially as the 
national language replacing English 
1971 Conversion of English primary schools 
to Malay primary schools commences  
Malaysian government attempts to exclude 
the English language medium of instruction 
in all public primary schools in response to 
the May 1969 riots  
1970 New Economic Policy Act 1970–1990 Curriculum reviews emphasising the teaching 
of the 3 R’s but in Malay medium exclusively 
1971–75 Second Malaysia Plan The introduction of educational quotas at 
public universities for Bumiputras based on a 
ratio of 55:45 for Bumiputra and non-
Bumiputra students respectively 
1971–75 Second Malaysia Plan All government-assisted English language 
primary schools had been changed to Malay 
schools  
1983 Fourth Malaysia Plan All government-assisted English language 
secondary schools had been changed to 
Malay schools 
1985 Integrated primary schools introduced Combined al primary schools in educational 
zones into one. Provoked strong negative 
response amongst Chinese and Indian/Tamil 
communities 
1988 Programs for integrating school 
children towards concepts consistent 
with national unity 
Unification of curriculum so that all students 
were required to complete a common core of 
subjects 
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1996 Education Act 1996 
 
Amended the 1961 Education Act with a 
deliberate move towards a more multicultural 
approach in education. Effectively reduced 
government control over schools using non-
Malay mediums of instruction 
1996 Private Higher Educational Institutions 
Act of 1996 
Enabled the establishment of private 
universities and university colleges as well as 
branch campuses of foreign universities that 
were involved in linked in or twinning 
programs 
1996 Public Service (JPA) Scholarships 
scheme introduced 
Full scholarships offered to study in leading 
universities worldwide. However subject to a 
quota system 
1997 Vision school project Aimed to improve national integration 
1999 Smart schools pilot project launched  
2001 Eighth Malaysia Plan Utilising lifelong learning to raise domestic 
living standards 
2001 Eighth Malaysia Plan Enhancing access to tertiary education 
2001 Eighth Malaysia Plan Using knowledge-based education as a tool 
for employment restructuring 
 
2003 Primary Schooling across Malaysia 
made compulsory 
Universalisation of primary education across 
Malaysia 
2004 Eighth Malaysia Plan University Quota system abolished 
 
In order to put all of the various policy changes that impacted on Malaysia education 
over this period, Table 4.8 provides a summary of all of the national policy plans 
over the relevant period. The terminology in relation to the various plans changed 
after 1965. Until that year the plans were titled Malaya plans based on the Federation 
of Malaya concept that included Singapore. After the exit of Singapore from the 
Federation in August, 1965, the sovereign state of Malaysia emerged. All subsequent 
plans were titled Malaysia plans commencing with First Malaysia Plan in 1966. 
 
Table 4.8 Malaysian National Policy Planning, 1956–2006 
Long-Term Development Plan Years 5 Year Development Plan 
   
 1956–1960 First Malaya Plan 
 1961–1965 Second Malaya Plan 
   
Pre-New Economic Policy 1966–1970 First Malaysia Plan 
   
New Economic Policy or 1971–1975 Second Malaysia Plan 
First Outline Perspective Plan 1976–1980 Third Malaysia Plan 
(1971–1990) 1981–1985 Fourth Malaysia Plan 
 1985–1990 Fifth Malaysia Plan 
   
National Development Policy or 1991–1995 Sixth Malaysia Plan 
Second Outline Perspective Plan 1996–2000 Seventh Malaysia Plan 
(1991–2000)   
   
National Vision Policy or 2001–2005 Eighth Malaysia Plan 
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Third Outline Perspective Plan 2006–2010 Ninth Malaysia Plan 
(2001–2020)   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Obviously education policy in Malaysia has been derived from these national policy 
frameworks for developing the country. These frameworks have been profoundly 
influenced by ethnic and/or racial considerations. The New Economic Policy has 
been viewed as the foundation for policy implementation during the post-1970 
period, which focused on Malay interests and their privileged status as Bumiputra. 
However the education policy development and implementation still reflected the 
approaches of the earlier Razak Report and the Rahman Talib Report, which had 
been the two initial building blocks for national education policy. The 
implementation of policy after 1970 maintained these reports’ recommendations 
embodied in Education Act of 1961. It became a principal regulation in 
administering the education system in Malaysia, specifically related to the school 
system and the language of instruction. Therefore, any debates surrounding 
education policy processes and issues were always associated with the education 
policy framed by these two documents. Given the surrounding debates concerning 
national unity, a harmonious society, the aim of developing a common identity and 
loyalty as the Malaysian nation, whilst needing to achieve a status as a developed 
country within a ‘Malaysian own mould’, the government has attempted to 
incorporate a range of integration policies and programs in the educational sector 
towards the achievement of national unity. 
 
The period of the 1990s demonstrated that Malaysia had been involved in an 
economic and social transformation which had been affected by globalisation. 
Intense competition in business and trade, and the need for scientific and 
technological advancement had brought new challenges to national education system 
in Malaysia. This situation had required the state to alter national policies, including 
education. Whilst the state continued to mediate national and domestic issues in 
education, the significant impact of globalisation to the nation forced the government 
to respond to the challenge. The 1990s witnessed Malaysian education policy 
experiencing transformation in various aspects, derived from the government’s 
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paradigm policy response in respect of national and globalisation matters. With the 
concern with progress and being a competitive nation in the global sphere, this is the 
age when more pragmatic concerns had been addressed together with concerns of 
nationalism (Gill 2002). Being aware of the need for Malaysian people to compete in 
the global economic field, the state considered education policy in terms of meeting 
the global challenges. With many other nations and their educational policy in the 
context of globalisation, the Malaysian government saw the need for education to 
contribute to the global and regional competitiveness of the Malaysian economy. 
One response was in relation to English being recognised as the language of business 
and international communication. This has been reflected in the state education 
policy and programs subsequent to 1990, when the New Economic Policy ended. 
 
However the continued influence of the New Economic Policy upon subsequent 
economic policy has raised questions as to whether Malaysian economic policy has 
been properly focused on the required outcomes over the period. Whilst literacy rates 
have increased across both gender and ethnic lines over the period 1970 to 2000, and 
overall enrolments have increased, there are still remain ongoing issues as to whether 
resources have been allocated into the most appropriate levels of education across the 
Malaysian population. 
 
Further the imposition of quotas at the higher education levels since the early 1970s 
may well have retarded not only the educational performance of the Malaysian 
population, but also may have had adverse impacts upon the educational attainment 
of the Malaysian labour force over this period. Given the need for the Malaysian 
workforce to be better equipped to meet the needs of industries that are increasingly 
using higher levels of technology and competing in dynamic regional and global 
markets, it is doubtful whether the past and current policy platforms have produced 
educational settings that can meet these challenges. As the Ministry of Education in 
its Education Development Plan for Malaysia 2001–2010 itself identified: 
 
At present, only 11 per cent of the population aged 18–21 years have the 
opportunity to enrol in non-degree programs and only 5 per cent of the age 
cohort enrolled in degree programs. The challenge to the MOE is to further 
increase accessibility to tertiary education in line with the democratisation 
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concept, meet the growing demand of society for higher education, and 
fulfill the increasing need for knowledgeable and skilled manpower. 
(Education Development Plan for Malaysia 2001–2010, p.8, Paragraph 4.5) 
 
As a result of the quota system being introduced and maintained since 1973, it can be 
argued that many non-Malay students have been excluded from the best universities 
and so have been forced to attend either private institutions or go overseas to pursue 
higher education. Regardless, these developments were not compatible with the 
optimal development of the domestic stock of human capital. 
 
However as most of these objectives as expressed in the most recent manifestation of 
this policy, namely the National Vision Policy, are to be tested against a 2020 
timeline, it may be premature to make an ultimate judgment on education policy in 
this context 
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Chapter 5: Economic History of Singapore since 
Independence in 1965 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Since the 1960s the Singapore economy has been regarded as one of the Tiger 
economies by most economic commentators including the World Bank (1993). 
Others have called it one of the four original newly industrialised economies along 
with South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Chowdhury & Islam 1993). From a 
small British colony that was relatively resource poor in terms of land, capital, and 
labour when it gained independence in 1965, it has developed into a major financial 
hub and a sophisticated manufacturing and service centre. Growth rates have been 
very high and very consistent over the period examined in this thesis. In 2006 real 
GDP, as measured in 2000 prices, was approximately 8.5 times its 1975 level, as 
measured in local currency. In USD terms it was 12.5 times its 1975 level. While in 
2006 real GDP was approximately 32 times its 1960 level. In USD terms it was 
approximately 61 times its 1960 level by 2006. 
 
In this chapter, the economic history of Singapore will be examined. Section 5.2 of 
the chapter identifies and describes some of the patterns or trends that have 
characterised Singapore’s economic history over the period 1960 to 2006. Section 
5.3 looks at the role of direct foreign investment in driving consistently high levels of 
economic growth, and its impact upon the domestic labour market in terms of 
education. Section 5.4 explores the policies that encouraged export-oriented 
industrialisation as well as the increasing levels of openness that characterised the 
economy. Section 5.5 provides coverage of the role of the state in terms of an 
environment that receptive and conducive to high rates of growth. Finally, Section 
5.6 contains some concluding remarks that summarise the excellent performance of 
the Singaporean economy. 
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5.2 Key Patterns of Singapore’s Economic History 
 
Singapore is an island-state with a total area of approximately 687 square kilometres 
making it the 191st country in comparative size globally (CIA Fact Book 2009). Its 
population as of 2006 was 4,483,900 (Singapore Department of Statistics). The 
ethnic composition of the population based on the 2000 Census was Chinese 76.8 
per cent, Malay 13.9 per cent, Indian 7.9 per cent, and other races, 1.4 per cent. As a 
British colony until 1957 it was initially heavily dependent on shipping and other 
maritime and port-related activities. Singapore also had a relatively small 
manufacturing sector mainly associated with its various maritime functions. 
 
There are a number of characteristics that can be identified when looking 
at the Singapore growth story since 1960. Table 5.1.shows the economic 
growth rates over the period in relation to specific decades. 
 
Table 5.1 Average Growth Rates per Decade in Singapore at 2000 Prices in 
Singapore Dollars, 1961–2006 
Period Average Growth Rate of Real GDP (%) 
1961–1970 9.2 
1971–1980 8.9 
1981–1990 7.5 
1991–2000 7.6 
2001–2006 5.4 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, STS Online, Catalogue M012251.1, Table P015279 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.2 Singapore has only experienced negative economic 
growth on four occasions, 1964, 1985, 1998 and 2001. On each of these instances 
external factors played a key role. In 1964, the political uncertainty associated with 
Singapore’s membership of the Federation of Malaysia produced a lack of business 
confidence in the overall economy. In addition the closure of British naval bases in 
Singapore had an adverse impact upon shipping and associated activities (Huff 
1994). The changing political climate during the period 1963/64 when the People’s 
Action Party went into an alliance with the Communist Party produced a period of 
rising industrial unrest. An additional factor that reduced entrepot trade was the 
Indonesian policy of confrontation with Malaysia during the period of 1963 to 1966, 
as this reduced regional trade. 
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In 1985, Singapore was adversely affected by developments in the global economy. 
These included declining global petroleum prices that resulted in less overall demand 
for shipping and other marine services. This had a negative impact on Singapore’s 
key activities in the areas of ship repairs, stevedoring, and shipbuilding. Concurrently 
US economic growth slumped from eight per cent in the first quarter of 1984 to 2.3 
per cent in the first quarter of 1985. This had a negative effect on Singaporean 
exports and particularly in computer parts and electronic components in relation to 
semiconductors. A further factor which provides a linkage to labour force 
educational attainment process in Singapore was the earlier decision by policymakers 
to increase wage rates over the period 1979 to 1981. This led to acceleration in the 
decline of labour-intensive industries, and their eventual replacement with capital-
intensive industries. However the sudden increase in domestic wage rates led to a fall 
in Singapore’s international competitiveness and so added to domestic recessionary 
pressures. 
 
In turn the 1998 experience was primarily due to the Asian Currency Crisis which 
reduced regional growth across Asia and therefore adversely affected Singaporean 
exports. It also reduced stock prices, property prices and other forms of asset wealth 
due to a falling exchange rate (Tyabji 1998). Again this produced a year of negative 
GDP growth of 1.4 per cent. 
 
In 2001, the collapse in global confidence associated with falling stock-market prices 
in North American and European financial markets and an associated decline in 
global demand for electronics products saw a fall in real GDP of 2.4 per cent 
measured in 2000 prices. Combined with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the Singapore economy was particularly affected in the areas of manufacturing and 
commerce. Manufacturing production fell by 3.5 per cent in the first six months of 
2001, whilst the commerce sector fell by 3.3 per cent in the first six months of 2001 
(ADB 2001). Finally, this period saw significantly slower growth rates in both the 
financial and export sectors, respectively. However the economy recovered 
moderately in 2002 and 2003, respectively with growth rates of 4.2 per cent and 3.5 
per cents, respectively before recording a growth rate of 9.2 per cent in 2004. This 
demonstrated the ability of the Singaporean economy to repeatedly recover strongly 
from its intermittent periods of slow economic performance. 
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Table 5.2 Annual Growth Rates of GDP in Singapore at 2000 Prices in 
Singapore Dollars, 1964–2006 
Year Growth Rate (%) 
1964 -3.8 
1965 7.5 
1966 10.8 
1967 12.2 
1968 13.6 
1969 13.6 
1970 13.7 
1971 12.0 
1972 13.4 
1973 11.2 
1974 6.1 
1975 4.1 
1976 7.1 
1977 7.8 
1978 8.5 
1979 9.4 
1980 9.7 
1981 9.7 
1982 7.1 
1983 8.5 
1984 8.3 
1985 -1.4 
1986 2.1 
1987 9.8 
1988 11.5 
1989 10.0 
1990 9.2 
1991 6.6 
1992 6.3 
1993 11.7 
1994 11.6 
1995 8.2 
1996 7.8 
1997 8.3 
1998 -1.4 
1999 7.2 
2000 10.1 
2001 -2.4 
2002 4.2 
2003 3.5 
2004 9.0 
2005 7.3 
2006 8.2 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, STS Online, Catalogue M012251.1, Table P015279 
 
Another pattern that was distinctive has been the rise of manufacturing during this 
period in relation to a much greater export focus upon manufacturing activities. 
Initially Singaporean exports had been largely associated with agricultural staple 
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products or extractive commodities such as rubber and tin that were shipped to 
overseas markets via Singapore whilst it was a member of the embryonic Malaysian 
Federation. In this context, the manufacturing sector was quite subdued during the 
period until 1965. This particular direction was heavily influenced by the expectation 
that the Federation of Malaysia would provide a large domestic market for 
Singapore. During this period Singapore conducted import-substitution policies. 
However with its exit from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, the Singaporean 
government strongly encouraged investment in the areas of low-technology 
manufacturing. This level of government involvement was to continue on throughout 
the remainder of its economic history. In fact the role of government throughout this 
period is one of the salient features of Singaporean economic development. This was 
especially the case with the establishment of the Economic Development Board in 
1961 which was to play a pivotal role in economic policy making over the entire 
period but particularly after 1965. 
 
Table 5.3 Sectoral Structure of GDP in Singapore, 1959–2002 
Sector 1959–65 
(%) 
1966–78 
(%) 
1979–85 
(%) 
1985–97 
(%) 
1998–2002 
(%) 
Agriculture 3.5 2.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 
Mining 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Manufacturing 10.4 21.3 26.6 25.6 25.7 
Utilities 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Construction 3.4 6.5 8.5 6.7 6.2 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 33.3 26.5 18.3 17.5 17.2 
Transport &Communications 13.3 11.2 12.7 11.8 11.1 
Financial & Business Services 16.1 17.1 21.4 26.0 27.3 
Community, Social & 
Personal Services 
17.4 12.5 9.5 10.4 10.8 
Sources: Akkemik (2009); Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators Series, 2000–2007 
 
As Table 5.3 shows there has been a significant change in the structure of the 
Singapore economy over this period. From a relatively low base in 1965 of 10.4 per 
cent of the economy being based in manufacturing, the economy saw a rapid increase 
in the manufacturing sector during the period of 1966 to 1978, with an average 
contribution to output of 21.3 per cent. Over the three succeeding periods, the 
contribution of manufacturing to Singaporean GDP has exceeded 25 per cent. More 
recent data from the ADB Key Indicators Series has the manufacturing sector 
continuing to exceed 25 per cent from the period of 2003 to 2006, inclusive (ADB 
Key Indicators, 2008). 
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The other major structural change was in the services sector. The composition of the 
services sector changed in relation to its components, namely, transport and 
communications, financial and business, and a range of miscellaneous services that 
include community, social, and personal services. During this overall period there 
has been a significant increase in the contribution of financial and business services 
to output with a rise from 16.1 per cent in the period 1959/65 to 27.3 per cent in the 
period 1998/2002. This trend contrasted starkly with the decline in community, 
social, and personal services as contributors to growth over this period. The 
emergence of Singapore as a major regional and global financial centre has reflected 
the explicit objectives of Singaporean government policy. The financial sector was to 
play a key supporting role to the various industries developing in Singapore after 
1965. Secondly, it was to become a key industry in its own right in tandem with the 
manufacturing and shipping industries (Montes 1999). Economic policy has 
encouraged high levels of foreign investment. In addition, the natural advantages that 
it possesses have seen numerous financial institutions establish operations in 
Singapore. These advantages include a robust and growing domestic economy, a 
stable currency, an extensive and efficient transportation and communications 
infrastructure, and a strategic location between the South China Sea and the Indian 
Ocean, adjacent to global transportation routes whether by air or by sea (Tan 1999). 
In addition Singapore had a strong tradition of commercial trading in the Asian 
region that dates back to its period as a British colony. Moreover the colonial 
heritage provided it with a legal and regulatory framework that provided substantial 
confidence to new entrants into its financial sector. (Peebles & Wilson 2002). 
 
An additional benefit that is highly relevant to the development of the financial 
sector in Singapore was the role that it was to play in offering a range of services that 
were highly dependent upon significant levels of human capital content. In turn the 
capacity for such services to be offered was largely determined by the quantity and 
quality of formal education that could be provided within Singapore, apart from 
expatriate workers. These services included a range of financial and business 
services including accounting and auditing, legal services, advertising, market 
research, computer and management consultancy services (Huff 1994). Moreover as 
the financial centre dimension grew over time there was a related increase in demand 
for other ancillary professions such as engineering, surveying, architecture, 
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information technology, and design services in order to provide the buildings and 
construction services to house these institutions. In turn this placed greater emphasis 
upon the development of a skilled and well-trained domestic labour force. These 
pressures generated a range of training and educational reforms as will be covered in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Whilst the Singapore dollar was tied to the USD from 1967 to 1973, the decision to 
allow it to become a fully flexible currency by late 1973, only added to its 
attractiveness. Moreover the decision to abolish all currency exchange controls in 
1978 enabled all Singaporean residents (individuals and corporations) to freely move 
funds, import capital, or repatriate profits without restriction. Similarly, trade 
regulations were minimal. Import duties applied only to a few items (automobiles, 
alcohol, petroleum, and tobacco), and licenses were required only for imports 
originating from a few former Eastern bloc countries. There were no export duties. 
As the government played an active part in promoting exports, there was an 
extensive system of supports including an export insurance plan. 
 
A further trend that has characterised Singaporean development over this period has 
been its high rate of domestic savings. Gross domestic savings, which is GDP less 
domestic consumption, has consistently exceeded 29 per cent since 1975 as shown in 
Table 5.4. Since 1985, domestic savings have regularly exceeded 40 per cent. 
 
Table 5.4 Gross Domestic Savings for Selected Years in Singapore, 1970–2006 
Year Gross Domestic Savings (%) 
1965 9.8 
1970 18.4 
1975 29.4 
1980 38.1 
1985 40.5 
1990 43.3 
1995 50.2 
2000 48.1 
2001 41.6 
2002 40.6 
2003 43.7 
2004 47.0 
2005 48.6 
2006 49.9 
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators Series, 1999 to 2008 
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The ability of Singapore to consistently achieve such a high savings rate has been 
attributed to two main features of the economy, namely, the ability of the 
government to regularly achieve public-sector surpluses for the bulk of the period 
1975 to 2006, and the role of the Central Provident Fund in mobilising household 
savings. Public-sector surpluses refer to the government’s budget surplus and the 
surpluses achieved by the various semi-government agencies and statutory boards. 
Since 1980, the Singaporean government has regularly achieved budget surpluses 
apart from the period 1985 to 1987. Therefore fiscal policy has been consistently 
conservative during this latter period. Alternatively, the Central Provident Fund was 
established in 1955 as a compulsory national social security savings plan to ensure 
the financial security of all employees either retired or no longer able to work. Every 
employed Singaporean or permanent resident is automatically a member of Central 
Provident Fund. In this sense it is very much a form of compulsory or mandatory 
savings. Both employees and employers make contributions at different rates to this 
fund. These rates have changed over time and from an employee’s perspective they 
vary depending upon age. Whilst there has been much debate about the role of the 
Central Provident Fund in terms of increasing the overall savings rate in Singapore 
(Faruquee and Husain 1998; Cao and Ng 1995), the World Bank concluded that it 
may have been a key factor in boosting the rate (The East Asian Economic Miracle 
1993). An additional method by which domestic savings have been increased in 
Singapore has through the voluntary savings that are deposited in the Post Office 
Savings Bank which although established in 1877, was converted into a statutory 
board in 1972. Possessing one of the largest retail branch networks across Singapore, 
it has been a large recipient of household savings. The latter replicates similar 
savings schemes that had been applied previously in Japan, Taiwan, and South 
Korea. The Singapore variant of this system not only reduced transaction costs for 
depositors and increased the overall level of savings but provided an additional 
source of finance that was available to the overall public sector. 
 
Whilst high domestic savings rates have been a key feature of the Singapore 
economy over the period, and particularly since the 1970s, the level of domestic 
investment has been an equally strong feature. Gross capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP has averaged 35 per cent over the period of 1975 to 2006. Gross 
capital formation is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation, 
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changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or 
sector. In the case of Singapore it has on occasions exceeded 40 per cents as it did in 
the first half of the 1980s. As gross capital formation represents productive 
investment, Singapore’s ability to achieve high rates of capital accumulation have 
been made possible by high levels of domestic savings as well as large inflows of 
direct foreign investment into an economy that was receptive to such inflows. After 
1980 Singapore theoretically achieved enough domestic savings to finance all 
domestic capital formation. Apart from the latter years of this period between 2002 
and 2006, as shown in Table 5.5, when gross capital formation fell to levels below 30 
per cent, gross capital formation was a key driver in Singapore’s consistently high 
growth rates. 
Table 5.5 Gross Capital Formation as a Percentage of GDP in Singapore at 
Current Market Prices, 1975–2006 
Year Gross Capital Formation (%) 
1975 36 
1976 36 
1977 34 
1978 36 
1979 37 
1980 41 
1981 44 
1982 48 
1983 48 
1984 48 
1985 42 
1986 36 
1987 34 
1988 31 
1989 33 
1990 33 
1991 34 
1992 36 
1993 35 
1994 34 
1995 34 
1996 38 
1997 39 
1998 38 
1999 34 
2000 31 
2001 30 
2002 25 
2003 24 
2004 23 
2005 22 
2006 23 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, STS Online, Catalogue M012251.1, Table P015279 
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A final key feature of the Singapore economy over this period was the consistently 
low levels of inflation that prevailed. From 1960 to 2006, the Consumer Price Index 
averaged 2.66 per cent per annum whilst over the period 1975 to 2006, the average 
Consumer Price Index result was 2.05 per cent per annum. The differential between 
the two previous figures can be explained by periods of significant inflation in the 
years 1973 and 1974 on one hand and then 1980 and 1981 on the other. In the first 
period consumer prices rose 19.6 per cent and 22.3 per cent due to the first oil shock 
in 1973. In the second period, consumer prices rose by 8.5 per cent and 8.2 per cent, 
respectively, largely due to the second oil shock in 1979. These results were 
spectacular given the open nature of the Singapore economy and the fact that 
Singapore has a very high import component of much of its output. It also imports 
most of its staples such as foodstuffs and other necessities, a trend that would 
normally have made it vulnerable to greater variations in inflation. 
 
5.3 Role of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
It is vital to investigate why the Singapore economy was able to achieve these 
outcomes. Moreover given the thrust of this thesis, to what extent did improvements 
in labour force educational attainment as a proxy for human capital accumulation 
play a part in this process? One such linkage or nexus was the role of foreign direct 
investment in Singapore over the period. Since the late early 1970s there was a 
concerted attempt to attract foreign investment into Singapore. Government policy 
was strongly focused on attracting foreign capital since the late 1960s and even more 
so during the early 1970s. These policies accelerated in the three succeeding decades 
with a wider range of promotional tools and approaches. In fact government 
intervention in domestic labour markets was prompted by the realisation that 
relatively low-wage rates were key attractive feature for foreign investors in the 
initial phase. Legislation passed in 1968 effectively transferred wage-bargaining 
power from employees to employers as well as reducing the power of trade unions to 
take industrial action, (Huff 1994). The introduction of a National Wages Council in 
1972 to regulate all wage increases across the economy by establishing semi-
mandatory guidelines for all wage increases, confirmed this outcome. 
 
 89 
 
In combination with Singapore’s natural advantages for foreign investors, a wide 
range of government incentives including tax breaks, pioneer status provisions for 
new firms, investment allowances, equity injections by government agencies, and 
subsidised loans (Kai-Sun et al. 2001) provided a business climate that was 
particularly attractive to foreign multinational enterprises. Additional incentives were 
provided in the form research and product development grants, small company 
grants, land provision, and the creation of science and technology parks as well as 
the provision of high-quality infrastructure. Many of these initiatives were created 
through the intervention of the Economic Development Board which was discussed 
in Chapter 5. In the context of foreign investment this statutory board has been the 
key agency within the Singaporean government for attracting foreign direct 
investment. 
 
Further government education policy that encouraged the acquisition of English 
language skills was an additional attraction as were the legal and accounting systems 
that had their origins in the United Kingdom. The latter have been seen as critical in 
terms of reassuring investors of their property rights as opposed to adverse 
experiences that foreign investors had previously gone through in other Asian 
economies. From a relatively low-level in the early 1970s as shown in Table 5.6, 
foreign direct investment exceeded ten per cent of domestic GDP in 1980, and over 
the period 1975 to 2006, averaged eleven per cent of GDP. 
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Table 5.6 Foreign Direct Investment and Net Inflows as a Percentage of GDP in 
Singapore, 1975–2006 
Year Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows 
(% of GDP) 
1975 5 
1976 4 
1977 4 
1978 4 
1979 9 
1980 11 
1981 12 
1982 10 
1983 7 
1984 7 
1985 6 
1986 9 
1987 14 
1988 14 
1989 10 
1990 15 
1991 11 
1992 4 
1993 8 
1994 12 
1995 14 
1996 10 
1997 14 
1998 9 
1999 20 
2000 18 
2001 18 
2002 7 
2003 13 
2004 19 
2005 12 
2006 20 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators and Global Development Finance 
 
Whilst initially the manufacturing sector was enhanced by this flow of foreign 
capital, foreign investment was also to emerge in the services sector and particularly 
in the financial and business services categories. By the late 1990s these two 
categories were receiving in excess of 43 per cent of all foreign direct investment 
into Singapore (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 1998). The previous factors and 
advantages that Singapore possesses have undoubtedly provided a strong set of 
incentives for foreign investment flowing into Singapore. The extent to which the 
quality of human capital plays a role when foreign firms are deciding to actually 
invest has been a matter of some debate. The available theoretical literature has 
continually assumed that human capital has been one of the key considerations when 
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foreign investors decide to invest or not (Dunning 1988; Lucas 1990; Zhang & 
Markusen 1999). However many of the empirical studies based on cross-country 
regressions and time series analyses across different sets of developing economies 
provide mixed results. Moreover there are very few single country studies that 
explore this relationship (Miyamoto 1993). However studies by Broadman and Sun 
(1997), and Coughlin and Segev (2000) of the Chinese economy in the early 1990s 
indicate that that adult literacy has been one of major geographical determinants of 
foreign direct investment. To add to the complexity these results appear to differ 
depending upon the datasets used in terms of time periods examined. Another 
problem that has made such studies much more difficult to interpret has been the 
wide variation in the proxy variables that have been developed as a relevant proxy 
for human capital. 
 
More contemporary studies such as Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), UNCTAD (2002a), 
and Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002) use more recent datasets that generally produced 
results that demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between human capital 
variables and foreign direct investment. One of the distinctive aspects of these 
studies is that the data sets include a wider number of manufacturing firms that 
concentrated upon value-adding activities. This may suggest that multinational firms 
that commenced operations in various developing economies during this later time 
period were primarily concerned with productivity and efficiency performance as 
opposed to other criteria. In order to generate such outcomes, a skilled and well-
trained, well-educated work force would be seen as a major factor when decision-
making occurs. In fact studies such as UNCTAD (2002a), and Nunnenkamp and 
Spatz (2002) find high correlations between various human capital proxies such as 
tertiary enrolment ratios, and the average years of education amongst the population 
aged over 15 and positive foreign direct investment inflows. Given that there are 
many other dimensions to human capital apart from labour force educational 
attainment, it may well be the case that other empirical studies contained other 
control variables that had already captured or incorporated other less explicit benefits 
that are associated with improvements in human capital. Such dimensions could 
include better health levels, stronger adherence to the rule of law, reductions in 
criminal activity and corruption, and improvements in civil liberties. However in the 
case of Singapore even before the 1980s there was an existing education and training 
 92 
 
system, although with its problems as Chapter 6 will reveal. At the same time there 
were key policy-making agencies in the government and its statutory boards and 
ministries such as the Economic Development Board and the Ministry of Education. 
These entities were responsive to the needs of foreign investors and multinational 
enterprises. Policy changes over the period since independence reflected a 
willingness to reshape, if not remodel, the entire education system so that it was 
responsive to the needs of industry. Initially this focus was on attracting 
manufacturing firms that would facilitate the labour-intensive industrialisation drive 
that the Singaporean government initiated in the period from 1965 to 1973. However 
after that period there were clear and deliberate policy adjustments in the periods 
from 1974 to 1985, and then from 1985 to 1997, to continue to attract foreign 
investment but with succeeding shifts in from capital-intensive and then to efficiency 
intensive production outcomes. 
 
Given the growth of the services sector across the Singaporean economy and 
especially in the business and financial services categories, it is highly likely that 
these firms would have required labour that is more highly skilled and better 
educated, and particularly at the post-secondary and tertiary levels. It is also the case 
that service-related multinational enterprises will need effective business support 
linkages and greater levels of global connectivity (Miyamoto, 1993). In such 
environments there is greater need for trained workers who can not only deal with 
the inherent technical aspects of their job functions but other tasks such as business 
administration, management, logistics, computing and information services as well 
as technological change. The Singaporean educational and training model with its 
focus on the development of English-speaking workers would appear to have been 
well-designed for such functions given the importance of English when conducting 
global and regional business. 
 
There is another aspect of Singaporean economic development that highlights the 
role of direct foreign investment and labour force educational attainment. 
Multinational enterprises (as explained in Chapter 5) are more likely to provide 
enterprise training either independently or collaboratively with local educational 
providers. As to whether they provide an adequate level of training is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The World Business Environment Survey is one of the very few 
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surveys that examine industrial training amongst global developing economies. 
Conducted in the period 1999 to 2000, it surveyed over 10, 000 firms across 80 
countries, with the aim of collecting data on the interactions between firms and 
domestic governments. It does provide some useful data on formal training provided 
by firms on a cross-country basis. The World Business Environment Survey revealed 
that on average 60 per cent of firms in East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean 
regions provided some form of industrial training (Batra & Tan 2002; Batra 2003). In 
relation to East Asia there were some wide variations in relation to the provision of 
some form of firm-based training that ranged from 65 to 75 per cent in Singapore 
whereas it was only around 30 per cent in Malaysia. It would therefore appear that 
Singapore as at the upper end of the spectrum in terms of firms, and particularly 
multinational enterprises, providing some form of on-the-job training to their 
employees. 
 
Other potential benefits include the higher likelihood that foreign firms are more 
likely to engage in such formal on-the-job training than local firms (Miyamoto and 
Todo 2003). Various reasons have been put forward as to why this should occur. 
These include the significant financial advantages that foreign firms possess relative 
to domestic firms, the stock of knowledge that such firms already possess from 
training provision elsewhere, and often on a global basis as well as in their countries 
of origin, the motivation to supply training could be higher so as to identify not only 
the better local employees, but to identify the respective strengths and weaknesses of 
various local firms in terms of production and training processes, and finally, the 
ability to identify the best local employees and so offer them attractive wage and 
salary packages to retain them within their organisations. 
 
Given Singapore’s policy approach to engage in knowledge-intensive production and 
service-provision activities, it would appear that the role of foreign direct investment 
has been significant in achieving these outcomes. Other benefits flowing from such a 
high level of direct foreign investment could include the transfer of technologies 
through training spillovers as foreign firms provide additional training to those local 
firms who either provide them with inputs. This also applies to other local firms who 
purchase the output of foreign firms operating in the domestic Singapore market. 
Finally, foreign firms such as multinational enterprises, as has been the case in 
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Singapore, can use local educational institutions in their host country. Through either 
direct financial support or the provision of workshops, skill centres, equipment and 
materials, such assistance will not only benefit local students and workers but 
provide foreign firms with a greater pool of highly trained and highly educated 
labour at the post-secondary and tertiary levels that they can potentially draw upon. 
In addition, schemes have operated that have allowed Singaporean workers to 
receive training in the home countries such as Germany and Japan where foreign 
firms are based and have advanced domestic training and skills centres. Finally, the 
Singaporean education system’s strong links to various foreign educational 
institutions at the polytechnic and university levels, that in turn have close links to 
industry, is a useful example of this trend. 
 
5.4 Export-Oriented Trade Policy and Openness 
 
It would be fair to say that trade in goods and services has continued to be the 
building block of the Singaporean economy as it was in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries since the British East India Company commenced operations in 1819. The 
various stages of industrial development that Singapore experienced after 
independence in 1965 and particularly in the period from 1975 onwards—had a 
singular aim. This was to move from a strategy that was based on an import-
substitution industrialisation approach that largely prevailed in the period before 
1965. The alternative was an industrialisation strategy based on export performance. 
The various trends identified in Section 5.1 and the content of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 
were consistent with a strong export orientation. Singaporean policymakers and the 
Economic Development Board identified the various comparative advantages. The 
focus on trade provided Singapore with the opportunity to derive some of the 
benefits that are associated with such a strategy. In relation to static benefits, trade 
theory would suggest that comparative advantage-based trade should lead to higher 
levels of domestic consumption because of falling prices. However this benefit has 
been far less pronounced in the case of Singapore due to its very high domestic 
savings rate. The dynamic gains from trade are normally associated with productivity 
gains. These are linked to economies of scale that are generated as outward-looking 
firms engage in global markets. Other linkages extend to improvements in quality 
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and functionality in both products and services as the level of competition is 
expanded and intensified. Finally, greater trade with a focus on exports will 
inevitably lead to greater exposure to new technologies. To appreciate the role of 
trade and specifically exports upon the Singaporean economy, it is useful to examine 
two key variables. These are the percentage of Singaporean exports as a percentage 
of GDP at both current and constant prices, and the level of openness over the period 
1975 to 2006. This data is presented in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 Exports as a Percentage of GDP, Openness, Current Prices and 
Constant Prices in Singapore, 1975–2006 
Year Exports as a % of 
GDP at Current 
Prices 
Exports as a % of 
GDP at 2000 Prices 
Openness at 
Current Prices 
1975 139 0.85 2.88 
1976 152 0.89 3.12 
1977 165 0.95 3.32 
1978 169 0.99 3.43 
1979 189 1.11 3.85 
1980 207 1.26 4.22 
1981 203 1.25 4.11 
1982 190 1.22 3.85 
1983 171 1.18 3.42 
1984 160 1.16 3.23 
1985 157 1.14 3.16 
1986 153 1.24 3.05 
1987 170 1.27 3.39 
1988 190 1.46 3.73 
1989 184 1.45 3.59 
1990 183 1.49 3.59 
1991 174 1.53 3.38 
1992 166 1.54 3.23 
1993 166 1.62 3.24 
1994 171 1.75 3.27 
1995 187 1.84 3.58 
1996 182 1.87 3.48 
1997 175 1.90 3.38 
1998 173 1.86 3.25 
1999 184 1.87 3.51 
2000 196 1.96 3.78 
2001 191 1.92 3.68 
2002 193 1.98 3.69 
2003 212 2.18 3.97 
2004 225 2.39 4.26 
2005 238 2.50 4.48 
2006 246 2.57 4.62 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, STS Online, Catalogue M12251 and Catalogue12352. 
 
While data at both current and constant prices for Singaporean GDP is presented, the 
increase in exports as percentage of GDP at 2000 prices indicates their relative 
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importance to the economy. Since 1975, this latter variable has tripled in value 
demonstrating the growth of the export sector. In addition, the openness results 
reveal the extent to which the economy is exposed to international trade. By the end 
of this period, whether using current or constant prices, Singapore’s external sector 
was in excess of 4.5 times the size of its domestic economy. Some commentators 
such as Peebles and Wilson (2002) have pointed out it may be useful to have access 
to more refined data that provides distinctions between not only total exports and 
domestic exports, but between total domestic exports and non-petroleum exports, 
given the special nature of the Singaporean trading system in relation to petroleum 
exports. However in the area of high-technology exports, Singapore performance as 
an exporter has been extremely robust since the late 1980s. Again this is an area 
where the benefits of more highly trained and highly educated labour inputs are 
likely to manifest themselves. 
 
While data sets in this area are extremely limited in terms of historical time coverage, 
Table 5.8 provides information on high-technology manufactured exports in relation 
to total manufactured exports over the period 1989 to 2006. The results suggest that 
there has been a 60 per cent increase in this variable during this period. As measured 
in current USD terms, there has been a tenfold increase in such exports over that 
period. Unfortunately data limitations in relation to the former variable prevent wider 
analysis at this point. 
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Table 5.8 High-Technology Exports as a Percentage of Total Manufactured 
Exports, and High-Technology Exports as Measured in Current USD in 
Singapore, 1989–2006 
Year High-Technology Exports as a % of 
Total Manufactured Exports 
High-Technology Exports 
(Current USD $) 
1989 36 11,565,509,184 
1990 40 14,935,981,264 
1991 40 17,212,933,386 
1992 45 21,648,940,131 
1993 47 27,361,594,955 
1994 50 40,136,147,170 
1995 54 53,412,401,906 
1996 55 57,763,286,460 
1997 57 59,528,107,519 
1998 59 54,688,155,214 
1999 61 59,810,800,429 
2000 63 73,643,311,318 
2001 61 62,260,431,919 
2002 60 63,791,607,235 
2003 56 76,036,241,388 
2004 57 93,757,969,078 
2005 57 105,077,510,028 
2006 58 124,136,907,743 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators and Global Development Finance 
 
The increasing share of high-technology manufactured exports from Singapore is 
clear evidence that deliberate government policy initiatives applying to the exchange 
rate, the labour market, infrastructure and finally education and training have all been 
consistent with the emphasis upon growth as identified in Section 5.2 of this chapter. 
Moreover the World Bank in its seminal publication on the East Asian growth 
experience, titled, ‘The East Asian Economic Miracle: Economic Growth and Public 
Policy’, describes successful Asian economies as those that are ‘are stable 
macroeconomically, have high shares of international trade in GDP, invest heavily in 
people, and have strong competition among firms’ (World Bank 1993, page. 25). It 
would appear the Singapore’s strategy in relation to its international trade policies 
accurately reflected that formula. 
 
5.5 The Role of Government and Government Policy 
 
Since independence Singapore has become a competitive first world economy. This 
transformation did not occur by chance but was the result of deliberate government 
policy led by the People’s Action Party and its long-term Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
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Yew. The Singapore experience would appear to provide an alternative pathway to 
the conventional two competing views as to how the state should operate within the 
development process. The so-called neo-classical or conventional view has been that 
robust market competition and free trade have been the twin engines of economic 
growth across East Asia. The alternative view has been that the state or the public 
sector across this region should be the dominant engine of economic growth. 
However the Singapore experience would tend to suggest that elements of both 
views have been critical. A further complication when considering the role of the 
state is the homogeneous character that is implied by that term. Perhaps it would be 
more useful to distinguish between two categories of state. In the development 
literature these are labelled the weak and strong states (Chowdhury & Islam 1993). 
The weak state is one which is vulnerable to local and foreign interests and other 
forms of rent-seeking behaviour. They also have limited power to tax and regulate 
(Acemoglu 2005). As a result policy outcomes are often associated with benefiting 
selective interests as opposed to the entire population irrespective of wealth, status, 
or income level. Alternatively, the strong state has the capacity to quarantine such 
interests and other forms of rent-seeking behaviour. Moreover they possess the 
capacity to tax and regulate. Whilst a strong state may have some historic 
connections to some modernising interests, access to the government by these groups 
is heavily regulated and transparent. 
 
By most measures Singaporean policymakers would appear to have demonstrated 
more of the features that resemble the strong state category. Coming from a 
background of political instability that adversely impacted on the development 
process until 1965, it eventually emerged into a very strong and at times forceful 
government that adopted a very determined approach to development policy. 
 
Aware of the resource constraints facing Singapore, the government and bureaucracy 
as well as a number of statutory boards, including the Economic Development 
Board, represented a highly educated technocratic public sector. Featuring highly 
qualified staff and with well-developed links to industry, these agencies focused on 
broad developmental objectives over recommended target periods. They did not rely 
on a broad range of narrowly defined performance indicators that applied in other 
Asian economies that used rigid 5 year planning horizons. 
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This pattern provided Singapore with a significant amount of flexibility when it had 
to respond to changing market conditions, either regionally or globally. In relation to 
the Economic Development Board, it is significant that its explicit policy has been to 
employ only the best university graduates from Singapore’s university sector. During 
this time there was a particular preference for science and engineering graduates 
(Kai-Sun et al. 2001). A similar pattern emerged in other key government agencies 
such as the Monetary Authority and the Housing Development Board. 
 
However Singapore adhered to discipline when it came to the operation of fiscal and 
monetary policies. In relation to fiscal policy, Singapore has achieved budget 
surpluses for every fiscal year since 1980 apart from the three years of 1985, 1986, 
and 1987, in response to the recession of 1985/86. The ability to generate consistent 
budget surpluses for the bulk of the period 1975 to 2006 has enabled the government 
to make a significant contribution to national savings. It also demonstrates a sound 
macroeconomic platform from which other economic policies could be launched. It 
has also allowed the government either directly or through its range of statutory 
boards to make significant investment in public infrastructure that has been in many 
ways complementary to the private sector including foreign companies. In addition 
to raising revenue, tax policy has been used to provide a range of incentives to 
provide a degree of guidance to the private sector whether it be foreign or domestic 
firms. In fact tax policy in Singapore has been a useful demonstration of the type of 
intervention that has been exercised in Singapore since 1975. Rather than using 
heavy-handed government directives, market-friendly policy initiatives were adopted 
so as to provide the private sector with an optimal business environment. The result 
was continual investment flows. 
 
One fiscal advantage that Singapore has been able to maintain compared to other 
industrialised economies in North America, Europe, and Australasia has been the 
absence of a costly welfare sector that would have otherwise placed significant 
pressure on its budgetary balances. In contrast the strong fiscal position achieved by 
Singapore has allowed it make greater investments in public housing, health, and 
education at all levels. 
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Monetary policy has been conducted by the Monetary Authority of Singapore which 
was established in 1971. Whilst nominally a central bank it does not use the various 
instruments that are employed by its counterparts in the rest of the industrialised 
world. Given the extremely open nature of the Singapore economy, the Monetary 
Authority does not attempt to control the domestic monetary system by interest rate 
variations that impact upon domestic liquidity. Rather, the main tool of monetary 
policy in Singapore is the exchange rate. Under a system of managed floating the 
Monetary Authority will selectively intervene in currency markets to maintain the 
value of the Singapore dollar within the specific but undisclosed target band. 
However the rationale for these interventions in currency markets is not primarily to 
smooth out short-term fluctuations in the currency per se but to support the 
government’s economic objectives and specifically to counter any impact of 
imported inflation. This supports the policy outcomes that were identified in Section 
5.2 of this chapter in relation to a consistent track record of low domestic inflation. 
Again this is representative of the type of deliberate and flexible intervention that has 
characterised the Singapore economy over this period. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified some of the key patterns that have characterised the 
Singapore economy since independence in 1965. It has been an economy that has 
regularly achieved high rates of economic growth. There has also been a continual 
transformation of the manufacturing sector with a strong focus on regional and 
global export markets. Encouraged by various government incentives, the 
manufacturing sector has evolved from on that concentrated on labour-intensive low 
value-added products in the 1970s to a sector that is now focused on knowledge-
intensive, high value-added products. Manufacturing and the services sector were the 
vehicles by which Singapore changed directions from an import-substitution strategy 
to one based on export performance. In addition to the various comparative and 
locational advantages that it possesses, Singapore also has been able to maintain a 
low-inflation economy largely due to its closely controlled wages policy and a 
flexible exchange rate policy and conservative monetary policy that has been able to 
successfully shelter Singapore from various inflationary shocks over this period. 
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These structural changes took place in relation to not only the relative importance of 
the manufacturing sector but also the services sector and particularly the financial 
sector. Moreover the economy was also bolstered by a very high domestic savings 
rate that facilitated more domestic investment and particularly in infrastructure. High 
levels of domestic savings were accompanied by high rates of capital formation that 
provided a solid platform for the continued development and evolution of the 
manufacturing sector. Business-friendly industrial, tax, and labour market policies 
consistently proved to be very attractive to foreign investors and particularly 
multinational enterprises. By its market-oriented economic and its educational 
reforms, the government gradually upgraded, diversified, liberalised and opened up 
the overall investment climate. While not exclusively dependent upon foreign 
investment, the government, through its ability to forge meaningful consultative links 
with the private-sector generated outcomes that provided both an excellent material 
infrastructure and a highly skilled work force for potential investors. During the 
1980’s and beyond, foreign direct investment became increasingly important, 
providing not only new employment opportunities and technological transfers. 
 
With a greater focus on exports and trade throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Singapore 
was able to continue to exploit its comparative advantages. The rate of foreign 
investment continued to accelerate as the domestic labour force and the associated 
education and training systems responded to the needs of these new and emerging 
industries. The increased emphasis on vocational, technical and university education 
through collaborative pathways enhanced Singapore’s attractiveness as an 
investment destination. Combined with prudent and reliable macroeconomic policies, 
Singapore’s export-oriented industrialisation policy focus continued to produce solid 
economic growth rates during the latter part of this period. Moreover government 
policy making was consistently based on pragmatism and flexibility with a results-
orientated agenda as opposed to any explicit ideological position or criteria. Finally 
the Singapore growth record over this period appears to substantiate and validate the 
role of the strong state as part of the development process from a theoretical 
perspective. 
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Chapter 6: Singaporean Education Policy and its Impact 
upon the Economy 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Singaporean education system has its origins with the system left by the British 
colonial administration since the country became an independent nation in 1965. The 
British system aimed to maintain ethnic and political harmony. The British system 
traditionally generated a relatively small number of highly trained university 
graduates. Therefore it resulted in a much larger number of young people who left 
the education system following secondary schooling and entered the workforce with 
no particular skills. This chapter will look at the transformation of Singaporean 
education over the period 1965 to 2006. Section 6.2 will consider the immediate 
challenges faced by Singapore over the period 1959 to 1965 when it moved from 
being British colony to being an independent nation state. Section 6.3 will trace the 
next phase of Singaporean education in the period from 1965 to 1978 when the 
Singaporean education system underwent some significant educational reforms 
concurrently with a specific type of industrialisation. Section 6.4 will study the 
period 1979 to 1984 when Singaporean industrialisation moved from a basic 
manufacturing phase to an economy based on more advanced and higher technology 
based phase. Section 6.5 assesses the next phase of Singaporean education during the 
period 1985 to 1997 as the economy moved towards more elaborately transformed 
manufacturing. Section 6.6 investigates the period from 1997 to 2006 as the 
Singapore economy contended with challenges presented by the Asian Currency 
Crisis and ends with 2006. Finally, Section 6.7 contains some relevant concluding 
remarks which focus on the relatively good performance of the overall Singaporean 
education system across all levels. 
 
6.2 The Initial Phase: 1959 to 1965 
 
In 1959, when the first elections were held in Singapore for the new Legislative 
Assembly, the prevailing system inherited from the British colonial administration 
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did not facilitate racial and/or ethnic integration. During the 1950s racial integration 
as an explicit colonial objective did not exist. Across the Singaporean population the 
three ethnic groups considered themselves to be Chinese, Malays and Indians, 
respectively, rather than as Singaporean citizens. In 1960, the resident population 
consisted of approximately 78 per cent Chinese, fourteen per cent Malay, and seven 
per cent Indian (Tan 1997). Moreover the government did not adopt policies to 
encourage bilingualism across the education system in relation to either the teaching 
of English and Chinese. Specifically there was no attempt made by the colonial 
administration to either regulate or support Chinese schools in Singapore. At the 
same time there was very little attempt made to encourage the teaching of English 
across the various ethnic communities. As a result of this haphazard approach to 
education policy during this period, the vast majority of the population had few 
opportunities for tertiary education, and they could not hope to be employed in the 
civil service. In addition many students did not complete secondary education whilst 
there was little scope for technical education options. 
 
It was also significant that during this period (and in fact in the period after the end 
of World War II) Chinese education developed with little assistance from the British 
administration. Moreover funding for Chinese schools came primarily from private 
donations from the local Chinese community. Another aspect of the Chinese schools 
was that the curriculum, textbooks, examinations, and school administration were all 
modelled on the system developed in China (Goh 1995). 
 
In fact the system of education in the first four decades of the twentieth century was 
characterised by ‘the absence of a single and clearly enunciated guiding policy’ 
(Wilson, 1978). There was a wide range of schools varying in terms of the 
management structure, levels of government control and supervision, and the 
medium of instruction, curricula, and the quality of teaching staff (Gopinathan 1974). 
The only schools where children of different ethnic backgrounds were enrolled were 
the English medium schools, which catered for only a small minority. These schools 
were favoured by the colonial authorities in terms of funding and opened doors to 
clerical and administrative employment in the civil service or in British controlled 
trading corporations. The overall effect of such a system was socially divisive, 
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accentuating racial, linguistic, and cultural differences as well as the widening gap 
between rich and poor. 
 
Another complication that impacted on Singaporean education policy were the 
changes in government in the four years from 1959 to 1963 when it was fully 
independent, and then from 1963 to 1965 when Singapore became a member of the 
Malaysian Federation. During the latter period Singaporean education policy was 
heavily influenced by assuring Malaya that the ethnic Chinese majority in Singapore 
were maintaining their allegiance. In fact the Malay language was initially adopted as 
the national language in 1959 so as to convince the Malay majority in the Malaysian 
Federation that the Chinese majority in Singapore did not jeopardise the interests of 
the Malay minority in Singapore (Tan, 1997). The purpose was to defuse concerns 
within the Federation that the Malay minority in Singapore were being treated as 
second or even third class citizens. However, with the expulsion of Singapore from 
the Malaysian Federation in 1965, this policy was abandoned. 
 
Another feature of the period 1959 to 1965 was the mismatch of the education 
system with the nature of the economic system. By the early 1960s Singapore was 
primarily an entrepot centre where approximately 70 per cent of its GDP was 
associated the importing and exporting of merchandise without paying much in the 
way of duties. The only significant industrial activity was associated with 
shipbuilding and ship repairs. Most of these activities were carried out by public and 
military entities such as the Singapore Harbor Board and the British Naval base. Any 
manufacturing that did take place was primarily confined to light engineering, 
assembly of vehicles, marine engineering, printing and commodity-processing 
(Colony of Singapore, Annual Report 1955). 
 
Any re-orientation of economic policy towards a more industrialised set of outcomes 
required a more skilled and more technically trained labour force. This was seen as a 
fundamental problem by Singaporean policymakers (Goh 1995). In response to these 
short-comings, the government recognised that certain changes had to take place. 
These were presented in the form of the first Five-Year Plan over the period 1961 to 
1965. This plan aimed to improve the overall educational standards of the domestic 
population. 
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Firstly universal and free primary education was introduced in 1960 (Tan 1997). 
Secondly, equal treatment was given to the four main streams, namely Malay, 
Chinese, Tamil, and English. Malay remained as the national language of the newly 
independent state of Singapore until 1965. The fourth plank of the educational policy 
was to emphasise mathematics, science, and technical subjects. The latter were 
viewed as the building blocks for the development of a more appropriately skilled 
and trained labour force into the future. 
 
As a by-product of increased investment in education and particularly in primary 
education, there was a significant increase in student enrolments in English language 
schools. For example in 1959, of those students entering primary school, only 47 per 
cent were in the English stream whilst 46 per cents opted for Chinese language 
schools. (Boon & Gopinathan 2008). Conversely in 1979, approximately 91 per cent 
of all primary school children were enrolled in English whilst only nine per cent of 
children were enrolled in Chinese schools. This clear change in primary school 
enrolment was associated with increasing recognition that the English language was 
the international language of business and so for Singapore to be equipped to deal 
with the challenges of the global market place, English language acquisition was 
non-negotiable. In turn these changes also reflected a growing recognition by the 
domestic population that Singapore was commencing the start of an industrial 
transformation. Given the increasing role of foreign investment’s contribution to 
Singaporean economic growth, the increasing acceptance of English as the global 
language of business was critical. This was emphasised across all levels of education 
as it was seen as a priority not only in terms of global trade but in a regional context 
as well, even at the cost of bilingualism. 
 
These reforms coincided with a significant increase in total education expenditure 
across all levels of education, as shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Annual Total Education Expenditure in Singapore, 1959–1967 
Year Education Expenditures ($) Total National Expenditure (%) 
1959 60,008,000 23.6 
1960 57,100,000 23.5 
1961 65,841,000 17.1 
1962 82,307,000 23.4 
1963 94,644,000 15.8 
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1964 103,358,000 31.7 
1965 112,806,000 28.8 
1966 124.076,000 23.4 
1967 135,051,000 22.8 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, various years 
 
In absolute dollar terms there were significant increases in total expenditure in every 
year apart from 1960. What was also significant about education expenditure in 
Singapore during the 1960s was that almost one hundred per cent of all education 
was financed by government revenues. This allowed government policy through the 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance to be centrally imposed across the 
entire education system. This was a pattern that was to be continued up until the 
present day. This was especially important during this first phase of education 
reform. There were a number of impediments to the achievement of mass education 
across the entire nation. These included an uneven distribution of population across 
the island-state in terms of urban areas compared to rural areas. In addition in highly 
populated areas there were shortages of suitable sites for school buildings. A further 
problem was the tendency for parents to send their children to schools based on 
familial links and/or specific language options. It was in this context that strong 
central planning conducted by the government was needed. 
 
As a resulted of a concerted effort by the Singapore government in terms of both 
educational reforms and a very active building program, student enrolments in public 
educational institutions expanded dramatically as indicated by Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 Student Enrolments in Public Educational Institutions in Singapore, 
1960–2005 
Level 1960 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Primary 283,036 355,096 328,034 277,875 261,553 290,261 
Secondary 50,923 104,720 160,556 163,590 180,982 213,063 
Pre-University 5128 6,671 13,782 24,699 21,690 28,901 
Institutes of 
Technical Education 
590 1,193 9,830 18,894 9,476 21,603 
Polytechnics 2,332 3,208 9,276 21,610 46,841 64,422 
National Institute of 
Education 
2,327 5,603 685 1,125 2,482 3,676 
Universities 3,502 4,996 8,540 16,958 34,591 59,441 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2007, Education Statistics Digest. 
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Whilst there was a significant increase in enrolments at the primary level and 
secondary level during this period the growth rates for both polytechnic and 
university enrolments were much more modest in absolute terms. The same applied 
to technical education as it was not until 1964 that the government established 
secondary vocational schools for the first time (Boon & Gopinathan 2008). These 
schools were designed to cater for those students who were not able to enter the 
academically oriented secondary schools but aimed to provide student with basic 
vocational skills. A further development that signalled Singapore’s recognition of the 
need for more technically trained students was the opening of its second polytechnic 
namely Ngee Ann Polytechnic in 1963. The significance of this event was the role 
that polytechnic education was to play even in this early phase. The key role of these 
institutions was to train and generate technicians and middle-level professionals so as 
to support the industrial transformation of Singapore. Whilst the first phase of 
Singaporean economic development was still very much focused on labour-intensive 
production processes, the polytechnic system emphasised characteristics that could 
be applied to various stages of development. These included a strong industry focus, 
an emphasis on training for the application of skills and knowledge to problem-
solving, practical training exercises where students deal with real-life simulations, 
provide a balance between broad-based training and industry-relevant specialist 
options, and finally, structured industry placements for students either during or at 
the end of their respective study programs. 
 
Finally during this period there were minimal developments in university education. 
Whilst the Nanyang University was established in 1955, the University of Singapore 
was opened in 1962. The former was established mainly with the assistance of 
donations from Chinese communities across Asia, and was the first Chinese language 
university established across Southeast Asia. Alternatively the University of 
Singapore was established as part on agreement between the Federation of Malaysia 
and the Singapore government that the Kuala Lumpur division and the Singapore 
division of the University of Malaya should become totally separate entities. This 
was the first step in the National University of Singapore becoming one of Asia’s 
premier tertiary institutions. 
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6.3 The Educational Reform Phase: 1965 to 1978 
 
This period has been called the survival-driven education period. Singapore was 
faced with a growing population and a growing unemployment rate. Its initial 
economic strategy of import substitution industrialisation became no longer viable in 
the light of a reduced domestic market when it separated from Malaysia. It then had 
to shift towards an export-oriented industrialisation. It was in this climate that 
education policy focused more on technical and vocational education. Concurrently 
the government had the challenge of producing policies that were consistent with 
unifying a heterogeneous population that spoke a range of different languages. 
Moreover it had to deal with a student population that studied in educational 
institutions at both primary and secondary levels using a variety of curricula often 
sourced from different countries. 
 
With the formation of the independent Singaporean state on August 9 1965, after its 
expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia, educational policy was heavily 
influenced by the direction of economic policy as represented by the policies 
associated with the Singaporean Economic Development Board. The latter was 
established in 1961. Moreover the economy contracted in 1964 by 3.8 per cent. In a 
more general sense, the direction of development policy moved from an import-
substitution industrialisation policy towards a more export-oriented industrialisation 
policy approach. The latter was accelerated with Singapore’s lack of access to a 
substantial domestic market once it was expelled from the Federation of Malaysia. 
Whilst primary education enrolments declined over the period 1965 to 1975, most 
commentators attribute this to the introduction of successful family planning 
methods by the Singapore government. As shown in Table 6.3 the overall growth in 
secondary education, from around 60 thousand in 1960 to around 150000 in 1965, 
and then to around 160000 in 1972, was impressive. As Table 6.4 indicates the 
annual growth rate for the period 1959/60 to 1967/68, exceeded or approached ten 
per cent per annum in seven out of the nine years for which data is available. A 
possible explanation for these rapid growth rates in secondary education enrolments 
during this period was the increasing familial recognition of the importance attached 
to secondary education whether it is in academic or vocational categories. The 
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linkage between educational achievement and higher income levels was by now 
clearly understood, or at least, assumed across the Singapore population. 
 
Table 6.3 Student Enrolment in Primary and Secondary Education in 
Singapore, 1959–1972 
Year Primary Education Secondary Education 
1959 272,254 48,723 
1960 283,036 50,923 
1961 307,981 67,857 
1962 324,697 72,308 
1963 341,620 84,425 
1964 353,622 99,592 
1965 362,672 114,736 
1966 370,899 132,088 
1967 373,427 144,448 
1968 379,828 150,251 
1972 354,936 161,371 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2007, Education Statistics Digest 
 
Table 6.4 Annual Growth Rates of Student Enrolment in Primary and 
Secondary Education in Singapore, 1959–1968 
Year Primary Education (%) Secondary Education (%) 
1959/1960 6.7 4.5 
1960/1961 5.9 33.2 
1961/1962 5.4 6.6 
1962/1963 5.2 16.7 
1963/1964 3.5 17.9 
1964/1965 2.6 15.2 
1965/1966 2.3 15.1 
1966/1967 .07 9.4 
1967/1968 1.7 4 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2007, Education Statistics Digest 
 
In order to consolidate the educational reforms from the earlier phase, the Ministry of 
Education ended the tradition of decentralised and largely ethnically divided schools 
consistent with separate Chinese, Malay, and Tamil schools. Given the formation of 
the new Singaporean state in August 1965, educational integration was seen as vital 
for the development and survival of the embryonic nation-state, largely devoid of 
natural resources, apart from its strategic location as a trading port. In addition, the 
ability of the Singapore government was also linked to its success in attracting 
foreign investment and particularly from foreign-owned multinational corporations. 
To achieve the latter it would need to provide a domestic labour force that suited the 
requirements of these companies. Inevitably this required competence in the use of 
English. 
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To meet these objectives, the Ministry of Education enhanced the first Five-Year 
Plan by introducing a common and standardised syllabus for all school subjects in 
the four languages of Mandarin, English, Malay, and Tamil. Additionally, 
compulsory bilingualism was introduced in all schools. Finally a common national 
examination system was introduced for all primary schools. This was titled the 
Primary School Leaving Examination. This was then used to decide whether students 
would proceed to academic, technical, or vocational secondary education 
 
During the period 1966 to 1972, twelve vocational schools and seven technical 
schools were established. The Technical Education Department was also established 
in 1968 as an autonomous unit within the Ministry of Education. Its function was to 
manage and monitor the development of technical secondary education, industrial 
training and technical teacher training. As part of this restructure secondary 
vocational schools were phased out and replaced with vocational institutes. To 
complete this process all apprenticeship schemes were now placed under the control 
the Technical Education Department, having previously been under the control of the 
Ministry of Labour. The final building block for improved technical and vocational 
training was the establishment of the Industrial Training Board in 1973. The role of 
this entity was to centralise, coordinate and intensify industrial training. This was a 
critical development in that it entrenched a formalised system of vocational training 
independent of the Singaporean school system (Seng 2007) 
 
There were two other educational initiatives that focused on improved technical 
education. Firstly, the Economic Development Board established formal training 
centres that were linked to manufacturing companies operating in Singapore. As 
opposed to the fairly basic workshops that had previously been attached to secondary 
schools, these centres provided applied and real-time industrial training for workers. 
Companies such as the India’s largest automobile producer Tata Motors Limited, 
Texas Instruments from the US, and Phillips from the Netherlands, worked 
collaboratively with the Economic Development Board so as to provide relevant and 
cutting-edge training opportunities. Secondly, the Economic Development Board 
provided opportunities for Singaporean workers to train overseas through Overseas 
Training Centres from 1971 onwards. Such training centres were established in 
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Germany, Switzerland, United States, Japan, France, and India over the next five 
years. 
 
However by the end of the 1970s, a number of ongoing problems continued to plague 
the Singapore Education system. On one hand significant rates of failure in the 
Primary School Leaving Examination meant that many students did not go onto 
secondary education let alone complete it (Boon & Gopinathan 2008). As a result of 
this trend, the growth rate in secondary schools was well below the anticipated level 
with up to 30 per cent of eligible students not making the successful transition from 
primary to secondary education. Meanwhile, the high wastage rates associated with 
this latter trend especially in the early to mid-1970s meant that literacy rates were 
unsatisfactory. This was particularly the case in relation to English language 
proficiency. 
 
In order to address these and other problems a high-level reviewing committee, led 
by Dr Goh Keng Swee (the then Deputy Prime Minister) and his team of systems 
engineers, conducted a review of the Singaporean education system in 1978. 
 
6.4 The Second Industrialisation Phase and the New Educational 
System: 1979–1984 
 
The Report on the Ministry of Education, 1978 (also known as the Goh Report) lead 
to recommendations for the New Education System. It recognised key weaknesses in 
the Singaporean education system as it had operated towards the end of the 1970s. 
These included bilingual education policies that did not work, particularly in relation 
to English language usage, relatively low literacy levels, and high educational 
wastage in terms of students not completing secondary education. Specific 
recommendations included allowing students who could not cope with bilingual 
education (and so being relatively illiterate in both) to simply concentrate on the 
mastery of one language. Another was the introduction of the streaming of students 
to allow for variations in academic and intellectual abilities of students across 
different cohorts. Finally there was a clear recognition of the importance of providing 
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technical and vocational options for those students who struggled to cope in more 
academic curricula. 
 
The New Education System was introduced in January 1979. It was a policy 
framework that was constructed singularly on educational considerations. From a 
level of approximately 16.6 per cent of GDP in 1960, the manufacturing sector had 
reached approximately 30 per cent of GDP by 1980 (Peebles & Wilson 2002). The 
move away from the various entrepot activities associated with its functions as a key 
port and related shipbuilding activities, it was clear to policymakers that this trend 
could not be maintained. By this stage Singapore was heavily reliant upon foreign 
investment largely provided by multinational corporations attracted by cheap labour 
costs. However the start of the 1980s saw the emergence of more competition from 
other Asian and Southeast Asian economies that could provide more attractive 
incentives, including labour costs. The previous advantages that Singapore possessed 
were being gradually eroded. Therefore a movement away from low-skilled, labour-
intensive, and relatively low-technology manufacturing towards higher-skilled, 
capital-intensive, and higher technology manufacturing was required. A conscious 
decision was made to discontinue the competition with other low-wage and hence 
low-cost economies, particularly in the Asian region. Moreover by moving towards 
more capital-intensive manufacturing, the economy became less reliant upon labour 
and therefore did not require a large population increase to fuel domestic economic 
growth. It was in this context that the second phase of educational reform took place 
as represented by the New Education System. Whilst ostensibly trying to reduce 
educational wastage, and improve efficiency, it aimed to maximise each participant’s 
educational and training outcomes.  
 
The New Education System provided for three streams in both primary and 
secondary school. The rationale was to allow all students to progress at a speed 
which was more in line with their knowledge and abilities. Therefore less capable 
primary students were allowed up to eight years to complete primary education, 
while secondary students could take up to five years to complete the General 
Certificate in Education Ordinary Level and a further three years for the Advanced 
Level. Additionally a new lower secondary school leaving certificate, the General 
Certificate in Education Normal was introduced. From a labour market perspective 
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the New Education System aimed to allow each student to progress as far as possible 
within his or her educational environment. This was then seen as being the optimal 
platform for both future training and employment outcomes. 
 
On a more global level, the New Education System attempted to make improvements 
in four main areas, 1. the standardisation of work procedures and processes across all 
educational institutions at the primary and secondary levels so as to improve overall 
educational management, 2. the adoption of not only curricula at all levels but also 
the quality of learning materials used, and particularly in the science and 
mathematics discipline areas, 3. the provision of more flexible and part-time training 
options in the technical and vocational education spheres, and finally; increased 
collaborative participation of foreign firms in the provision of training. The latter 
focused on the creation of technical institutes primarily through bilateral agreements 
between Singapore and other economies such as Japan and Germany in the provision 
of accelerated and relatively intensive technical diplomas using world’s best practice 
approaches (Boon & Gopinathan 2008). 
 
By most measures the New Education System achieved significant improvements in 
terms of academic results. Pass rates for both English and other second languages in 
a bilingual context at the Primary School Leaving Examinations exceeded 85 per 
cent by the mid-1980s. Further education wastage rates declined significantly. In 
1986, for example, only 3,772 pupils (or less than one per cent of the total school 
population below sixteen years of age) left school without having at least ten years of 
education (Boon & Gopinathan 2006). Perhaps it was in the area of vocational and 
technical education, that the New Education System proved to be somewhat 
disappointing. Whilst structural changes were made within the Technical Education 
Department such as the creation of the Vocational and Industrial Training Board 
through the amalgamation of the Industrial Training Board and the Adult Education 
Board in 1979, little had been done to lift the profile of technical training and blue-
collar jobs during this period. Vocational and technical training was not viewed as a 
desirable educational outcome by many existing stake-holders and especially parents. 
Rather it was seen primarily as a second-best option for those students who had been 
unable and/or unwilling to meet the challenges posed by more rigorous academic 
programs. This view was in stark contrast to some other Asian economies such as 
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South Korea and Japan where vocational and technical training was viewed in 
relatively high esteem. In the Singaporean system the junior colleges had historically 
been viewed as the preferred destination for those students who were determined to 
progress to university education. They were basically a two-year post-secondary 
educational option, after students had completed their four or five years of normal 
secondary education. The challenge for Singaporean policymakers was to provide 
attractive technical and vocational educational alternatives to these junior colleges. 
The development and introduction of polytechnics and institutes of technical 
education in the next period represented the government’s response to this challenge. 
 
Finally from a university perspective, the most significant event during this period 
was the formation of the National University of Singapore in 1980. This new entity 
came about from the merging of the Nanyang University and University of 
Singapore that previously existed as two independent tertiary institutions. Based on 
the 1979 Dainton Report on Higher Education in Singapore, the Singapore 
government accepted its primary recommendation and so the National University of 
Singapore was formed. 
 
6.5 The Third Industrialisation Phase and Educational Reform: 
1985 to 1997 
 
The starting point for this period is the 1985/86 recession. The Singaporean economy 
shrunk by approximately 1.6 per cent in real terms during that period. The 
circumstances for this recession were primarily due to overseas factors that led to a 
fall in global demand for manufactured products. Regardless, Singaporean 
policymakers saw the need to not only further diversify in terms of the types of items 
produced but to further invest in service provision. In response to this recession, the 
Singapore government convened an Economic Committee in 1986 to identify the 
causes of the recession and in turn to examine possible policy changes, consider 
future strategies and prospects, policies for growth across the various sectors of the 
economy. Titled, ‘The Singapore Economy: New Directions’, it concluded that the 
Singaporean education system was still lagging behind those of other industrialised 
economies, despite having made significant improvements since 1965. Specifically 
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the committee identified the problems associated with excessive levels of wastage in 
relation to students not completing secondary education in previous decades. As a 
result of this pattern, the committee identified that there were many workers within 
the domestic labour force who lacked fundamental skills. Therefore it was necessary 
to upgrade the skills of this cohort as a matter of priority. The report emphasised the 
greater use of adult education programs to improve the skills of such workers. 
However the committee was pragmatic enough to realise that it could take up to 
decades for the Singaporean education system to catch up to those education systems 
already operating in other industrialised economies. 
 
Such an example was the greater usage of the Basic Education for Skills Training 
program which had been introduced in 1983 to upgrade the English language and 
mathematics competency of workers with less than primary level six education to up 
to Primary Year Six levels. By 1996, approximately 400,000 workers had enrolled in 
at least one of these modules. Another example identified was the Worker 
Improvement through secondary education program which had been launched in 
1987 for graduates of the Basic Education for Skills Training program and workers 
with only up to Primary Year Six education. The aim of this program was to raise 
competencies in both English language skills and mathematics to a Secondary Year 
Four level. By 1996 approximately 170,000 workers had enrolled in at least one of 
these modules. 
 
As part of their specific recommendations, the committee recommended that the 
median educational level of the Singaporean work force would need to be increased 
given that in 1980 only 73 per cent of the domestic labour force had completed either 
only primary or no education at all. Further, in the same year only 3.5 per cent had 
completed either tertiary or university education. Secondly, it stressed the need for 
ongoing training and re-training of the domestic labour force. Thirdly it urged the 
need for expanding and improving education at the post-secondary and tertiary 
levels, and increasing enrolment numbers. 
 
In relation to technical and vocational education, by the early 1990s there was 
recognition that employees and/or trainees who had only completed primary 
education would find it difficult to deal with new manufacturing methods and new 
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technologies embodied in these processes in a period of rapid change. This issue was 
particularly the case as Singapore moved into an efficiency-driven phase of 
development. As opposed to those more competent students who could opt for either 
polytechnics or universities, the Technical Education Department initiated a new 
educational option. These post-secondary educational institutions were titled 
institutes of technical education. These were post-secondary educational institutions 
that effectively replaced the former vocational schools that catered for students who 
had previously performed poorly in the mainstream secondary schools. They were 
entirely focused on vocational technical education. Between 1992 and 1998, ten such 
institutes were either built or were upgraded from pre-existing vocational schools 
across Singapore. This demonstrated the government’s commitment to technical and 
vocational education. The creation of the institutes of technical education as stand-
alone educational entities lifted the status of technical education across Singapore 
from both a student as well as a parental perspective. Up until their creation under-
performing students at the completion of primary education had been essentially 
forced to go to vocational secondary schools. Not only were the latter negatively 
viewed by both students and their parents, they did not provide any further pathways 
to higher levels of education. However with the creation of institutes of technical 
education, well-performing students had the opportunity to move onto polytechnic 
education and in some cases to university education based purely on merit 
performance. These institutes were regarded as post-secondary education. However, 
in many other developed economies they would be the equivalent of the last two 
years of a high school or upper secondary education. 
 
Their primary aim was to train technicians and skilled workers for employment 
opportunities across all sectors of the economy. In addition they were specifically 
designed to provide an alternative route for those students who did not move on to 
junior colleges or polytechnics. Moreover the institutes were the vehicles through 
which the New Apprenticeship Scheme was launched in 1992. Based on the dual 
German model (Tan 1997), it combined both on-the-job training with off-the job 
training comprising theory and workshop practice at one these institutes. In addition, 
the institutes provided training not only for students and apprentices but also 
industrial trainers both on-the-job and off-the-job. Finally the range of 
apprenticeships that were now covered through these institutes was extended from 
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traditional skills to include retail sales, health care and travel and tourism. The 
creation of this new entity in the early 1990s was a crucial milestone in the 
development of comprehensive technical education across Singapore. It was a 
dynamic institution that was of only inward-looking in terms of addressing the needs 
of the Singapore economy. It also had an outward-looking focus in that it was a 
system that was prepared to embrace world best practices in terms of vocational, 
technical, and industrial training. These included the use of competency-based 
education as found in the German training system, and the DACUM curriculum 
methodology as used in the United States for vocational training (Tan 1997). This 
initiative again demonstrated the willingness of the Singapore government to be 
extremely proactive not only in relation to manpower planning but to network with 
industry to match better the needs of industry with the provision of appropriate 
educational and training programs.. 
 
In relation to tertiary and university education, higher education in Singapore was 
encouraged to not only increase enrolment levels but to commence more extensive 
research and development activities and develop and nurture closer linkages with 
industry. As part of this process Nanyang Technological Institute in combination 
with the National Institute of Education amalgamated to form the Nanyang 
Technological University in 1991. This was seen as a template for future tertiary 
education in Singapore. Moreover it was also viewed as a way of encouraging a more 
competitive environment with the existing National University of Singapore. The 
two universities were then competing for student enrolments as well as bidding for 
recurrent and development funding as well as research grants. 
 
At this time government expenditure on both recurrent and capital expenditures for 
both universities and polytechnics expanded significantly. Recurrent university 
spending in the fiscal year 1989/90 amounted to $ 288.5 million in Singapore dollars. 
By 1997/98 it had reached $656.6 million. In relation to development or capital 
expenditures across the university sector, it amounted to $ 19.6 million in 1989/90. 
By 1997/98, it had increased to $165 million. The latter represented an eight fold 
increase in capital spending across the university sector. This was indicative of the 
government commitment to improved and expanded university education. 
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In order to capitalise on this increased expenditure, both the National University of 
Singapore and the Nanyang Technological University adopted a range of strategies 
aimed at becoming world-class universities. These included the expansion of 
undergraduate and postgraduate education by attracting more students from the 
Asian region and beyond. A demonstration of this aim was the establishment of 
various new research institutes at both universities. A second initiative was to revise 
the undergraduate curricula at both universities so as to encourage more creative and 
problem-solving skills, with an emphasis on engineering and science courses. A third 
initiative was to improve the physical infrastructure at both universities so as to 
approach those facilities available at world-class universities in the developed 
economies. The latter was facilitated by the significant increases in development 
expenditures that took place over this period as indicated earlier. A fourth initiative 
was to encourage all students at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels to take 
up optional courses offered by other faculties so as to widen their learning 
experiences. Finally, both universities invested heavily in social and recreational 
infrastructure so as to provide all students with a more varied and comprehensive 
cultural and social life on their respective campuses. 
 
While there was a large increase in university expenditure, the extra polytechnic 
funding was even more pronounced. Polytechnic spending in the fiscal year 1989/90 
amounted to $126.8 million in Singapore dollars. By 1997/98 it had reached 
approximately $429.2 million. In relation to development or capital expenditures 
across the polytechnic sector, it amounted to $15.4 million in 1989/90. By the fiscal 
year, 1997/98, it had increased to $305.3 million. The latter represented a twenty fold 
increase in capital spending. This was indicative of the government commitment to 
improved and expanded university education. This data is shown in Tables 6.5 and 
6.6 as follows. 
 
When examining the data contained in both of these tables, it is significant that in 
relation to recurrent expenditures in relation to both the university and polytechnic 
sectors that reductions took place in the fiscal year following the Asian Currency 
Crisis in 1997/98. Although development expenditures did fall in the polytechnic 
sector, interestingly they increased significantly in the case of university 
expenditures. 
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Table 6.5 Singapore Government Recurrent Expenditure, 1989–2006 
Year University ($) Recurrent ($) 
1989/90 288,571 126,876 
1990/91 351,476 15,110 
1991/92 841,154 17,008 
1992/83 412,524 196,330 
1993/94 431,554 262,593 
1994/95 502,999 320,283 
1995/96 520,289 338,960 
1996/97 546,120 393,624 
1997/98 656,619 429,234 
1998/99 537,450 419,673 
1999/00 569,971 387,239 
2000/01 898,505 524,055 
2001/02 1,114,554 592,733 
2002/03 973,779 578,551 
2003/04 1,034,804 714,264 
2004/05 1,029,869 594,446 
2005/06 1,058,239 622,933 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2003 and 2010, Education Statistics Digest 
 
Table 6.6 Singapore Government Development Expenditure, 1989–2006 
Year University ($) Polytechnic ($) 
1989/90 19,594 15,449 
1990/91 74,852 39,512 
1991/92 102,152 117,542 
1992/83 163,974 106,249 
1993/94 200,739 131,237 
1994/95 141,746 274,947 
1995/96 154,278 259,823 
1996/97 174,201 159,244 
1997/98 165,004 305,286 
1998/99 315,054 275,051 
1999/00 340,949 146,463 
2000/01 329,625 169,183 
2001/02 331,992 308,888 
2002/03 384,117 146,433 
2003/04 302,293 183,424 
2004/05 453,944 262,858 
2005/06 247,374 152,823 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2003 and 2010, Education Statistics Digest 
 
Given these changes and the associated increases in both recurrent and capital 
expenditures for both the university and polytechnic sectors, it is not surprising that 
there was a large expansion in student enrolments in both areas. This is shown in 
Table 6.5. However, this table only includes data for full-time students enrolled in 
both types of institution. More recent data would indicate that when taking part-time 
students into consideration, both university and polytechnic enrolments will be 
considerably higher. 
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Table 6.7 Student Enrolments in University and Polytechnic Full-Time for 
Selected Years, 1980–2006 
Year University Polytechnic 
1960 3,502 2,232 
1970 7,061 2,794 
1980 8,634 7,835 
1990 22,005 24,078 
1993 25,805 33,982 
1994 27,189 37,141 
1995 28,529 41,002 
1996 29,855 43,837 
1997 30,934 46,592 
1998 32,109 48,734 
1999 33,722 50,578 
2000 36,121 52,033 
2001 37,983 53,599 
2002 39,156 54,689 
2003 40,095 55,753 
2004 41,628 56,048 
2005 43,663 58,880 
2006 46,479 62,962 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2003 and 2010, Education Statistics Digest 
 
Given the adoption of the various recommendations set out by the Singapore 
Economic Committee of 1986, the general consensus was that Singaporean 
manpower planning had been relatively successful. The success criterion had been 
largely achieved by the end of this period in terms of meeting the needs of the 
economy for trained workers at all levels (Boon & Gopinathan 2006). However as 
this period came to an end there was one fundamental problem that had not been 
resolved. Given the impending move into a so-called knowledge-based economy, 
there was a clear need to develop a critical mass of indigenous scientists and 
engineers, not only for the present but into the future. This was vital if Singapore was 
to accelerate its own domestic technological capacity so as to compete more 
effectively in regional and global markets. 
 
6.6 The Fourth Industrialisation Phase and Educational Reform 
after the Asian Currency Crisis: 1998 to 2006 
 
This period commences with the Asian Currency Crisis that commenced in July 
1997. Whilst other Asian economies such as Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia suffered more severely during this period, Singapore was still adversely 
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affected by a contraction of approximately 1.4 per cent in 1997/98. However the 
economy recovered quickly with growth rates 7.2 per cent in 1998/99 and ten per 
cent in 1999/2000, respectively. 
 
It was in this context that the Singaporean government and specifically the Ministry 
of Education implemented a number of policy changes aimed at improving the 
educational levels and skills was base of the domestic population. These changes 
were found in the policy initiative titled ‘Thinking Schools, Learning Nation’ that 
was introduced in 1997. This policy based on the idea that there was a need to build 
up an atmosphere of innovation and enterprise. To achieve those outcomes 
policymakers wanted to improve student attitudes and life skills. Moreover this 
policy approach was reflective of a shift in orientation from an economy based on 
efficiency improvements to one based on ability improvements. The rationale for this 
new policy approach was to recognise that Singapore was a small island city-state 
that was very limited in terms of its natural resources apart from it population, and 
hence human capital. Therefore it was necessary to maximise the returns that could 
be generated from its population, and especially its domestic labour force. Whilst 
previous educational reforms had focused on efficiency, it was seen as necessary to 
move towards improved ability and knowledge outcomes in relation to technology 
and managerial performance. 
 
As part of this new policy all students would be provided with 10 years of general 
education, including six compulsory years at the primary level. A national 
curriculum was introduced and national examinations were held at the end of 
primary, secondary, ad junior college years. However students were to be given 
greater choice and flexibility when it came to further educational options either at the 
university level, polytechnic level, or the institutes of technical education level. 
Moreover students were provided with a range of different pathways by which they 
could reach these educational destinations. 
 
A number of key elements constituted this policy approach. Firstly, teachers were to 
move away from being a knowledge provider to a knowledge facilitator. The logic 
behind this approach was to give students greater freedom to work either 
independently and/or collectively in terms of collecting and processing and analysing 
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information. Moreover learners were encouraged to be far more proactive 
participants and display less reliance on the class teacher. This was very much 
reflected in the theme of ‘Teach Less, Teach More’ (Lee 2006) that was enunciated 
by the Singapore government. As part of this approach there was to be far less 
reliance on rote learning and a one size fits all approach to educational practice in 
both primary and secondary education (Tharman 2005). 
 
The second component of this policy was to use the education system to develop 
both character and leadership amongst Singaporean students. The Ministry of 
Education and in turn the government overall believed that there was a need to foster 
certain moral values across the student cohort. At the same time there was a need to 
develop leadership qualities amongst students. In order to achieve these outcomes 
teacher were encouraged be strong moral examples in school communities. In 
addition students were encouraged to be exposed to and to participate in much wider 
ranges of activities through memberships in various clubs, societies and sporting 
associations. 
 
From a teaching perspective the Singapore government was proactive in providing 
salary and general remuneration packages and remuneration that not only encouraged 
the best practitioners to remain in the profession but were highly competitive with 
salaries and remuneration packages that were enjoyed by other professions such as 
lawyers, engineers, and medical practitioners (Boon & Gopinathan 2008). Moreover 
teachers at the primary, secondary, and technical levels were also encouraged to 
update their knowledge and skills base with up to 100 paid hours of professional 
training per year. Other incentives included additional payments to teachers who 
stayed in the profession after a certain number of years. Finally school managers and 
teaching staff were encouraged to apply for regular sabbatical leave both in 
educational as well as non-educational organisations. 
 
Perhaps one concrete way to demonstrate the effectiveness of these programs was the 
performance of Singaporean students in international testing regimes such as the 
International Mathematics and Science Studies tests that have been occurring on a 
global basis since 1995. These tests apply to Year Five and Year Nine students and 
are conducted every four years. In 1995, 41 countries participated and in 2007, 48 
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countries participated. Since their commencement in 1995, Singapore has achieved 
first place in mathematics every year apart from 2007 when it finished third behind 
Taiwan and South Korea, at the Year Nine level. In relation to science, Singapore has 
achieved first place every year apart from 1999 when it finished second behind 
Taiwan. Similar results applied to the Year Five test results. Various explanations 
have been offered as to reasons why Singaporean students perform as well as they 
do. These range from the increased use of streaming according to academic abilities 
to curriculum changes to better teaching practice. Regardless Singaporean results 
would indicate that the policy approaches adopted at the primary and secondary 
levels have achieved concrete results. 
 
At the technical and polytechnic levels, there are now five polytechnics operating in 
Singapore. Whilst Singapore Polytechnic was established in 1954 and Ngee Ann 
Polytechnic was established in 1962, three other polytechnics have since been 
established. Tamasek Polytechnic was established in 1990. Nanyang Polytechnic was 
founded in 1992. Finally, the Republic Polytechnic was established in 2002. With 
enrolments of approximately 63, 000 in 2006, these five institutions have provided 
an invaluable role in terms of allowing students who did not initially want to go to 
university to attend an alternative post-secondary institution. These are aimed at 
providing workers who are well-trained and suitably equipped to work either in the 
manufacturing or services sectors. Unlike other industrialised economies where 
polytechnics and/or institutes of advanced education have eventually upgraded these 
institutions into universities, this has not been the case in Singapore. Given their 
strong vocational focus and their wide range of courses for both full-time and part-
time students, these institutions have the scope and flexibility to maintain a very 
strong industry focus. For example in the 2006/07 academic year, the five 
Singaporean polytechnics offered 146 pre-employment courses in disciplines 
spanning business, maritime sciences, engineering, health sciences, chemical 
sciences, design, and bio-technology to name just a few (Boon & Gopinathan 2008). 
The newest polytechnic, Republic Polytechnic, for example, offers 35 full-time 
diploma courses as well as a number of post-diploma courses. It also offers part-time 
courses at the diploma level in addition to executive and specifically designed 
workforce skills courses at the certificate, advanced certificate, diploma, and 
graduate diploma levels, respectively. Therefore policymakers from the Ministry of 
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Education saw the importance of maintaining these institutions as autonomous 
entities that would carry out specific functions in contrast to the university sector. 
 
The final component of Singaporean education has been the university sector. As 
mentioned earlier there have been a number of key in terms of the orientation of 
university education in Singapore since 1985 as was examined in the previous 
chapter. However one key event that took place during this period was the 
establishment of the Singapore Management University in 2000. Based on the 
Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania, it now extends the 
number of universities in Singapore to three. However the newest of the three 
universities has focused heavily not only on world-class teaching and research but 
has emphasised producing a university environment that encourages creativity and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
From a resource allocation perspective, there have been significant increases in both 
recurrent and development expenditures as indicated by Tables 6.5 and 6.6, over this 
period. Between 1995/96, and 2005/06, recurrent expenditures have doubled from 
$520.3 million to $1012.8 million. In relation to development or capital expenditures, 
they have more than doubled over the period 1997/98 to 2004/05 with an increase 
from $165 million to approximately $436 million (although the fiscal year 2005/06 
saw a significant reduction, this spending category back to approximately $247 
million as a result of fiscal tightening). These figures are reflective of the substantial 
increases in university enrolments over the period of nearly 50 per cent from 30,934 
full-time students in 1997 to 46,479 full-time students in 2006 as indicated in Table 
6.7. 
 
Finally in relation to university education, the most recent changes have been to 
introduce and extend the concept of lifelong learning, for the entire population 
whether it is on a full-time or part-time basis. This has been driven by government 
policy to make tertiary education much more relevant to the demands of a rapidly-
changing economy. As part of this approach certain strategies have been introduced 
based on overseas experiences in other industrialised economies. These include 
multiple learning opportunities for tertiary students outside of the normal university 
institution in terms of entry and exit points at different points along their course 
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programs. These include course delivery at the workplace. Secondly, greater 
provision of flexible learning needs to be offered especially for those students 
already in the workforce. Thirdly, students need to have the opportunity to receive 
recognition for prior learning whether it is in a formal educational institution or in 
the workplace or through some associated educational provider. Fourthly, 
universities were required to commit to greater investments in new technologies so 
as to increase and expand educational access at both the undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels. Finally, the university sector in Singapore was encouraged, if 
not required, to engage in more collaborative activities with other educational 
providers to as to achieve economies of scale and hence share resources. This was to 
apply to external institutions such as employers, government agencies, trade unions, 
and community groups. This strategy was seen as being essential if the university 
sector was to play a role in allowing Singapore to attract and develop new growth 
sectors such as biomedical sciences, info-communications, creativity technology, 
integrated resorts and high-value engineering, to name just a few (Seng 2007). 
 
In relation to both post-secondary education and tertiary education, Table 6.8 reveals 
that these two levels of education recorded the largest increase over this period in 
terms of gross enrolment ratios. This table shows the gross enrolment ratios for 
various levels of education across Singapore over the period 1999 to 2006. The gross 
enrolment ratio for a given level of education is derived by dividing the total resident 
enrolment for a particular level of education, regardless of age, by the resident 
population of the age group which according to national legislation, should be 
enrolled at that level. The post-secondary level, which includes the institutes of 
technical education, has increased by six per cent over this period while the tertiary 
level, which includes both polytechnics and universities, has increased by three per 
cent. 
 
Table 6.8 Gross Enrolment Ratios, Primary to Tertiary, 1999–2006 
Gross Enrolment Ratio 
(%) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Primary Age (6–11) 97 97 95 96 95 96 96 96 
Secondary Age (12–15) 99 99 100 98 99 98 99 99 
Post-Secondary (16–17) 44 48 48 49 50 50 51 52 
Tertiary (16–20) 45 45 45 46 46 47 47 48 
All (6–20) 87 88 87 87 87 88 88 88 
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Source: Ministry of Education, 2003 and 2010, Education Statistics Digest. 
 
However there are some potential problems that may adversely affect university 
education in Singapore. These include the level of control exercised by the Ministry 
of Education across a wide range of decision-making by all universities. This was 
seen as incompatible with the level of decentralisation that universities require when 
responding to regional and global changes in the private sector in terms of funding, 
recruiting, teaching, training, and research decisions. In addition, the process of 
applying quotas to certain undergraduate areas such as medicine, engineering, and 
law has been often criticised as denying many well-credentialed students, and 
especially women, timely access to these areas. This could lead to possible supply-
side constraints in the future that could hold back the positive contribution of 
university education to potential Singaporean growth.  However it may concurrently 
prevent an over-supply in certain professions. 
  
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the role of education policies in the context of Singapore 
since independence in 1965. In the first period, the Singapore economy emerged 
from being a former British colony. The embryonic nation-state commenced 
industrialisation with very limited experience in either production and/or 
manufacturing. Based on previous British education priorities, there had been a 
strong preference for traditional academic education. These preferences were 
reinforced by parental and familial biases for academic education that would lead 
primarily to a university education. Conversely, vocational and technical education 
was largely viewed as very much a second-best option. As a result policymakers 
were faced with major problems as they attempted to restructure the Singaporean 
economy from one largely dependent on trade and shipbuilding to an economy based 
on manufacturing and services. However, there were other problems during this 
period as Singapore’s status as a member of the Federation of Malaysia changed over 
this period from 1957 to 1965, from inclusion to finally expulsion. A final issue that 
needed to be addressed during this period is the problem of trying to achieve general 
bilingualism which proved to be an ongoing impediment to student performance in 
many cases. However the willingness of the Singaporean government to become 
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heavily involved in education policy from the outset was a clear signal of 
increasingly proactive participation into the future. 
 
In the second phase, which is often referred to as the survival-driven education 
period, policymakers were aware of the problems of shifting from the import 
substitution industrialised economic strategy towards a more export-oriented 
economy that would attract more foreign investment aware of lower cost conditions 
prevailing in the island-state. Some of the challenges associated with the latter were 
the improvement of the overall levels of completed secondary education and the 
integration of the Singaporean education system that had been previously 
characterised by a range of schools largely based on ethnic lines. In order to create an 
appropriately skilled and trained labour force, the education system had to be re-
modelled. Whilst technical education was recognised as an area into which more 
resources must be channelled, there was still the ongoing problem of educational 
wastage at the primary and secondary levels that needed to be rectified. 
 
During the third phase of Singaporean education policy development and practice, 
policymakers were focused on improvements in both productivity and efficiency in 
order to effectively complete in regional and global markets. In response to these 
objectives, a range of reforms were introduced aimed at improving completion rates 
at both primary and secondary education levels. They also emphasised the increasing 
importance of technical and vocational education relative to more traditional 
secondary academic education. In response, institutes of technical education were 
established with a focus on continuous and world-class vocational and technical 
education being offered to existing and prospective Singaporean students and 
workers. In addition, extra funding was allocated to post-secondary education at both 
the polytechnic and university levels. The polytechnics were seen as the natural 
extension of the institutes in terms of enhanced technical education whilst the 
university sector was encouraged to achieve world-class performance levels in both 
teaching and research endeavours. 
 
In the fourth phase, education policy was inextricably affected by the direction of 
Singaporean economic policy after the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997/98. Given the 
finite nature of Singapore’s resources there was a deliberate movement away from 
 128 
 
economic growth based on efficiency to growth based on ability. This shift was seen 
as integral if the economy was to become one based on higher levels of innovation 
and entrepreneurship. Apart from reforms at the primary and secondary levels in 
relation to curriculum and teacher remuneration, Singaporean students demonstrated 
their world-class learning results in various international testing forums. In relation 
to institutes of technical education that had now been centralised to three large 
centres across the island, enrolments increased in the period 2000 to 2006, exceeding 
the national intake target of 25 per cent of the annual school cohort for technical 
education. At the polytechnic and university levels, both recurrent and development 
expenditures increased substantially over the period from 1997/98 to 2005/06. As 
new polytechnics and universities were opened, enrolment levels increased in both 
categories. 
 
These periods have indicated that Singaporean educational policy has been used as a 
key instrument of overall economic policy, particularly since its independence in 
August 1965. Policymakers within the Ministry of Education and associated 
educational entities as the Technical Education Department and the Vocational and 
Industrial Training Board have been willing to undertake serious and comprehensive 
reforms on a timely basis in response to changing economic conditions, irrespective 
of external factors such as ethnic and language considerations. Further, the consistent 
recognition of the importance of technical, polytechnic, and university education as 
regional and global market conditions have consistently changed, has greatly 
advantaged Singaporean economic performance since 1965. Resource allocation to 
these institutions has not been constrained by fiscal policy considerations for the bulk 
of this time frame. Moreover, the willingness of each of these post-secondary levels 
of education to forge and develop closer links with industry at both the domestic and 
international levels has greatly assisted the competitiveness of domestic Singaporean 
firms whether they are in the manufacturing or service sectors. All of these elements 
have been encouraged by a very proactive and consultative government policy 
approach linking educational policy with explicit economic imperatives continually 
over this period. 
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Chapter 7: The Data and Its Characteristics 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the data sets used in this thesis. Chapter 7 uses an 
econometric model to examine the effect of labour force educational accumulation 
on economic growth in Singapore and Malaysia as measured by the growth rates in 
GDP per capita in both economies. This chapter makes use of survey data and other 
times series data that was obtained from the relevant statistical agencies and other 
government departments in both economies over the period 1975 to 2006. 
 
The specific data on labour force educational attainment was obtained from the 
annual labour force surveys that are conducted by the Ministry of Manpower—now 
titled the Ministry of Labour - in Singapore, and the Department of Statistics in 
Malaysia. Labour force educational attainment data for Singapore was obtained from 
the Labour Force Surveys carried out by the Research and Statistics Department of 
the Ministry of Labour over the period 1975–2006. In relation to Singapore, these 
surveys were first commenced in 1974. Specifically, the data used in relation to 
Singapore is obtained from Table 8, titled: Economically Active Persons Aged 
Fifteen Years and Over by Highest Qualification Attained. Economically active 
persons refer to persons aged fifteen years or over who were either employed or 
unemployed during the reference period. This group is also referred to as the labour 
force. 
 
In relation to Malaysia, labour force educational attainment data for Malaysia was 
obtained from the Labour Force Survey Reports published by the Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia over the period 1975 to 2006. These surveys have been carried 
out since 1975. Specifically the data used for Malaysia was sourced from Table 1.5, 
Percentage Distribution of the labour Force by Educational attainment and Ethnic 
Group, Malaysia. In the Malaysian Labour Force Survey Reports, the labour force is 
defined as those who, during the reference period, were in the 15 to 64 age group (in 
completed years last birthday) and who were either employed or unemployed. 
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The aggregate time series data for Singapore was obtained from the Singapore 
Department of Statistics. Specifically it was obtained from the SingStat Time Series 
(STS) Online System. This database is the Singapore Department of Statistics' web-
based time series retrieval system. 
 
The aggregate time series data for Malaysia was obtained from the Malaysian 
Department of Statistics. The data was sourced from a number of publications 
including various Yearbooks of Statistics and Annual Time Series publications 
produced by the Department. 
 
7.2 Aggregate Times Series Data 
 
The following tables and graphs show the behaviour of a number of major 
macroeconomic variables that have been examined in this thesis. The data is shown 
in both levels and annual percentage changes. 
7.2.1 GDP 
 
Table 7.1 and Chart 7.1 show GDP at current prices for both economies in local 
currency terms over this period. In relation to GDP at current prices, in local 
currencies, both Singapore and Malaysia have experienced rapid growth over this 
period. These patterns are reflective of the development of both economies in 
combination with population increases in both economies as well as rising levels of 
investment. Whilst Singapore has been regarded as one of the initial four Asian 
Newly Industrialising economies in most contemporary development literature, 
Malaysia has been generally regarded as the Asian economy that will achieve a 
similar status in due course. 
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Table 7.1 GDP at Current Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
Country Mean Median Max Obs. 
Singapore 87,722.4 70,674.0 216,995 32 
Malaysia 190,976 127,102 572,555 32 
All 139,349 93,170.7 572,555 64 
 
Chart 7.1 GDP at Current Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
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Table 7.2 and Chart 7.2 show GDP at constant prices for both economies in local 
currency terms over this period. 
 
Table 7.2 GDP at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
Country Mean Median Max Min. Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
Singapore 94,348.84 79,528.56 212,739.71 25,039.48 56,558.14 0.49 1.95 32.00 
Malaysia 223,029.43 187,944.33 474,213.61 62,648.89 126,314.98 0.45 1.86 32.00 
All 158,689.13 127,344.31 474,213.61 25,039.48 116,749.79 1.07 3.22 64.00 
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Chart 7.2 GDP at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
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Table 7.3 and Chart 7.3 show the change in percentage terms of GDP in constant 
prices expressed in local currency terms. A similar pattern appears in both 
economies, although Malaysia is slightly more volatile as consistent with a larger 
negative skew. These trends can be possibly explained by a number of factors. 
However there is not any sign of a regular growth cycle in either economy. 
Alternatively there have been three discrete periods when there have been significant 
declines in GDP in both economies. These were the recession of 1985/86, the impact 
of the Asian Currency Crisis, and finally, the collapse in economic performance 
associated with the so-called dot.com bubble collapse of 2001/2002 and the 
associated adverse impact upon global equity markets. A further factor that adversely 
affected both economies was the impact of the slowdown in global demand for 
electronics products that significantly affected Singaporean export performance. This 
pattern was also repeated in the case of Malaysia which was also heavily dependent 
upon US demand for information and communications technology exports. The latter 
declined dramatically during the 2001/2002 period. 
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Table 7.3 GDP at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Annual Percentage 
Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.02 0.04 -1.38 4.19 31 
Malaysia 0.07 0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.04 -1.81 6.61 31 
All 0.07 0.08 0.12 -0.07 0.04 -1.62 5.62 62 
 
Chart 7.3 GDP at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Annual Percentage 
Change) 
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Table 7.4 and Chart 7.4 show GDP at current prices for both economies expressed in 
USD. It is interesting to note that economies are approximately equivalent in size 
when expressed in USD terms. This may reflect the relative strength of the Singapore 
dollar as opposed to the Malaysian ringgit against the USD over this period. 
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Table 7.4 GDP at Current Prices in USD (Millions) 
Country Mean Median Max Min. Obs. 
Singapore 51,438.7 40,003.8 136,566 5,670.39 32 
Malaysia 60,242.0 46,579.5 156,087 9,329.17 32 
All 55,840.3 43,594.9 156,087 5,670.39 64 
 
 
Chart 7.4 GDP at Current Prices in USD (Millions) 
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Table 7.5 and Chart 7.5 show GDP at constant prices for both economies expressed 
in USD. It is interesting that both economies are almost the same size even though 
Singapore has about a quarter of the population. It is also significant that Singapore 
has recently become larger than Malaysia. The growth of the Singapore economy 
relative to that of the Malaysian economy can be explained by both the rate of capital 
accumulation and the rapid growth of exports over this period. The high rate of 
capital accumulation can be explained by both a very high domestic savings rate and 
the high-level flow of foreign investment into Singapore over this period. Both of 
these variables were significantly lower in the case of Malaysia. The relative ease of 
access for foreign investors in relation to Singapore also played a role. 
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Table 7.5 GDP at Constant Prices in USD (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 54,526.35 44,990.26 133,888.41 10,559.39 37,025.31 0.41 1.83 32 
Malaysia 73,844.12 68,886.63 129,277.73 26,171.50 31,057.97 0.19 1.76 32 
All 64,185.24 58,973.95 133,888.41 10,559.39 35,270.03 0.16 1.83 64 
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Table 7.6 and Chart 7.6 show the rate of change in GDP at constant prices for both 
economies expressed in USD. The comments that applied to Table 7.3 and Chart 7.3 
would also apply here. 
 
Table 7.6 GDP at Constant Prices in USD (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.09 0.10 0.18 -0.13 0.07 -1.18 4.32 31 
Malaysia 0.06 0.07 0.18 -0.33 0.09 -2.53 11.89 31 
All 0.07 0.08 0.18 -0.33 0.08 -2.17 10.97 62 
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Chart 7.6 GDP at Constant Prices in USD (Annual Percentage Change) 
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Table 7.7 and Chart 7.7 show GDP at current prices per capita for both economies 
expressed in USD. 
 
Table 7.7 GDP at Current Prices in USD Per Capita (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Obs. 
Singapore 14,153.8 12,929.7 31,027.9 32 
Malaysia 2,928.13 2,556.44 5,859.08 32 
All 8,540.95 4,595.03 31,027.9 64 
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Chart 7.7 GDP at Current Prices in USD Per Capita (Millions) 
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Table 7.8 and Chart 7.8 show GDP at constant prices per capita for both economies 
expressed in USD. Singapore has achieved a much higher result than Malaysia and 
the gap has accelerated since the 1985/86 recessionary period in both economies. 
 
Table 7.8 GDP at Constant Prices in USD Per Capita (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 15,330.25 14,546.23 30,419.50 4,666.93 7,922.48 0.19 1.61 32 
Malaysia 3,809.10 3,669.75 5,999.36 2,127.71 954.91 0.44 2.83 32 
All 9,569.67 5,344.52 30,419.50 2,127.71 8,065.01 1.10 2.74 64 
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Chart 7.8 GDP at Constant Prices in USD Per Capita (Millions) 
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Table 7.9 and Chart 7.9 show the rate of change in GDP at constant prices per capita 
for both economies expressed in USD. The variation in the Malaysian economy is 
much more pronounced during its recessionary periods apart from the 2001/02 period 
when it was less than Singapore. 
 
Table 7.9 GDP at Constant Prices in USD Per Capita (Annual Percentage 
Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.06 0.08 0.15 -0.15 0.07 -1.40 5.06 31 
Malaysia 0.03 0.05 0.16 -0.35 0.09 -2.47 11.67 31 
All 0.05 0.06 0.16 -0.35 0.08 -2.21 11.05 62 
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Chart 7.9 GDP at Constant Prices in USD Per Capita (Annual Percentage 
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7.2.2 The Labour Force and Population 
 
Table 7.10 and Chart 7.10 show the labour force for both Singapore and Malaysia. 
Given the differences in population size it is not surprising that Malaysia has a much 
larger labour force. 
Table 7.10 Labour Force 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 1,552,448.66 1,459,527.50 2,594,100.00 858,393.00 478,722.90 0.37 2.12 32 
Malaysia 7,345,296.88 7,187,450.00 10,413,900.00 4,412,900.00 1,941,964.00 0.17 1.70 32 
All 4,448,872.77 3,503,500.00 10,413,900.00 858,393.00 3,238,963.78 0.47 1.74 64 
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Table 7.11 and Chart 7.11 show the percentage changes in labour forces for both 
Singapore and Malaysia. The variations in the Singaporean labour force are much 
more volatile and highly skewed. This may reflect the exposure of Singapore to 
variations in global and regional conditions as shown by the declines in the 
1985/1986 period and the 2001/2002 period, respectively. It may also reflect the 
changes in the participation rate over this period. Finally it may reflect the role of 
guest workers who provide a significant component of the labour force. 
 
Table 7.11 Annual Labour Force Percentage Change 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.04 0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.28 3.24 31 
Malaysia 0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.19 4.23 31 
All 0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.41 3.86 62 
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Table 7.12 and Chart 7.12 show the populations for both Singapore and Malaysia. 
The growth rate of the population for Malaysia is higher than that of Singapore. This 
may be explained by the successful introduction of family planning schemes in 
Singapore during the 1980s. In contrast cultural conditions in Malaysia would prove 
to be less receptive to such schemes being adopted. 
 
Table 7.12 Population 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 3,217,471.88 3,091,100.00 4,401,400.00 2,262,600.00 701,441.99 0.23 1.60 32 
Malaysia 18,656,206.25 18,215,001.50 26,640,200.00 12,300,291.00 4,399,404.28 0.29 1.89 32 
All 10,936,839.06 8,350,845.50 26,640,200.00 2,262,600.00 8,384,530.78 0.39 1.60 64 
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Chart 7.12 Population 
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Table 7.13 and Chart 7.13 show the percentage change in populations for both 
Singapore and Malaysia. The growth rate of the population for Malaysia is higher 
than that of Singapore. This may be explained by the successful introduction of 
family planning schemes in Singapore during the 1980s. It also may reflect the rapid 
economic development of Singapore and the greater participation of women in the 
labour force. In contrast cultural conditions in Malaysia would prove to be less 
receptive to such schemes being adopted. Moreover in Malaysian agricultural areas 
large family sizes were seen as desirable outcomes as they provided additional 
sources of domestic labour from the family unit. 
 
Table 7.13 Population (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.28 2.95 31 
Malaysia 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 3.09 15.76 31 
All 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.18 5.33 62 
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Chart 7.13 Population (Annual Percentage Change) 
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7.2.3 Investment 
 
Table 7.14 and Chart 7.14 show the gross capital formation at current prices 
expressed in local currency. 
 
Table 7.14 Gross Capital Formation at Current Prices in Local Currency 
(Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Obs. 
Singapore 27,540.4 23,334.2 55,475.9 4,832.70 32 
Malaysia 53,465.6 44,237.0 121,494 5,602.00 32 
All 40,503.0 29,721.1 121,494 4,832.70 64 
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Table 7.15 and Chart 7.15 show the gross capital formation at constant prices 
expressed in local currency. Singapore has had a relatively constant growth rate in 
this variable until the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997/98. Malaysia has been far more 
volatile in relation to this measure. 
 
Table 7.15 Gross Capital Formation at Constant Prices in Local Currency 
(Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 27,421.75 22,333.28 49,798.83 7,446.38 14,763.72 0.21 1.50 32 
Malaysia 60,353.31 55,467.86 134,494.15 12,866.19 36,224.20 0.33 1.82 32 
All 43,887.53 34,536.29 134,494.15 7,446.38 32,068.08 1.05 3.17 64 
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Chart 7.15 Gross Capital Formation at Constant Prices in Local Currency 
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Table 7.16 and chart 7.16 show the percentage change in gross capital formation at 
constant prices expressed in local currency for both economies. Certainly gross 
capital formation has been far more volatile in Malaysia. The significant decline in 
the first half of the 1980s can be associated with the fiscal and trade imbalances in 
the 1981 to 1983 period that produced a large fall in foreign investment. The second 
period commences with the Asian Currency Crisis and continues with the 
introduction of capital controls. 
 
Table 7.16 Gross Capital Formation at Constant Prices (Annual Percentage 
Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.07 0.10 0.20 -0.12 0.10 -0.60 2.23 31 
Malaysia 0.08 0.08 0.34 -0.43 0.16 -1.07 4.98 31 
All 0.08 0.10 0.34 -0.43 0.13 -0.96 5.32 62 
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Chart 7.16 Gross Capital Formation At Constant Prices (Annual Percentage 
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7.2.4 Government Expenditures 
 
Table 7.17 and Chart 7.17 show the level of government consumption expenditure at 
current prices in Singapore and Malaysia expressed in local currency. 
 
Table 7.17 Government Consumption Expenditure at Current Prices in Local 
Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Obs. 
Singapore 9,243 7,042 24,288 1,423 32 
Malaysia 23,997 17,465 70,394 3,924 32 
All 16,620 11,952 70,394 1,423 64 
 
 
 147 
 
Chart 7.17 Government Consumption Expenditure At Current Prices in Local 
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Table 7.18 and Chart 7.18 show the level of government consumption expenditure at 
constant prices in Singapore and Malaysia expressed in local currency. 
 
Table 7.18 Government Consumption Expenditure at Constant Prices in Local 
Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 9,727.05 7,534.97 23,000.00 2,715.65 6,179.28 0.73 2.18 32 
Malaysia 28,119.09 24,820.52 58,325.14 10,064.09 13,810.37 0.76 2.58 32 
All 18,923.07 17,689.91 58,325.14 2,715.65 14,090.68 1.12 3.69 64 
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Chart 7.18 Government Consumption Expenditure At Constant Prices in Local 
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Table 7.19 and Chart 7.19 show the annual percentage change in the level of 
government consumption expenditure at constant prices in Singapore and Malaysia 
expressed in local currency terms. 
 
Table 7.19 Government Consumption Expenditure at Constant Prices (Annual 
Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.07 0.07 0.24 -0.06 0.07 0.47 3.32 31 
Malaysia 0.06 0.06 0.27 -0.14 0.09 -0.03 3.27 31 
All 0.07 0.07 0.27 -0.14 0.08 0.04 3.60 62 
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Chart 7.19 Government Consumption Expenditure at Constant Prices (Annual 
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Table 7.20 and Chart 7.20 show the recurrent government education expenditure in 
current prices for Singapore and Malaysia in local currency. After 1990 the growth in 
Malaysian expenditure was much greater. This is consistent with the growth rate of 
the population compared to Singapore. 
 
Table 7.20 Recurrent Education Expenditure at Current Prices in Local 
Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Obs. 
Singapore 2,360 1,919 6,352 340 32 
Malaysia 8,124 5,372 25,589 1,198 32 
All 5,242 3,175 25,589 340 64 
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Chart 7.20 Recurrent Education Expenditure At Current Prices in Local 
Currency (Millions) 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
 Singapore  Malaysia
 
 
Table 7.21 and Chart 7.21 show the recurrent education expenditure in constant 
prices for Singapore and Malaysia in local currency. 
 
Table 7.21 Recurrent Government Education Expenditure at Constant Prices in 
Local Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Obs. 
Singapore 2,481 2,041 6,015 649 32 
Malaysia 8,509 5,747 24,232 2,286 32 
All 5,495 3,697 24,232 649 64 
 
 
 
 151 
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Table 7.22 and Chart 7.22 show the percentage annual change in government 
recurrent education expenditure in constant prices for Singapore and Malaysia in 
local currency. 
 
Table 7.22 Recurrent Government Education Expenditure at Constant Prices 
(Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.08 0.07 0.30 -0.14 31 
Malaysia 0.08 0.06 0.36 -0.06 31 
All 0.08 0.07 0.36 -0.14 62 
 
 
 152 
 
Chart 7.22 Recurrent Government Education Expenditure At Constant Prices 
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Table 7.23 and Chart 7.23 show total government education expenditure at current 
prices for Singapore and Malaysia expressed in local currency terms. 
 
Table 7.23 Total Education Expenditure at Current Prices in Local Currency 
(Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Obs. 
Singapore 3,016 2,326 6,959 391 32 
Malaysia 10,770 6,832 30,938 1,410 32 
All 6,893 4,269 30,938 391 64 
 
 153 
 
Chart 7.23 Total Education Expenditure At Current Prices in Local Currency 
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Table 7.24 and Chart 7.24 show total government education expenditure at constant 
prices for Singapore and Malaysia expressed in local currency terms. Given the size 
of its population it not surprising that Malaysian expenditure is much higher than 
Singapore. 
 
Table 7.24 Total Government Education Expenditure at Constant Prices in 
Local Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 3,165.03 2,473.89 6,590.23 746.69 1,974.49 0.49 1.83 32 
Malaysia 11,241.08 7,309.49 29,297.35 2,690.84 8,758.88 1.05 2.65 32 
All 7,203.05 5,031.37 29,297.35 746.69 7,498.87 1.86 5.50 64 
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Chart 7.24 Total Government Education Expenditure At Constant Prices in 
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Table 7.25 and Chart 7.25 show the annual percentage changes in total government 
expenditures at constant prices. Both economies have experienced volatility in this 
measure. 
 
Table 7.25 Total Government Education Expenditure at Constant Prices 
(Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.08 0.07 0.36 -0.09 0.10 0.71 3.52 31 
Malaysia 0.08 0.06 0.33 -0.14 0.10 0.27 2.76 31 
All 0.08 0.06 0.36 -0.14 0.10 0.49 3.11 62 
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Table 7.26 and Chart 7.26 show total education expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
for both economies. Malaysia has consistently spent a higher percentage of its GDP 
on total education expenditure than Singapore. This may reflect the fiscal discipline 
that Singapore has maintained in terms of overall spending over this period. 
Malaysian expenditure displays some volatility over the same period. 
 
Table 7.26 Government Education Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 3.40 3.21 4.55 2.60 0.57 0.53 2.06 32 
Malaysia 5.61 5.39 7.68 4.57 0.73 1.12 3.66 32 
All 4.50 4.56 7.68 2.60 1.29 0.29 2.19 64 
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7.2.5 Trade 
 
Table 7.27 and Chart 7.27 show exports at constant prices for Singapore and 
Malaysia in local currency. Both economies had a massive increase in exports over 
this period. This reflected the emphasis on export-oriented industrialisation that both 
economies adopted. 
 
Table 7.27 Exports at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 173,284.79 120,274.56 546,709.72 21,160.14 146,697.33 0.96 2.97 32 
Malaysia 210,811.14 143,581.78 592,482.30 30,587.87 174,928.93 0.69 2.15 32 
All 192,047.97 129,351.59 592,482.30 21,160.14 161,257.90 0.84 2.55 64 
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Table 7.28 and Chart 7.28 show the annual percentage changes in total exports for 
Singapore and Malaysia at constant prices expressed in local currency. 
 
Table 7.28 Exports at Constant Prices (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.11 0.11 0.28 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 3.31 31 
Malaysia 0.10 0.12 0.22 -0.07 0.07 -0.57 2.79 31 
All 0.11 0.11 0.28 -0.07 0.07 -0.23 3.20 62 
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Table 7.29 and Chart 7.29 show imports at constant prices for both Singapore and 
Malaysia. Both economies had a large increase in imports over this period. This 
reflected the increased capitalisation of both economies. In the case of Singapore, the 
import total reflected the re-export structure of its economy. 
 
Table 7.29 Imports at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 158,105.22 111,649.18 483,897.63 22,088.79 129,121.22 0.92 2.87 32 
Malaysia 186,023.68 136,727.51 513,755.24 24,105.04 149,767.22 0.61 2.08 32 
All 172,064.45 118,652.24 513,755.24 22,088.79 139,423.35 0.77 2.43 64 
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Chart 7.29 Imports at Constant Prices in Local Currency (Millions) 
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Table 7.30 and Chart 7.30 show the percentage change in total imports at constant 
prices for Singapore and Malaysia. Both economies experienced large declines in 
imports during recessionary period. However Malaysia’s variations were much more 
pronounced. 
 
Table 7.30 Imports at Constant Prices (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.11 0.10 0.25 -0.09 0.08 -0.35 3.37 31 
Malaysia 0.11 0.09 0.26 -0.19 0.11 -0.71 3.26 31 
All 0.11 0.10 0.26 -0.19 0.10 -0.63 3.64 62 
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Chart 7.30 Imports at Constant Prices (Annual Percentage Change) 
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Table 7.31 and Chart 7.31 show the levels of openness for both Singapore and 
Malaysia over this period. Openness is defined as total exports plus total imports 
divided by GDP. Both economies have become far more open over time with 
Singapore starting from a much higher base level. Both economies reduced various 
forms of protection over this period. 
 
Table 7.31 Openness 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 3.03 2.92 4.84 1.73 0.85 0.42 2.35 32 
Malaysia 1.51 1.49 2.33 0.87 0.51 0.18 1.44 32 
All 2.27 2.12 4.84 0.87 1.03 0.59 2.64 64 
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Table 7.32 and Chart 7.32 show the annual percentage changes in openness for 
Singapore and Malaysia over the period. Both display some volatility but Malaysia 
has experienced larger variations that may reflect more dramatic trade and foreign 
investment policy changes over time. 
 
Table 7.32 Openness (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.03 0.03 0.14 -0.05 0.05 0.44 2.55 31 
Malaysia 0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.08 0.05 0.02 2.27 31 
All 0.03 0.03 0.14 -0.08 0.05 0.20 2.41 62 
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Chart 7.32 Openness (Annual Percentage Change) 
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7.2.6 Labour Force Educational Attainment 
 
Table 7.33 and Chart 7.33 show the effective labour results for Singapore and 
Malaysia at LE1 levels. In the case of Singapore it refers to that proportion of the 
domestic labour force which either had no formal education and/or did not complete 
primary education. In the case of Malaysia it refers to that proportion of the domestic 
labour force which completed no formal education. This level is falling for both 
economies over time as the overall education system in both economies expand their 
education systems over time with the introduction of compulsory primary education. 
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Table 7.33 LE1 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 20.77 19.51 34.83 11.35 5.63 0.68 2.87 32 
Malaysia 9.62 8.10 30.40 4.30 5.49 1.96 7.53 32 
All 15.19 15.59 34.83 4.30 7.87 0.47 2.40 64 
 
Chart 7.33 LE1 
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Singapore Malaysia
 
 
Table 7.34 and Chart 7.34 show the annual percentage changes in effective labour 
results for Singapore and Malaysia at LE1 levels. Singapore has been far less volatile 
than Malaysia in terms of this variable’s behaviour. As education expanded in both 
economies, this variable which represents the lowest level of educational attainment 
would logically decrease. 
 
Table 7.34 Proportion LE1 (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore -0.01 -0.04 0.47 -0.37 0.18 1.20 5.02 31 
Malaysia -0.01 -0.05 0.97 -0.63 0.28 1.50 7.32 31 
All -0.01 -0.05 0.97 -0.63 0.23 1.54 8.28 62 
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Table 7.35 and Chart 7.35 show the effective labour results for Singapore and 
Malaysia at LE2 levels. In the case of Singapore it refers to that proportion of the 
domestic labour force which either completed primary education and/or completed 
lower secondary education. In the case of Malaysia it refers to that proportion of the 
domestic labour force which completed primary education. For both this variable is 
falling consistently although more rapidly in Malaysia’s case. 
 
Table 7.35 LE2 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 26.10 30.45 33.93 13.00 7.56 -0.84 2.01 32 
Malaysia 34.62 34.75 51.20 20.60 9.43 0.15 1.71 32 
All 30.36 30.77 51.20 13.00 9.50 0.10 2.70 64 
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Table 7.36 and Chart 7.36 show the annual percentage changes in effective labour 
results for Singapore and Malaysia at LE2 levels. For both economies this level is 
falling at a similar rate with the only aberrations being Malaysia in 1980 and 
Singapore in 2000. 
 
Table 7.36 Proportion LE2 (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore -0.02 -0.02 0.69 -0.44 0.17 1.62 12.68 31 
Malaysia -0.02 -0.03 0.40 -0.26 0.10 1.92 12.11 31 
All -0.02 -0.02 0.69 -0.44 0.14 1.85 15.43 62 
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Chart 7.36 Proportion LE2 (Annual Percentage Change) 
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Table 7.37 and Chart 7.37 show the effective labour results for Singapore and 
Malaysia at LE3 levels. In the case of Singapore it refers to that proportion of the 
domestic labour force which completed secondary education. In the case of Malaysia 
it refers to that proportion of the domestic labour force which completed secondary 
education. For Singapore this measure is declining over time while for Malaysia it is 
still increasing although at a reduced rate after 1991. 
 
Table 7.37 LE3 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 28.32 28.89 31.03 22.79 2.31 -0.83 2.50 32 
Malaysia 47.07 50.75 55.80 28.70 8.51 -0.82 2.32 32 
All 37.69 30.58 55.80 22.79 11.30 0.47 1.55 64 
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Chart 7.37 LE3 
 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Singapore Malaysia
 
Table 7.38 and Chart 7.38 show the annual percentage changes in effective labour 
results for Singapore and Malaysia at LE3 levels. After 1995 the changes are more 
pronounced in Singapore. This would indicate a higher rate of post-secondary 
education being completed prior to labour force entry. 
 
Table 7.38 Proportion LE3 (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.00 0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.05 -0.36 3.34 31 
Malaysia 0.02 0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.03 -0.24 3.79 31 
All 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.04 -0.54 3.87 62 
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Chart 7.38 Proportion LE3 (Annual Percentage Change) 
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Table 7.39 and Chart 7.39 show the effective labour results for Singapore and 
Malaysia at LE4 levels. In the case of Singapore it refers to that proportion of the 
domestic labour force which completed some form of post-secondary education, 
including both diplomas and degrees. In the case of Malaysia it refers to that 
proportion of the domestic labour force which completed some form of tertiary 
education, including both diplomas and degrees. This variable is rising rapidly in 
both economies but far more rapidly in Singapore. This would be consistent with 
their educational reform process after 1980. 
 
Table 7.39 LE4 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 24.82 21.55 47.00 9.12 12.04 0.42 1.81 32 
Malaysia 8.79 5.60 19.20 1.60 5.60 0.53 1.88 32 
All 16.80 13.42 47.00 1.60 12.33 0.94 2.93 64 
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Chart 7.39 LE4 
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Table 7.40 and Chart 7.40 show the annual percentage change of LE4 in both 
economies. The percentage changes are quite similar but there were some large 
variations in Malaysia in the early 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Table 7.40 Proportion LE4 (Annual Percentage Change) 
Country  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Skew.  Kurt.  Obs. 
Singapore 0.06 0.05 0.25 -0.10 0.06 0.44 6.01 31 
Malaysia 0.10 0.05 1.44 -0.54 0.31 2.64 12.92 31 
All 0.08 0.05 1.44 -0.54 0.22 3.76 24.87 62 
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Chart 7.40 Proportion LE4 (Annual Percentage Change) 
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Table 7.41, 7.42, 7.43, and 7.44 show four correlation matrices that relate to the key 
variables used in the analysis of the Singapore and Malaysian economies
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CORRELATION MATRICES 
Table 7.41 Levels in Singapore 
 
GDP_CO
NS_USD
_PCAP LF POP 
CAP_CO
NS 
GOVT__
CONS 
IM_CON
S 
EX_CON
S 
OPEN_C
ONS LE1 LE2 LE3 LE4 
EDU_CO
NS 
EDU_PE
R_CENT
_GDP 
GDP_CONS_USD_PCAP  1.00  0.95  0.97  0.95  0.91  0.94  0.94  0.97 -0.81 -0.84 -0.28  0.96  0.92  0.02 
LF  0.95  1.00  0.99  0.94  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.97 -0.74 -0.91 -0.36  0.98  0.98  0.22 
POP  0.97  0.99  1.00  0.97  0.97  0.95  0.95  0.96 -0.74 -0.92 -0.33  0.99  0.98  0.18 
CAP_CONS  0.95  0.94  0.97  1.00  0.91  0.90  0.89  0.92 -0.75 -0.86 -0.24  0.94  0.94  0.17 
GOVT__CONS  0.91  0.98  0.97  0.91  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.95 -0.63 -0.94 -0.49  0.98  0.99  0.19 
IM_CONS  0.94  0.97  0.95  0.90  0.98  1.00  1.00  0.98 -0.64 -0.91 -0.52  0.97  0.95  0.06 
EX_CONS  0.94  0.97  0.95  0.89  0.98  1.00  1.00  0.97 -0.63 -0.92 -0.53  0.97  0.95  0.06 
OPEN_CONS  0.97  0.97  0.96  0.92  0.95  0.98  0.97  1.00 -0.76 -0.88 -0.35  0.97  0.93  0.06 
LE1 -0.81 -0.74 -0.74 -0.75 -0.63 -0.64 -0.63 -0.76  1.00  0.46 -0.21 -0.72 -0.67 -0.18 
LE2 -0.84 -0.91 -0.92 -0.86 -0.94 -0.91 -0.92 -0.88  0.46  1.00  0.48 -0.94 -0.94 -0.16 
LE3 -0.28 -0.36 -0.33 -0.24 -0.49 -0.52 -0.53 -0.35 -0.21  0.48  1.00 -0.40 -0.40  0.24 
LE4  0.96  0.98  0.99  0.94  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.97 -0.72 -0.94 -0.40  1.00  0.98  0.14 
EDU_CONS  0.92  0.98  0.98  0.94  0.99  0.95  0.95  0.93 -0.67 -0.94 -0.40  0.98  1.00  0.27 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP  0.02  0.22  0.18  0.17  0.19  0.06  0.06  0.06 -0.18 -0.16  0.24  0.14  0.27  1.00 
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Table 7.42 Levels in Malaysia 
 
GDP_CO
NS_USD_
PCAP LF POP 
CAP_CO
NS 
GOVT__C
ONS IM_CONS EX_CONS 
OPEN_C
ONS LE1 LE2 LE3 LE4 
EDU_CO
NS 
EDU_PER
_CENT_G
DP 
GDP_CONS_USD_PCAP  1.00  0.71  0.68  0.93  0.66  0.73  0.65  0.78 -0.56 -0.76  0.76  0.67  0.51 -0.33 
LF  0.71  1.00  1.00  0.87  0.96  0.96  0.97  0.97 -0.74 -0.96  0.90  0.97  0.92  0.04 
POP  0.68  1.00  1.00  0.85  0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97 -0.75 -0.95  0.89  0.97  0.94  0.06 
CAP_CONS  0.93  0.87  0.85  1.00  0.82  0.89  0.85  0.93 -0.65 -0.86  0.81  0.86  0.73 -0.18 
GOVT__CONS  0.66  0.96  0.97  0.82  1.00  0.97  0.97  0.93 -0.69 -0.91  0.81  0.97  0.97  0.14 
IM_CONS  0.73  0.96  0.97  0.89  0.97  1.00  0.99  0.98 -0.66 -0.92  0.80  0.98  0.93 -0.02 
EX_CONS  0.65  0.97  0.97  0.85  0.97  0.99  1.00  0.96 -0.66 -0.92  0.79  0.98  0.95  0.03 
OPEN_CONS  0.78  0.97  0.97  0.93  0.93  0.98  0.96  1.00 -0.70 -0.94  0.87  0.95  0.88 -0.08 
LE1 -0.56 -0.74 -0.75 -0.65 -0.69 -0.66 -0.66 -0.70  1.00  0.58 -0.84 -0.69 -0.61 -0.07 
LE2 -0.76 -0.96 -0.95 -0.86 -0.91 -0.92 -0.92 -0.94  0.58  1.00 -0.88 -0.92 -0.86  0.05 
LE3  0.76  0.90  0.89  0.81  0.81  0.80  0.79  0.87 -0.84 -0.88  1.00  0.80  0.72 -0.07 
LE4  0.67  0.97  0.97  0.86  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.95 -0.69 -0.92  0.80  1.00  0.95  0.08 
EDU_CONS  0.51  0.92  0.94  0.73  0.97  0.93  0.95  0.88 -0.61 -0.86  0.72  0.95  1.00  0.29 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.33  0.04  0.06 -0.18  0.14 -0.02  0.03 -0.08 -0.07  0.05 -0.07  0.08  0.29  1.00 
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Table 7.43 Changes in Singapore (%) 
 
GDP_CO
NS_USD LF POP 
CAP_CO
NS 
GOVT__
CONS 
IM_CON
S 
EX_CON
S 
OPEN_C
ONS LE1 LE2 LE3 LE4 
EDU_CO
NS 
EDU_PE
R_CENT
_GDP 
GDP_CONS_USD  1.00  0.17  0.16  0.58 -0.24  0.77  0.73  0.50 -0.60  0.38  0.03  0.02  0.04 -0.32 
LF  0.17  1.00  0.35  0.48  0.36  0.20  0.12 -0.02 -0.26  0.42 -0.28 -0.01  0.44  0.32 
POP  0.16  0.35  1.00  0.59  0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.34  0.21 -0.17  0.13  0.01  0.50  0.45 
CAP_CONS  0.58  0.48  0.59  1.00  0.14  0.45  0.35  0.11 -0.27  0.24  0.12  0.01  0.50  0.26 
GOVT__CONS -0.24  0.36  0.13  0.14  1.00 -0.26 -0.39 -0.36  0.05  0.24 -0.33 -0.22  0.34  0.42 
IM_CONS  0.77  0.20 -0.06  0.45 -0.26  1.00  0.96  0.87 -0.61  0.54 -0.04  0.03 -0.07 -0.41 
EX_CONS  0.73  0.12 -0.13  0.35 -0.39  0.96  1.00  0.91 -0.55  0.42  0.08  0.08 -0.14 -0.47 
OPEN_CONS  0.50 -0.02 -0.34  0.11 -0.36  0.87  0.91  1.00 -0.44  0.33  0.07  0.08 -0.27 -0.49 
LE1 -0.60 -0.26  0.21 -0.27  0.05 -0.61 -0.55 -0.44  1.00 -0.72  0.15 -0.35  0.01  0.25 
LE2  0.38  0.42 -0.17  0.24  0.24  0.54  0.42  0.33 -0.72  1.00 -0.56 -0.15  0.06 -0.14 
LE3  0.03 -0.28  0.13  0.12 -0.33 -0.04  0.08  0.07  0.15 -0.56  1.00  0.25  0.08  0.13 
LE4  0.02 -0.01  0.01  0.01 -0.22  0.03  0.08  0.08 -0.35 -0.15  0.25  1.00 -0.02 -0.02 
EDU_CONS  0.04  0.44  0.50  0.50  0.34 -0.07 -0.14 -0.27  0.01  0.06  0.08 -0.02  1.00  0.89 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.32  0.32  0.45  0.26  0.42 -0.41 -0.47 -0.49  0.25 -0.14  0.13 -0.02  0.89  1.00 
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Table 7.44 Changes in Malaysia (%) 
 
GDP_CO
NS_USD LF POP 
CAP_CO
NS 
GOVT__
CONS 
IM_CON
S 
EX_CON
S 
OPEN_C
ONS LE1 LE2 LE3 LE4 
EDU_CO
NS 
EDU_PE
R_CENT
_GDP 
GDP_CONS_USD  1.00  0.13  0.04  0.70  0.28  0.68  0.49  0.39  0.18 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03  0.05 -0.22 
LF  0.13  1.00  0.12  0.07 -0.13 -0.01  0.10 -0.15  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.28  0.19  0.01 
POP  0.04  0.12  1.00 -0.14  0.16 -0.00  0.11  0.12 -0.10  0.04  0.17 -0.06  0.26  0.23 
CAP_CONS  0.70  0.07 -0.14  1.00  0.27  0.85  0.43  0.52  0.01  0.04  0.07  0.02  0.05 -0.16 
GOVT__CONS  0.28 -0.13  0.16  0.27  1.00  0.20 -0.33 -0.09  0.01  0.10  0.07 -0.06  0.47  0.54 
IM_CONS  0.68 -0.01 -0.00  0.85  0.20  1.00  0.70  0.83  0.03 -0.07  0.13 -0.17 -0.05 -0.30 
EX_CONS  0.49  0.10  0.11  0.43 -0.33  0.70  1.00  0.87 -0.00 -0.17  0.08 -0.12 -0.23 -0.49 
OPEN_CONS  0.39 -0.15  0.12  0.52 -0.09  0.83  0.87  1.00 -0.02 -0.14  0.10 -0.27 -0.14 -0.32 
LE1  0.18  0.09 -0.10  0.01  0.01  0.03 -0.00 -0.02  1.00 -0.84 -0.69 -0.38  0.02 -0.05 
LE2 -0.15  0.01  0.04  0.04  0.10 -0.07 -0.17 -0.14 -0.84  1.00  0.63  0.62  0.02  0.12 
LE3 -0.01  0.08  0.17  0.07  0.07  0.13  0.08  0.10 -0.69  0.63  1.00  0.25 -0.06 -0.03 
LE4 -0.03  0.28 -0.06  0.02 -0.06 -0.17 -0.12 -0.27 -0.38  0.62  0.25  1.00  0.14  0.18 
EDU_CONS  0.05  0.19  0.26  0.05  0.47 -0.05 -0.23 -0.14  0.02  0.02 -0.06  0.14  1.00  0.86 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.22  0.01  0.23 -0.16  0.54 -0.30 -0.49 -0.32 -0.05  0.12 -0.03  0.18  0.86  1.00 
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Appendix 1B: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
 
The data covers the period from 1975 to 2006. The data was constructed using 
information from the following sources: 
 
GDP at current prices data in relation to Singapore was obtained from the Singapore 
Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant catalogue 
number was, M012351: Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product at Current Market 
Prices, Annual. This data item was also sourced from the ADB Key Indicators series 
1999 to 2010. 
 
GDP at current prices data in relation to Malaysia was obtained from the Department 
of Statistics, Malaysia. Specifically this data was obtained from Year Book of 
Statistics 1975–2006 (various issues). 
 
Population data for Singapore was obtained from the Singapore Department of 
Statistics using the STS Online System. 
 
Population data for Malaysia was obtained from the Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia, and various Yearbooks of Statistics. 
 
GDP Deflator at 2000 prices was obtained from the Singapore Department of 
Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant catalogue number was 
M012261. 
 
Gross Capital Formation Expenditure at Current Prices for Singapore was obtained 
from the Singapore Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The 
relevant catalogue number was M012351. This data item was also sourced from the 
ADB Key Indicators series 1999 to 2010. 
 
Gross Capital Formation Expenditure at Current Prices for Malaysia was obtained 
from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. Specifically this data was obtained from 
the series of Year Book of Statistics 1975–2008, Table 11.1. 
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Gross Capital Formation Expenditure Price Deflator for Singapore was obtained 
Singapore Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant 
catalogue number was M01226: Deflators of Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product (2000=100), Annual. 
 
Gross Capital Formation Expenditure Price Deflator for Malaysia was obtained from 
the Department of Statistics Malaysia. This price deflator was derived by converting 
a series of price deflators ranging from 1970 to 1978 to 1987 into a price deflator 
using 2000 prices. It was obtained initially from the series of Year Books of Statistics 
1975–2008, Table 11.1, Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product by Type of 
Expenditure at Current Prices, and Table 11.2, Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product by Type of Expenditure at Constant 2000 Prices. 
 
Government Consumption Expenditure at Current prices for Singapore was obtained 
from the Singapore Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The 
relevant catalogue number is M012261. 
 
Government Consumption Expenditure at Current prices for Malaysia was obtained 
from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. This data was obtained from Year Book 
of Statistics 1975–2008, Table 11.1. 
 
Government Consumption Expenditure Price Deflator for Singapore was obtained 
Singapore Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant 
catalogue number was M012261, Deflators of Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product (2000 = 100), Annual. 
 
Government Consumption Expenditure Price Deflator for Malaysia was obtained 
from the Department of Statistics Malaysia. This price deflator was derived 
specifically by converting a series of price deflators ranging from 1970 to 1978 to 
1987 into a price deflator using 2000 prices. It was obtained initially from the series 
of Year Books of Statistics 1975–2008, Table 11.1, Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product by Type of Expenditure at Current Prices, and Table 11.2, Expenditure on 
Gross Domestic Product by Type of Expenditure at Constant 2000 Prices. 
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Government Education Expenditure at Current Prices for Singapore was obtained 
Government Consumption Expenditure at Current prices for Singapore was obtained 
from the Singapore Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The 
relevant catalogue number was M850011: Government Expenditure on Education, 
Annual. 
 
Government Education Expenditure at Current Prices for Malaysia was obtained 
from the Malaysian Federal Treasury Department Time Series Data, Federal 
Government Operating Expenditure 1970–2006, and Federal Government 
Development Expenditure 1970–2006. 
 
Export data at Current Market Prices for Singapore was obtained from the Singapore 
Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant catalogue 
number is M012351.1.5.1- P015510. 
 
Export data at Current Market Prices for Malaysia was obtained from the Department 
of Statistics, Malaysia. The data came from three discrete publications, Malaysia 
Economic Statistics—Time Series 1999, Malaysia Economic Statistics—Time Series 
2005, and Malaysia Economic Statistics—Time Series 2008, respectively. This data 
was also obtained from another publication from the Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia, namely, Annual National Accounts, Gross Domestic Product 2000–2006. 
 
Import data at Current Market Prices for Singapore was obtained from the Singapore 
Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant catalogue 
number is: M012351.1.5.2 - P015511. 
 
Import data at Current Market Prices for Malaysia was obtained from the Department 
of Statistics, Malaysia. The data came from three discrete publications, Malaysia 
Economic Statistics—Time Series 1999, Malaysia Economic Statistics—Time Series 
2005, and Malaysia Economic Statistics—Time Series 2008, respectively. This data 
was also obtained from another publication from the Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia, namely, Annual National Accounts, Gross Domestic Product 2000–2006. 
Exports and Imports Price Deflators for Singapore have been obtained from the 
Singapore Department of Statistics using the STS Online System. The relevant 
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catalogue numbers are: - M012261.4 - P015291 and M012261.5 - P015292, 
respectively. 
 
Openness data for both Singapore and Malaysia were obtained from two sources. 
The first source is the Penn World Tables 6.1 from the DX Database. Specifically, 
the data was sourced from: PWT6: Data Table 6.3. Malaysia Current IP Openness 
(C). In relation to Singapore, the data was sourced from: PWT6: Data Table 6.4., 
Singapore Current IP Openness (C). The second source was using the data for 
Imports and Exports, as described earlier in this section using the respective data 
sources. In the case of Singapore, the openness results were determined by using the 
specific variables, namely GDP, Exports, and Imports, all adjusted for 2000 price 
levels. In the case of Malaysia, the openness results were obtained from the Penn 
World Tables initially. The results were then compared to the openness results 
obtained from the ADB Key Indicators series. 
 
Labour force educational attainment data for Singapore was obtained from the 
Labour Force Surveys carried out by the Research and Statistics Department of the 
Ministry of Labour over the period 1975–2006. These surveys were first commenced 
in 1974. Specifically, the data used in relation to Singapore is obtained from Table 8, 
titled: Economically Active Persons Aged Fifteen Years and Over by Highest 
Qualification Attained. Economically active persons refer to persons aged fifteen 
years or over who were either employed or unemployed during the reference period. 
This group is also referred to as the labour force. 
 
Labour force educational attainment data for Malaysia was obtained from the Labour 
Force Survey Reports published by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia over the 
period 1975 to 2006. These surveys have been carried out since 1975. Specifically 
the data used for Malaysia was sourced from Table 1.5, Percentage Distribution of 
the labour Force by Educational attainment and Ethnic Group, Malaysia. In the 
Malaysian Labour Force Survey Reports, Labour Force is defined as those who, 
during the reference period, were in the 15 to 64 age group (in completed years last 
birthday) and who were either employed or unemployed. 
The effective labour variables for both Singapore and Malaysia were obtained by 
multiplying the various levels of labour force educational attainment by the annual 
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employment rate for both economies. The annual unemployment rates were obtained 
for both Singapore and Malaysia from their respective Departments of Statistics. 
Additionally, for Singapore, annual unemployment rates were obtained from the 
Singapore Yearbooks of Manpower Statistics which is published annually by the 
Ministry of Manpower (or Labour), Singapore. 
 
The exchange rate data for Singapore was obtained from the World Bank World 
Tables Database which is provided from the DX Database. Specifically the data for 
Singapore was obtained from Table SGP.08: Balance of Payments ($US) & 
Exchange Rate. It provides the annual average exchange rate conversion factor for 
the Singapore dollar against the USD over the relevant period. 
 
The exchange rate data for Malaysia was obtained from the World Bank World 
Tables Database which is provided from the DX Database. Specifically the data for 
Malaysia was obtained from Table MYS.08: Balance of Payments ($US) & Exchange 
Rate. It provides the annual average exchange rate conversion factor for the 
Malaysian ringgit against the US dollar over the relevant period. 
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Chapter 8: The Empirical Analysis 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the major empirical work conducted in the thesis. It uses SUR 
to look at the important determinants of economic growth in Singapore and 
Malaysia from 1976 to 2006. It then focuses on the education variables, also using 
SUR as well as SUTSE. The situation in both Singapore and Malaysia is compared 
and contrasted. One of the major restrictions in the work is the data. Investments in 
education are only likely to give a return with a substantial lag. However, as we 
only have 32 years of annual data any attempt to include lagged education 
independent variables will see a substantial loss of degrees of freedom. 
Nevertheless, the modelling conducted here is still able to confirm many of the 
conclusions already developed in the previous data chapter, as well as those from 
the theoretical and historical chapters found in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
respectively. 
 
This chapter will proceed as follows, in Section 8.2 the correlation coefficients for all 
of the data that was presented in Chapter 7 are calculated and interpreted. These 
correlation coefficients are for the data in both the levels as well as percentage 
changes. Then in Section 8.3 some econometric modelling using SUR is used to first 
look at the broad determinants of economic growth and then the analysis is narrowed 
to focus more closely on education. In Section 8.4 SUTSE are used to look more 
closely at the effects of education and how these affects may differ across the two 
countries. Then in Section 8.5 some conclusions are drawn. 
 
8.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
The economic performance measure that we are trying to explain is economic 
growth, as measured by real GDP per capita in constant USD prices in Singapore and 
Malaysia. Standard macroeconomic variables are used, as well as the labour force 
educational attainment levels of LE1, LE2, LE3 and LE4. These four variables 
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represent the human capital accumulation component of our models. These variables 
are quantitative measures of human capital accumulation and not measures of 
quality. All of these variables have previously been defined and discussed in Chapter 
7. 
 
Table 8.1 Correlation Coefficients, Singapore (levels) 
  GDP_CONS_USD_PCAP 
GDP_CONS_USD_PCAP 1.00 
OPEN_CONS 0.97 
POP 0.97 
LE4 0.96 
CAP_CONS 0.95 
LF 0.95 
IM_CONS 0.94 
EX_CONS 0.94 
EDU_CONS 0.92 
GOVT__CONS 0.91 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP 0.02 
LE3 -0.28 
LE1 -0.81 
LE2 -0.84 
 
For Singapore the correlation coefficients show a strong positive association between 
economic growth and the variables of openness, population growth, the proportion of 
the population in tertiary education, capital investment, and gross capital formation. 
There is a negative association with the lower levels of educational attainment. It 
would appear that in the case of Singapore that the greater the labour force 
proportion of workers who have completed post-secondary and/or tertiary education, 
then the higher the level of economic growth. This may reflect the level of economic 
development that this economy has achieved with a movement from labour-intensive 
production to knowledge-based industrialisation in the period after the Asian 
Currency Crisis. Combined with high levels of openness, it would suggest that the 
higher the level of human capital in the domestic labour force, then the higher, 
ceteris paribus, will be the levels of productivity increase. Given the exposure of the 
Singaporean economy to high levels of investment, both domestic and foreign, it 
would appear that higher educational levels have allowed faster and wider absorption 
and transmission of new knowledge. The latter has been important in the 
comprehension and processing of new information as well as the adoption of new 
technologies. These have been essential to higher growth in Singapore. 
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Table 8.2 Correlation Coefficients, Malaysia (levels) 
 GDP_CONS_USD_PCAP 
GDP_CONS_USD_PCAP 1.00 
CAP_CONS 0.93 
OPEN_CONS 0.78 
LE3 0.76 
IM_CONS 0.73 
LF 0.71 
POP 0.68 
LE4 0.67 
GOVT__CONS 0.66 
EX_CONS 0.65 
EDU_CONS 0.51 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.33 
LE1 -0.56 
LE2 -0.76 
 
For Malaysia the correlation coefficients show there to be a close positive association 
between economic performance and the variables of capital investment, the openness 
variables, as well as secondary and tertiary education. There is again a negative 
association with the lower levels of educational attainment. Given the stage of 
Malaysia’s economic development, it would appear, that labour force educational 
attainment in terms of both the completion of secondary and post-secondary and/or 
tertiary education has been critical. This has been reflective of the ongoing shortages 
in skilled labour that Malaysia has experienced during the 1980s and the 1990s. With 
an increased focus on labour-intensive manufacturing, it has been important to 
increase the number of workers who are able to operate at the lower levels of 
industrial activity in areas such as manufacturing, petroleum, construction and 
services sectors 
 
The analysis in Chapter 7 clearly showed that most of this data is non-stationary; 
therefore, we will now precede to analysis the data as percentage changes. It was 
decided that using percentage changes would achieve the objective of avoiding 
spurious correlations and would be easier to interpret. 
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Table 8.3 Correlation Coefficients, Singapore (% ch) 
  GDP_CONS_USD 
GDP_CONS_USD 1.00 
IM_CONS 0.77 
EX_CONS 0.73 
CAP_CONS 0.58 
OPEN_CONS 0.50 
LE2 0.38 
LF 0.17 
POP 0.16 
EDU_CONS 0.04 
LE3 0.03 
LE4 0.02 
GOVT__CONS -0.24 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.32 
LE1 -0.60 
 
Here again this table shows that economic performance is closely related to the 
openness variables as well as capital investment. The education variables are also 
important. It is interesting that education spending as a percent of GDP has a 
negative association with economic performance. It is possible that additional 
education will initially reduce the size of the labour force, and have a negative effect 
on economic growth. Then in the years to come, the economy will benefit. In 
addition, it may be necessary to not go beyond the quantity of expenditure on 
education and consider the efficiency of such spending to explain this result. Here we 
are referring to the coverage of the school-aged population in terms of the average 
duration of schooling relative to public spending. Commentators such as Mingat 
(1998) have identified Singapore as one of the least-efficient of Asian economies in 
terms of public spending relative to student coverage provided over the period 1960 
to 1992. This may partially provide an alternative explanation for this result. 
However more recent data to test this theory for both economies is not currently 
available. 
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Table 8.4 Correlation Coefficients, Malaysia (% ch) 
  GDP_CONS_USD 
GDP_CONS_USD 1.00 
CAP_CONS 0.70 
IM_CONS 0.68 
EX_CONS 0.49 
OPEN_CONS 0.39 
GOVT__CONS 0.28 
LE1 0.18 
LF 0.13 
EDU_CONS 0.05 
POP 0.04 
LE3 -0.01 
LE4 -0.03 
LE2 -0.15 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.22 
 
Here again this table shows that Malaysian economic performance is strongly related 
to the openness variables as well as capital investment. The education variables are 
also important, although the signs of the correlation coefficients do not necessarily 
make intuitive sense. LE1 being positive and LE4 negative is not what is expected 
and is different to the situation in Singapore. It is likely that the explanation for this 
relates to some of the issues raised about Malaysia in Chapters 3 and 4. Given the 
differences between the two economies in terms of their respective stages of 
economic development, the Malaysian economy had to deal with significant ethnic 
disparities. The position of the dominant Bumiputra population in terms of access to 
education and particularly in rural areas was an ongoing problem. Therefore 
completion of primary education for this group was important in the Malaysian 
context to complement simple labour-intensive production processes during the New 
Economic Policy period. It was also a key element of the attempt to reduce poverty 
and income disparities as part of this policy approach. The emphasis upon basic 
literacy and numeracy skills was a priority for this part of the Malaysian labour 
where skill shortages have been an ongoing problem. Conversely, given finite 
resources, an increasing proportion of the labour force with post-secondary and/or 
tertiary education was less important particularly until the late 1980s when the 
direction of industrial policy changed as discussed in Chapter 3. 
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8.3 SUR 
 
In order to focus more specifically on the relationships between the independent 
variables and economic growth we now use regression analysis. Initially Ordinary 
Least Squares regressions were used for both Singapore and Malaysia individually as 
well as a panel. However better results were obtained using a SUR panel data model, 
which is presented in Table 8.5.below. Note that all of the data is now in percentage 
changes and therefore is stationary. Given that the influences on both Singapore and 
Malaysia will be similar, it is not surprising that SUR gives the best fit. The 
economies of Singapore and Malaysia will be very closely aligned economically, 
therefore in a panel model it is very likely that the errors terms will be 
contemporaneously correlated. The SUR technique involves initially estimating the 
two equations using Ordinary Least Squares and then calculating the 
variance/covariance matrix of the error terms. Then the equations are re-estimated 
using Generalised Least Squares taking account of the correlations in the errors. For 
more information about SUR see Hill et al. (2008a, b). 
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Table 8.5 Balanced Panel SUR Weights, EQ09 
Dependent Variable: GDP_CONS_USD 
Linear Estimation After One-Step Weighting Matrix 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.057438 0.018279 -3.142267 0.0029*** 
MAS -0.027132 0.008656 -3.134562 0.0030*** 
CAP_CONS 0.054771 0.079074 0.692656 0.4919 
IM_CONS 0.588805 0.203624 2.891629 0.0058*** 
EX_CONS 1.003465 0.201638 4.976557 0.0000*** 
OPEN_CONS -1.604373 0.336631 -4.765969 0.0000*** 
GOVT__CONS 0.160247 0.088144 1.818024 0.0754* 
LE1 -0.010953 0.036087 -0.303519 0.7628 
LF -0.341176 0.184554 -1.848645 0.0708* 
EDU_CONS 0.178350 0.147152 1.212009 0.2316 
POP 0.359940 0.468641 0.768049 0.4463 
LE3 -0.130091 0.155986 -0.833990 0.4085 
LE4 0.008854 0.024897 0.355628 0.7237 
LE2 -0.074890 0.058468 -1.280865 0.2065 
EDU_PER_CENT_GDP -0.209747 0.161611 -1.297851 0.2007 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.731544 Mean dependent var 1.190188 
Adjusted R-squared 0.651578 S.D. dependent var 2.169052 
S.E. of Regression 1.108274 Sum squared resid 57.72876 
F-statistic 9.148223 Durbin-Watson stat 1.565485 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.742536 Mean dependent var 0.072627 
Sum squared resid 0.107434 Durbin-Watson stat 1.424374 
* Significant at the ten per cent level. 
** Significant at the five per cent level. 
*** Significant at the one per cent level. 
 
Table 8.5 presents the model that includes all of the independent variables, and 
shows how they relate to economic growth (percentage change in 
GDP_CONS_USD). The results demonstrate that: 
 
• Malaysia (MAS) performs significantly worse than Singapore, as MAS = 
1 for Malaysia and MAS = 0 for Singapore. 
• All of the economic openness variables of import growth (IM_CONS), 
export growth (EX_CON) and openness growth (OPEN_CONS) have a 
significant effect on economic growth. Both imports and exports have a 
significant positive effect, while openness is negative, although this is 
probably due to multicollinearity. 
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• Growth in government spending (GOVT_CONS) is significant and 
positive at the ten percent level. That is, higher levels of government 
expenditure are associated with higher levels of economic growth. 
• Labour Force (LF) growth is negative and significant at the ten per cent 
level. 
• In this model all of the other variables are insignificant. That is, 
CAP_CONS, EDU_CON, EDU_PER_CENT_GDP as well as all of the 
labour force educational attainment variables of LE1. LE2, LE3 and LE4. 
• LE1 refers to that proportion of the domestic labour force which either 
had no formal education and/or did not complete primary education. 
• LE2 refers to that proportion of the domestic labour force which either 
completed primary education and/or completed lower secondary 
education. 
• LE3 refers to that proportion of the domestic labour force which 
completed secondary education. 
• LE4 refers to that proportion of the domestic labour force which 
completed some form of post-secondary education, including both 
diplomas and degrees. 
 
Next, to focus on education this model was modified by firstly including a series of 
multiplicative dummy variables that aim to take account of the differences between 
Singapore and Malaysia in terms of the marginal effects on the independent 
variables. Then an iterative process was used whereby the insignificant variables 
were excluded in a systematic way, until the most preferred model was obtained. 
This model is presented in Table 8.6 below. 
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Table 8.6 Balanced Panel SUR Weights EDUC_3 
Dependent Variable: GDP_CONS_USD 
Linear Estimation After One-Step Weighting Matrix 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.029659 0.013792 2.150411 0.0362** 
IM_CONS 0.557748 0.085698 6.508296 0.0000*** 
LE1 -0.231381 0.088144 -2.625037 0.0113** 
LE1*MAS 0.308637 0.125277 2.463631 0.0171** 
LE2 -0.201810 0.101638 -1.985586 0.0524* 
LE2*MAS 0.456923 0.258719 1.766101 0.0832* 
LE3 -0.169392 0.210744 -0.803782 0.4252 
LE3*MAS -0.448340 0.433557 -1.034097 0.3059 
LE4 -0.189324 0.150572 -1.257367 0.2142 
LE4*MAS 0.177794 0.145892 1.218673 0.2285 
Weighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.547891 Mean dependent var 1.250561 
Adjusted R-squared 0.469641 S.D. dependent var 1.690513 
S.E. of Regression 1.075640 Sum squared resid 60.16408 
F-statistic 7.001833 Durbin-Watson stat 1.604356 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
Unweighted Statistics 
R-squared 0.543729 Mean dependent var 0.072627 
Sum squared resid 0.190393 Durbin-Watson stat 1.717915 
*** Significant at the one percent level. 
** Significant at the five percent level. 
* Significant at the ten percent level. 
 
Table 8.6 shows the education model. Again the dependent variable is economic 
growth (percentage change in GDP_CONS_USD). This appears to be the best model 
in terms of explaining which education variables affect economic growth. This 
model was also produced using an iterative process where variables where added and 
excluded depending on their statistical significance. Eventually the percentage 
change in constant price imports became the only non-education variable to be 
included as this measure of openness is one of the main drivers of economic growth. 
All of the education variables (LE1, LE2, LE3 and LE4) were included as well as 
multiplicative dummy variables to take account of the different marginal affects of 
education across the two countries. Also recall that MAS = 1 for Malaysia and 0 
otherwise. This means that as LE1 and LE2 are significant and negative, therefore in 
Singapore reductions in the proportion of the population with very low levels of 
education is associated with increases in economic growth in that country. LE3 and 
LE4 appear to be statistically insignificant, which means that these levels of 
education do not seem to have an immediate effect on economic growth in either 
Singapore or Malaysia. Given that higher education takes people out of the work 
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force for a number of years, with the effect only coming later, this result may not be 
surprising. 
 
 
To assess the effects of LE1 in Malaysia we need to test to see if the coefficients on 
LE1 and LE1*MAS sum to zero. In order to assess LE2 a similar test also needs to 
be performed. These tests are done using a standard Wald F-test to find out if the 
sum of the education coefficients is zero. The results for the Wald tests are presented 
in the Tables 8.7 and 8.8. 
 
Table 8.7 L1 Wald Test 
Equation: EDUC_1 
Test Statistic Value  df Probability 
F-statistic 0.378893 (1, 51)  0.5409 
Chi-square 0.378893 1  0.5382 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err. 
C(4) + C(5) 0.051922 0.084351 
Note: Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
As the probability is greater than 0.05 we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on LE1 and LE1*MAS sum to zero. That is, LE1 is an insignificant 
determinant of economic growth in Malaysia, although in Table 8.6 it was shown 
that it is a significant negative determinant in Singapore. 
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Table 8.8 L2 Wald Test 
Equation: EDUC_1 
Test Statistic Value  df Probability 
F-statistic 0.080176 (1, 51)  0.7782 
Chi-square 0.080176 1  0.7771 
Null Hypothesis Summary: 
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value  Std. Err. 
C(4) + C(5) -0.075048 0.265042 
Note: Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
Again as the probability is greater than 0.05 we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on LE2 and LE2*MAS sum to zero. That is, LE2 is 
an insignificant determinant of economic growth in Malaysia, although it is a 
significant negative determinant in Singapore. The results would generally indicate 
that LE2 is not critical to the Singaporean economy. Given that LE2 measures the 
proportion of the labour force that has completed primary education or at the 
maximum lower secondary education, it reflects those workers who have not 
completed their entire secondary education. As discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the 
thrust of Singaporean education policy was to reduce, if not eliminate, educational 
wastage. Increasing numbers of workers who have not achieved educational 
outcomes beyond LE2, represented a labour force that was being effectively de-
skilled in contrast to other contemporary Asian economies such as South Korea and 
Japan. This could retard productivity performance. Moreover much of the technical 
and vocational training that was initially embodied in the New Education System 
reforms of 1979 required completion of secondary education or at the very least 10 
years of compulsory education. This emphasis was reinforced with the educational 
reforms of The Singapore Economy: New Directions policy launched in1986, and its 
focus on close links to industry in the form of continual and advanced industrial 
training. In contrast educational policy in Malaysia during these periods was often 
constrained by policy parameters that were linked to ethnic and racial considerations 
in accordance with reducing economic disparities as opposed to the explicit needs of 
specific stages of industrial development. In conclusion falling levels of LE2 would 
be consistent with an improvement of the Singaporean labour force. 
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It is possible that the interdependence of economic growth and education could cause 
endogeneity bias of the coefficients in equation 8.6. There are two potential sources 
for this bias: 
1. Simultaneity bias; where a more educated workforce increases economic 
growth while at the same time a strongly growing economy is also more 
likely to cause its citizens to invest in more education. This will 
potentially cause the error term to be correlated with the independent 
variables causing bias coefficient estimates. 
2. Omitted variable bias; if there is an omitted variable that is correlated 
with both education and economic growth, its affects will appear in the 
error term which could again cause biased coefficient estimates. 
 
The Hausman Test for endogeneity bias involves finding Instrumental Variables (IV) 
and then comparing the IV estimates with those obtained from the initial estimation. 
Finding appropriate IVs within this area has proven to be problematic. Using the 
lagging education variables as IVs was attempted, however with only 31 years of 
annul data the loss of degrees of freedom resulted in poorly fitting equations. The 
other point is that in section 8.4 the Seemingly Unrelated Time Series Equations 
(SUTSE) method is used to examine the relationship between education and 
economic growth. This method cannot suffer from endogeneity bias and gives 
similar conclusions to those already obtained within this section. That is, although 
good IVs to implement a Hausman test for endogeneity were not found, the results 
obtained from the analysis in this section are consistent with the results in the next 
section which does not suffer from endogeneity. This suggests that endogeneity is 
unlikely to be a significant problem in this model. 
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8.4 SUTSE 
 
This section aims to explain the differences in economic growth across the two 
economies, but it does this by focusing more specifically on education. This is done 
by using SUTSE. SUTSE are a type of state space model. State space models have 
been used in many areas including Aoki (1987), Harvey and Jaeger (1993) and 
Proietti, Musso and Westermann (2007). Harvey (1989) and Koopman et al. (1999) 
provide detailed explanations of the technique. 
 
In our example yt denotes 2 x 1 vector comprising the GDP gap and the Education 
gap. We define the GDP gap to be the difference in the percentage change in real 
GDP per capita in USD across the two countries. The Education gap is the difference 
between the different educational attainment levels (LE1, LE2, LE3 or LE4) across 
the two countries. Therefore yt consists of a cross-sectional time series. It assumes 
that the different time series are not subject to any cause and effect relationships 
between them, however, they are subject to the same overall environment, and so a 
multivariate model will seek to link them together. Within a structural framework 
this is done by allowing the various components to be contemporaneously correlated. 
Such a model is a time series analogue of the SUR as used in the previous section. It 
is therefore appropriate to refer to the model as a system of SUTSE model. 
 
Yt = µt + εt       εt ~ NID(0, Σε) (1) 
µt = µt-1 + βt-1 + ηt     ηt ~ NID(0, Ση (2a) 
βt = βt-1 + ζt      ζt ~ NID(0, Σζ) (2b) 
 
The bolded character denotes N-vectors, where N represents the number of series (in 
this case two). In particular, Yt is a vector of observations at time t. The terms µt and 
βt are vectors of trends and growth rates through time. The association between the 
series is captured by the off-diagonal elements of the N x 2 Σ matrices. Equation (1) 
is referred to as the observation equation, whereas (2a) and (2b) are the component 
equations. 
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Therefore in our example the dependent variables are the two gaps between 
Singapore and Malaysian real GDP per capita in USD (GDP gap) and educational 
attainment (LE1, LE2, LE3 or LE4 - Gaps). Both of these variables are regressed 
against a stochastic trend of integration order two. 
 
The number of observations employed in this analysis is 32, thus the application of 
conventional approaches such as cointegration are problematic due to the small finite 
sample size. The SUTSE method is arguably more suitable in this context as it 
assumes a-priori the level of integration and dynamic structure without any loss to 
degrees of freedom. Conversely cointegration methods, for example, require each 
variable to be tested for unit roots prior to fitting the model. These tests can be 
unreliable when applied to small sample sizes. Further, if variables are found to be 
integrated and differencing is required, hence a further reduction in observations is 
incurred. 
 
The small sample size at our disposal means that modelling the effects of current 
education investment is difficult if not impractical. The reason being that current 
expenditure will have a long delayed effect on economic performance. Therefore, to 
model the effect education has on economic performance requires the use of many 
lagged variables, and as such we would have been left with very few observations in 
our time series. To address this problem attainment in education levels are 
considered. Specifically, the attainment of different levels of education for the 
population as a whole is determined by a survey process that is conducted in both 
economies. 
 
The objective therefore is to examine whether the different degrees of economic 
growth in Singapore and Malaysia can be explained by the gap in educational 
attainment. We use the education gap because it may capture past investment in 
education, for example, the proportion of individuals with a tertiary qualification is a 
direct result of previous government sponsored investments in the education sector. 
The data is the real GDP per capita gap between the two countries and the gaps in the 
various education levels. The sample is annual observations from 1976 to 2006. 
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Chart 8.1: The GDP and Education Gap 1976–2006 
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-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
%
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
$US
LE1-GAP LE2-GAP LE3-GAP LE4-GAP GDP gap
 
 
Chart 8.1 shows the gaps between real GDP per capita between Singapore and 
Malaysia and the gaps between the various education attainment levels between the 
two countries. The relative education attainment levels have been previously defined. 
The most striking feature of this graph is that that LE4 and GDP gaps seem to be 
trending the same way. In contrast the LE2 and LE3 (and hence GDP) gaps seem to 
be trending in opposite directions. Therefore, we have decided to investigate further 
the possibility that that Singapore’s better economic performance may be explained 
by their noticeable higher tertiary education attainment variable. This hypothesis is 
tested by fitting a SUTSE, with the final model presented below. 
 
The SUTSE model shows that the trend or the long-run pattern in the GDP difference 
is dependent on the LE4 difference. That is, the LE4 difference appears to be driving 
GDP difference. Two SUTSE models are applied, the first models LE4 and rGDPpc 
gaps as a function of a trend as depicted in equations (1) and (2). The second model 
modifies the first by constraining the trend in the rGDPpc gap to be a dependant on 
the trend in the tertiary attainment gap. In addition to this, we control for 
irregularities in the data by including an automatic intervention algorithm. A full set 
of model diagnostics are provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
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Table 8.9 Residual Diagnostics of the SUTSE model 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 rGDPpc Gap LE4 Gap rGDPpc Gap LE4 Gap 
Normality 3.8288 1.6169 3.6823 1.3738 
H(9) 8.4632 1.7702 8.1636 1.7169 
DW 1.8830 2.1480 1.9411 2.1882 
Q(q,q-p) 5.5013 3.1899 5.2231 4.0956 
Rd^2 0.7423 0.7156 0.74605 0.71528 
 
In the above Table 8.9, the following test results are shown: 
 
• Normality that represents the Chi-Square Test with two degrees of freedom. 
• H(9) represents the measure of heteroskedasticity with nine degrees of 
freedom. 
• DW represents the Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation. 
• Q(q,q-p) represents the Box-Ljung test which tests the normality of residuals. 
• Rd^2 represents the adjusted R2 result. 
 
The results in Table 8.9 clearly demonstrate two things, one, the models fitted 
represent the data well, and two, the restriction imposed (model 2) is valid, that is, 
investment in education (proxied by percentage of individuals in the labour force 
with tertiary attainment) explains (in part) the difference in economic performance. 
 
The goodness of fit results indicates the model fits closely to the data explaining in 
excess of 70 per cent of the variation. In addition, the residuals of the series are well 
behaved being approximately normally distributed, there is no significant 
heteroskedasticity and the Durbin-Watson results indicate there is no serial 
correlation. Therefore the models are an accurate summary of the dynamic 
characteristics of both series. 
 
A particularly important finding presented in Table 8.9 is that models 1 and 2 are 
indistinguishable therefore endorsing the belief that the education gap drives (in part) 
the GDP gap. Specifically Table 8.9 shows there is effectively no change in the 
goodness of fit when the restriction is imposed. Further, the likelihoods are not 
significantly different. 
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Therefore the results of this model fitting procedure support the belief that a major 
determinant of Singapore’s higher economic growth is the investment in the 
education sector, specifically the investment in the tertiary education sector. This 
suggests that investment in tertiary education is critical to a country’s long-term 
economic prosperity. Further, given the observations made in relation to Figure 8.1, 
it is not sufficient to invest in primary or secondary education. 
 
8.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explained the differences in economic growth in both Singapore and 
Malaysia over the period 1975 to 2006 as measured by the growth rates in real GDP 
per capita expressed in USD. Two approaches have been used to explore the 
available data. These are the SUR approach as shown in Section 8.3 and the SUTSE 
as shown in Section 8.4. The results generally indicate that the return to investment 
in human capital as measured by labour force educational attainment appears to be 
higher in Singapore compared to Malaysia. These results however are subject to the 
limitations associated with a relatively small number of annual data points. They are 
also subject to the constraints the educational attainment is a lagged variable and so 
the dividends of higher attainment may not materialise for a significant time period. 
The two approaches suggest that in the case of Singapore higher levels of workers 
with lower levels of educational attainment such as LE1 and LE2 have a negative 
impact upon growth. In the case of Malaysia, these adverse results do not seem to 
apply. However when using the SUTSE approach the contribution of post-secondary 
and/or tertiary education as measured by LE4 appears to have a very positive effect 
upon economic growth in Singapore. In contrast this variable appears to be either 
insignificant or negative when applied to Malaysian economic growth. 
 
These are a number of reasons that could explain these results. The differences in the 
two economies in terms of their respective levels of economic development or 
maturation may be consistent with these results. Singapore’s planned movement 
from a labour-intensive industrial economy to one that emphasises ability and 
knowledge-based industries require higher education and higher skills as a necessary 
component of the growth process. Malaysia’s policy focus since 1970 on income 
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redistribution and poverty reduction at the same time as pursuing formal industrial 
policies is consistent with a higher emphasis upon prioritising lower levels of 
educational attainment such as LE1 and LE2. The latter is also consistent with the 
aim of achieving universal education in Malaysia. Another key factor that may 
explain these results would be the high level of exposure to international trade and 
capital flows that have seen Singapore receive continually high levels of foreign 
investment in both the manufacturing and services sectors. This therefore has 
required higher levels of education and training in the domestic labour force to match 
the relevant production processes and embodied technologies. This will have a 
positive effect upon educational quality in the labour force and in turn productivity, 
both labour and capital. In contrast Malaysia has veered over time from 
protectionism to more free-market approaches in this area. As a result of this pattern 
changing labor market policies have created uncertainty.  Finally, the development of 
close relationships between key government agencies such as the Economic 
Development Board and Ministry of Education, and the private sector in Singapore, 
has produced education policies that have been responsive to the needs of the private 
sector. These relationships are less well-developed in Malaysia where the interests of 
other stake-holders may be more prominent when the policy formulation process 
takes place. 
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Appendix 1C: Summary Statistics 
 
MODEL 1 
 
 
Estimation done by Maximum Likelihood (exact score) 
 
• The selection sample is: 1976 - 2007 (T = 32, N = 2) 
 
• The dependent vector Y contains variables:   GDP gap  LE4-GAP 
 
• The model is:  Y = Trend + Irregular + Interventions 
 
• Component selection: 0=out, 1=in, 2=dependent, 3=fix 
     
  
GDP gap LE4 -GAP 
Level 1 1 
Slope 1 1 
Irregular 1 1 
 
 
Steady state found 
 
Log-Likelihood is -184.843 (-2 LogL = 369.687). 
 
Prediction error variance/correlation matrix     
 GDP gap      LE4-GAP 
GDP gap 281950.58489      0.09433 
LE4-GAP     56.55705 1.27505 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS                     
 GDP gap LE4-GAP 
T 31.000       30.000 
p 2.0000       2.0000       
Std Error 530.99       1.1292 
Normality 3.8288       1.6169 
H (9) 8.4632 1.7702 
DW 1.8830 2.1480 
r(1) 0.015327     -0.12060 
q 6.0000 6.0000 
r(q) 0.093679 -0.18842 
Q(q.q-p) 5.5013 3.8199 
Rd^2 0.74523 0.71560 
 
 
Variances of disturbances in Eq GDP gap: 
 Value (Q Ratio) 
Level 38267.3 (0.1522) 
Slope 251383 (1.000) 
Irregular 0.000000 (0.00000 
   
 
 
Variances of disturbances in Eq LE4-GAP: 
 Value (Q Ratio) 
Level 0.0115569 (0.01699) 
Slope 0.00287812 (0.004377) 
Irregular 0.000000 (1.000) 
   
 
 
Level disturbance variance/correlation matrix: 
 GDP Gap LE4-Gap 
GDP Gap 3.827e+004 0.9806 
LE4-Gap 105.3 0.3013 
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Slope disturbance diagonal variance matrix 
 GDP gap LE4-GAP 
GDP gap   2.514e+005 0.0000 
LE4-GAP 0.0000 0.002978 
 
 
 
Irregular disturbance diagonal variance matrix 
 GDP gap LE4-GAP 
GDP gap   0.0000 0.0000 
LE4-GAP 0.0000 0.6804 
 
 
 
State vector analysis at period 2007: Equation GDP gap 
 Value Probability 
Level 30904.12327 [0.00000] 
Slope 2270.87338 [0.00018] 
 
 
 
Equation LE4-GAP 
 Value Probability 
Level 27.49263 [0.00000] 
Slope 0.75323 [0.00035] 
 
 
Equation GDP gap: regression effects in final state at time 2007 
 Coefficient RMSE t-VALUE Probability 
Level break 
1999(1) 
-2448.50795    417.16156     -5.86945 [0.00000] 
Level break  
2002(1) 
-2888.84249    417.14504 -6.92527 [0.00000] 
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Equation LE4-GAP: regression effects in final state at time 2007 
 Coefficient RMSE t-VALUE Probability 
Outlier:  1996 (1) 5.06211      0.98083      5.16103 [0.00002] 
MODEL 2 
 
 
Estimation done by Maximum Likelihood (exact score) 
 
• The selection sample is: 1976 - 2007 (T = 32, N = 2) 
 
• The dependent vector Y contains variables:   GDP gap      LE4-GAP 
 
• The model is:  Y = Trend + Irregular + Interventions 
 
• Component selection: 0=out, 1=in, 2=dependent, 3=fix 
              
 
 
GDP gap LE4 -GAP 
Level 2 1 
Slope 1 1 
Irregular 1 1 
 
 
 
Log-Likelihood is -184.91 (-2 LogL = 369.821). 
 
 
Prediction error variance/correlation matrix     
 GDP gap      LE4-GAP 
GDP gap 281041.90485      0.07628 
LE4-GAP     45.68917      1.27652 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS                     
 GDP gap LE4-GAP 
T 31.000       30.000 
p 2.0000       2.0000       
Std Error 530.13 1.1298 
Normality 3.6823       1.3738 
H (9) 8.1636 1.7169 
DW 1.9411 2.1882 
 r(1) -0.016081     -0.14467 
q 6.0000 6.0000 
r(q) 0.091068 -0.17991 
Q(q.q-p) 5.2231       4.0956 
Rd^2 0.74605 0.71528 
 
 
 
Variances of disturbances in Eq GDP gap: 
 Value (Q Ratio) 
Slope 279573 (1.000) 
Irregular 655.102   ( 0.002343) 
   
 
 
 
  
Variances of disturbances in Eq LE4-GAP: 
 Value (Q Ratio) 
Level 0.366033   ( 0.5782) 
Slope 0.00228858   (0.003615) 
Irregular 0.633072   (1.000) 
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Level disturbance variance/correlation matrix: 
 GDP Gap LE4-Gap 
GDP Gap 1.901e+004 1.000 
LE4-Gap 83.41 0.3660 
 
 
 
Level disturbance variance/correlation matrix: 
 GDP Gap LE4-Gap 
GDP Gap 3.827e+004 0.9806 
LE4-Gap 105.3 0.3013 
 
 
 
Level disturbance factor variance for LE4-GAP: 0.366033 
Level disturbance factor loading  for GDP gap: 227.884 
             GDP gap     LE4-GAP 
Constant  2.459e+004      0.0000 
 
 
Slope disturbance diagonal variance matrix 
 GDP gap LE4-GAP 
GDP gap   2.796e+005 0.0000 
LE4-GAP 0.0000 0.002289 
 
 
Irregular disturbance diagonal variance matrix 
 GDP gap LE4-GAP 
GDP gap   655.1       0.0000 
LE4-GAP 0.0000 0.6331 
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State vector analysis at period 2007: Equation GDP gap 
 Value Probability 
Level 30845.02355 [0.00000] 
Slope 2298.79701 [0.00022] 
 
 
Equation LE4-GAP 
 Value Probability 
Level 27.45658 [0.00000] 
Slope 0.73439 [0.00033] 
 
 
Equation GDP gap: regression effects in final state at time 2007 
 Coefficient RMSE t-VALUE Probability 
Level break 
1999(1) 
-2415.11294    407.91520     -5.92063 [0.00000] 
Level break  
2002(1) 
-2864.45822    407.90157     -7.02243 [0.00000] 
 
 
 
Equation LE4-GAP: regression effects in final state at time 2007 
 Coefficient RMSE t-VALUE Probability 
Outlier:  1996 (1) 5.24162      0.97991      5.34907 [0.00001] 
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Chapter 9: Concluding Comments and Implications 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In the economic literature the role of human capital has been acknowledged as being 
important in the growth process. Since the 1980s there has been a large amount of 
empirical work investigating the effect of human capital—the concept of worker 
quality and skills generally measured by formal education both on-the-job and off-
the-job—in both developed and developing economies. These investigations have 
looked at effect of this measure on the level and growth of productivity and in turn, 
the level and growth of GDP. However the concept of human capital is not new. One 
can reasonably argue that Adam Smith (1776) in the ground-breaking Wealth of 
Nations revealed the nexus between investment in both physical and human capital. 
Specifically he identified education as one form of investment that will increase both 
productivity and wages, although it did incur some costs. It is therefore logical that if 
education can produce a rise in individual incomes then if aggregated across the 
entire economy this should lead to higher income and so perhaps higher output. This 
appears to be the original basis for human capital accumulation as a flow variable. 
Given the growth rates in the various economies of East Asia since 1960, it was a 
therefore challenge to explore the role of human capital accumulation in this growth 
process for two specific economies, namely Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
While there are numerous technical and methodological problems in calculating the 
effect of education on economic growth, it should not deter researchers from 
attempting new approaches. In this thesis the focus has been on examining education 
as macroeconomic variable that improves productivity and increases growth. This is 
different to many of the earlier approaches where the focus was on microeconomics 
variable as individuals use education to increase incomes. More specifically, one of 
the recurring methodological problems has been the measurement of human capital, 
as a stock and/or flow variable. This thesis explicitly does not attempt to measure the 
stock of human capital for either Singapore or Malaysia given the data challenges 
associated with this task. In this thesis rather than using school enrolment data or 
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average years of education, or the proportion of students enrolled particular 
discipline areas, the level of labour force educational attainment as produced by 
annual labour force surveys in both Singapore and Malaysia over the period 1975 to 
2006 are used. This approach has been adopted as it uses the proportion of the labour 
force with the highest level of educational attainment in both economies. As these 
surveys are considered over a 32 year period it may not be unreasonable to expect 
that there has been some interaction of formal education of workers surveyed with 
their respective work experience. In addition this data is usually not available for 
other economies, whether they are developed or developing economies. As such it 
has not been used in the normal cross-country regressions on which much 
macroeconomic empirical work has been based. This thesis does not claim that this 
measure is a perfect representation of human capital, it is however a reasonable 
proxy, given previous research, that can be used. As is the case with most other 
empirical work, input measures are used. Ideally the best measures would be 
educational outputs but these are very difficult to obtain. Given this constraint the 
labour force variables used in the thesis are useful. Therefore the choice of Singapore 
and Malaysia as two rapidly growing East Asian economies that have such data 
available is the basis of this thesis. 
 
9.2 Empirical Results 
 
The results from the empirical models in Chapter 8 indicate that there is a clear GDP 
growth gap between Singapore and Malaysia as measured by the growth rates in real 
GDP per capita in USD over the time period examined. There are a number of likely 
factors that are identified in the thesis that may explain these results. This is very 
much explained by the following: 
 
9.2.1 Education and Industry Policy Interaction 
 
In the case of Singapore, a clear relationship was established between investment in 
post-secondary and higher educational institutions and the rate of growth. This is 
linked to the direction and quality of the educational reform process over the period. 
This reform was a by-product of the consistently pro-growth policies of the 
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Singapore government since 1965. Moreover educational policy reforms were 
closely integrated with industrial policy through specific government agencies such 
as the Economic Development Board and others. In turn the domestic educational 
institutions were able to change the emphasis on different levels of education in 
response to industry needs. In contrast Malaysian educational policy was often 
determined by non-economic considerations, particularly after the introduction of the 
New Economic Policy in 1971. While the level of educational spending in Malaysia 
as a proportion of GDP has been consistently higher than that of Singapore, the 
overall results have been disappointing at least in economic terms. Moreover the 
rates of enrolment at the tertiary level have been increasing but are still relatively low 
by international standards. One of the factors impacting on the latter item has been 
the role of educational quotas that have been in place since 1973 as part of the New 
Economic Policy. While these quotas officially ended in 2004, there are still a 
number of key tertiary institutions that maintain them in a de facto sense. 
 
9.2.2 Technical and Vocational Training 
 
A further factor that has been examined in this thesis is the emphasis placed upon 
vocational and technical education in Singapore and Malaysia. With a strong focus 
on the role of polytechnics and institutes of technical education and the development 
of close links to industry for ongoing training opportunities, both onshore and 
offshore, Singapore has a adopted a very clear policy stance. In contrast, industrial 
and technical training in Malaysia has been extremely diverse in terms of coverage. 
Additionally there has been a lack of involvement between policymakers and the 
private sector with regard to the priorities that these policies address. This has been 
demonstrated with an expansion of tertiary education in Malaysia in the 1970s and 
early 1990s which lead to fewer resources being allocated to the primary and 
secondary levels. This is consistent with the results of this thesis whereby the lower 
levels of education were more significant for Malaysian growth. 
 
9.2.3 Educational Remuneration and Staffing 
 
In relation to education policy in both economies, there has been a clear difference in 
terms of the quality of inputs, and particularly teaching staff. In Singapore there has 
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been an explicit policy to attract the best and brightest teaching staff at all levels, and 
reward pay and conditions that apply to other professions in the private sector. 
Conversely, Malaysian education especially at the primary and secondary levels has 
been characterised by relatively poor rates of pay and conditions. These deficiencies 
have led to a lack of qualified teaching staff and a clear divide between urban and 
rural areas in relation to this input. Further, the application quota system at the 
tertiary level since 1973 to staff as well as students has also had an adverse impact 
upon the quality of university education. 
 
9.2.4 English Language Instruction 
 
The Singaporean education system has emphasised the importance of all students 
acquiring competent English language skills since its first education reform phase 
commencing in 1965. This was indeed recognition of the importance of English as 
the global language of business and commerce. While other languages were taught in 
both primary and secondary schools in Singapore, the emphasis on bilingualism was 
eventually made optional. With the levels of foreign investment taking place and 
number of foreign firms establishing operations in Singapore, this educational 
priority was well-timed. However in Malaysia, the emphasis on Malay as not only 
the national language of educational instruction but as a vehicle for achieving 
national unity reduced the role of English within the educational system at all levels, 
In turn it produced tensions and hostility among those minorities whose first 
language was not Malay. As such other schools within the system such as Chinese 
and Tamil institutions were forced to change their curricula. The costs of this 
element of the New Economic Policy may have contributed to the relatively poor 
performance of the Malaysian economy. 
 
9.2.5 Policy-Making Processes 
 
Another factor that must be considered in relation to educational policy and 
outcomes is the actual policy-making process. In Singapore, all policy making has 
been constructed against a backdrop of pro-growth objectives. As part of the 
transformation from a small British colony based on shipping and other maritime 
activities into a sophisticated manufacturing and service-providing economy, key 
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government agencies were actively involved from the outset. Relatively free of 
corruption and usually staffed by highly qualified personnel, these agencies shared 
not only a long-run vision for growth but actively discouraged dissent and 
encouraged collective values. They were less concerned with using re-distributive 
polices but more focused on increasing opportunities for all members of the 
population. This was important as it encouraged all residents to increase their skill 
levels through education. For Malaysia policy making was often ad hoc and 
conducted by a range of interested parties. Specifically with the adoption of the New 
Economic Policy, education policy was assessed not on its ability to achieve certain 
education outcomes and benchmarks but more often than not to reflect the 
aspirations of the Malay or Bumiputra majority. As opposed to explicit growth 
objectives, education policy was viewed as part of the attempt to eradicate poverty 
and to lessen the income and wealth differences between the Bumiputra majority and 
the other ethnic minorities. Some commentators have argued that the latter has been 
a contributing factor to the chaotic and highly diverse industrial training system in 
Malaysia. 
 
9.2.6 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The difference between the two economies in regard to foreign direct investment is 
another factor that must be considered when trying to explain the growth gap. 
Singapore has been consistently and continually welcoming of foreign capital 
inflows, whether in the industrial or service sectors. Given its low tax rates and well-
regarded legal and regulatory frameworks, there has been a continual flow of foreign 
capital into the economy as multinational corporations have established operations in 
the city-state. This has had a strong impact on gross capital formation in Singapore. 
Combined with a free trade philosophy, direct foreign investment has had a positive 
effect on the levels of Singaporean education and skills. These were needed if that 
the Singapore labour force was to efficiently use and exploit new technologies. 
Malaysia has had a mixed record in terms of free capital inflows. It has also 
maintained levels of protection to allow domestic firms to develop in the style of an 
infant-industry model at different times since 1960. In addition it has imposed 
currency and capital controls in order to stop so-called speculation in the domestic 
financial market as was the case during the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997/98. These 
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policies have contributed to lower levels of foreign investment in comparison to 
Singapore. Therefore Malaysian workers have had lower levels of exposure to new 
equipment and new technologies, and so this has held back their potential. 
 
9.2.7 Economic Openness 
 
Singapore has had relatively higher levels of openness compared to Malaysia. This 
differential was manifested in terms of access and exposure to new goods and 
services as well as new technologies that are embodied in imports of capital, plants, 
machinery and equipment. This would also apply to new management techniques 
and systems particularly in the services sector. The gains from trade were in 
Singapore. The associated openness allowed for the development of skills and 
experience as the domestic labour had increased exposure provide to goods and 
services, of both the investment and consumption categories. Greater openness 
provided both the private and public sector with greater incentives to supply higher 
levels of education and training in the vocational, polytechnic and university, both 
on-the-job and off-the job. The results were improved productivity in those sectors 
that were more exposed to global and regional trade, such as manufacturing. The 
available productivity results for Malaysia over this period would suggest that most 
of the productivity increase were due to increased mobilisation of inputs such as 
labour as opposed to new technology and improved labour inputs. 
 
9.2.8 Government Intervention 
 
A further factor that may explain the difference in performance between the two 
economies has been the nature of government intervention across both economies. 
This is the case whether it be in the formation of education policy, industrial policy, 
or labour market policy. Singaporean policy settings have been made with a focus on 
exploiting and improving their comparative advantages so as to achieve higher 
growth. Adopting a so-called market-friendly view, Singapore developed a well-paid 
public-sector technocratic bureaucracy that attracted some of the best and brightest of 
university graduates. This was to facilitate the design of policies that could solve 
particular problems based on quantitative benchmarks. Selective interventions in the 
economy by the government were limited, rather they were explicitly aimed at 
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achieving government targets. At the same time policymakers have been held 
accountable by the judiciary and by the electoral process as well as by internal 
checks and balances. While the Singaporean government was prepared to be 
proactive in using taxation and other policies to attract direct foreign investment, 
they were not prepared to jeopardise overall budget results using these policy 
initiatives. At an operational level these latter polices used clear price incentives to 
efficiently allocate resources In contrast Malaysian policy making varied from one 
five-year planning cycle to another. The motivations for policy changes were often 
unclear and highly influenced by non-economic considerations. Further, the 
Malaysian public sector was often resistant to reform and was unaccountable to the 
general population. Public service pay and conditions, apart from those at the very 
senior levels, were below their counterparts in the private sector, exposing various 
levels of the bureaucracy to corruption allegations. As a result the quality of the 
decision-making processes and the implementation of policy have been regularly  
unsatisfactory and attracted international criticism. This applied to education and 
training policies as well as across other areas of public policy. 
 
9.2.9 The use of Racial and Ethnic Criteria in Policy 
 
A final factor that may have more to say about Malaysia than Singapore has been the 
effects of racial and ethnic considerations. This was especially relevant where policy 
making has been concerned. While Malaysia has been relatively successful in its own 
right in terms of economic development, it has lagged behind Singapore. A recurring 
issue that has affected all policy has been the explicit aim of providing affirmative 
action opportunities to the Malay majority. Commencing with the New Economic 
Policy of 1971, this approach has seen many economic decisions based not on 
efficiency but on racial and ethnic criteria. These applied across a wide range of 
areas from the introduction of Malay as the national language of instruction to the 
application of university entrance quotas favouring Bumiputras in 1973. It also 
impacted on public service employment practices as well as the ownership of 
privatised government agencies during the 1980s and beyond. These attempts at 
redistribution as well as the marginalising of other non-Malay educational 
institutions could be seen as policies that potentially held back both Malaysian 
productivity and growth. In addition these re-distributive policies encouraged both 
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cronyism and corruption at all levels. From an education perspective, policies that 
were needed to efficiently allocate resources to specific levels of education and to 
different areas of the economy were often misplaced and counter-productive. 
 
9.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
As is the case in any dissertation, many difficult decisions have been made in order 
to keep the thesis within manageable proportions. A number of decisions have been 
(both explicitly and implicitly) made in terms of research questions, scope, 
methodology, data items and so forth. As a result, the effects of these decisions may 
be argued as possible limitations of the thesis. 
 
A more useful and constructive approach, however, is to view them as opportunities 
for productive further research. As such some suggestions for future research arising 
from this thesis include: 
 
(a) Construct a measure that represents educational quality for both economies 
and employ that variable in an appropriate empirical model. 
(b) Given the relatively small number of data points used here it would be useful 
to gain more frequent survey data on labour force educational attainment so 
as to expand the range of such research. This could extend to labour force 
educational attainment according to gender and ethnic categories depending 
upon data availability. 
(c) Attempt to collect relevant data for on-the-job training, experience, and 
learning-by-doing for both economies so as to expand our human capital 
measures and proxies. 
(d) Investigate the types of education that apply in both economies so as to see 
what sort of education is more important for growth, for example, 
engineering and mathematics as opposed to law and medicine at the tertiary 
level. The same research could be conducted in the technical and vocational 
educational areas. 
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